THE

ANTI-JACOBIN

Review and Magazine,

&c. &c. &c.

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Ge. Quo in ſtatu ſunt res Gallicæ? *Li.* Sanè turbulento. Magnæ bellorum minæ ſunt, quid mali allaturi ſint hoſtibus, neſcio: certè Galli jam ipſi non dicendis malis affliguntur. *Ge.* Unde proficiſcuntur iſti bellorum tumultus? *Li.* Unde, niſi ex ambitione monarcharum? *Ge.* At horum prudentiâ conveniebat ſedari rerum humanarum tempeſtates. *Li.* Sedant illi quidem, ſed ut Auſter mare. Perſuadent ſibi ſe Deos eſſe, ſuâque causâ Mundum hunc eſſe conditum. *Ge.* Immo princeps reipublicæ gratiâ conſtituitur, non reſpublica Principis causâ. *Li.* Imò non deſunt Theologi, qui frigidum ſuffundant, et ad hos tumultus claſſicum canant. *Ge.* Iſtos ego ſtatuerem in primâ acie. *Li.* At illi ſibi cavent poſt principia.

ERASMI COLLOQUIA, PERCONT. REDUCEM.

ORIGINAL CRITICISM.

Academical Queſtions. By the Right Hon. William Drummond, R.C. F.R.S. F.R.S.E. Author of a Tranſlation of Perſius. Vol. I. 4to. PP. 412. Cadell and Davies.

THE favourable expectations which we were induced to form of the work before us, when its title and author were firſt announced to the public, were greater than we ordinarily indulge; and we acknowledge with pleaſure that the entertainment, no leſs than the inſtruction which we have derived from its peruſal, has borne a fair proportion to what we had largely anticipated. If in ſome fundamental and very important reſpects we have been *diſappointed*, let us not on that account withhold the praiſes which it amply demands, nor ſcatter them "with the thrifty and penurious meaſure of critics by profeſſion." We gladly then contribute our teſtimony of applauſe to the learning, ingenuity, and elegance which the author has diſplayed throughout the whole of this performance. An extenſive acquaintance with the opinions of the beſt metaphyſical writers, both antient

and modern, a rich vein of intereſting and frequently original reſearch, together with copious illuſtration and a command of language at once fluent and preciſe, are the ſignal merits which he is juſtly intitled to claim. We have been inſtructed by him in ſome novelties, corrected in a few errors, and delighted by many an incurſion into the regions of fancy or ſentiment, which have unexpectedly refreſhed our minds when ſinking into wearineſs and perplexity. To the excellencies of his ſtyle a great part of the value of his work is indebted. It is elegant and correct without artifice, poliſhed without the appearance of much labour, and on *moſt* occaſions, where accuracy is required, ſingularly adapted to the intricate reſearches in which it is employed.

Such is our general view of the merits of the "Academical Queſtions." Our readers muſt not expect from us either a minute analyſis, or a comprehenſive inveſtigation of the multifarious topics of diſquiſition which the volume contains. So looſe and various indeed is the order of his metaphyſical inquiries, that the author himſelf has not ventured to furniſh the ordinary aids of an arranged index or table of contents. To purſue his reaſonings through the ſucceſſive paragraphs which compoſe the chapters of his work, would be a boundleſs and ſometimes unedifying taſk. Notwithſtanding our beſt endeavours, therefore, to preſerve the path which the author has choſen, we ſhall be compelled to uſe a more than ordinary privilege of latitude in the ſcope and connection of our remarks; and if apology be neceſſary for ſuch a procedure, we muſt ſhelter ourſelves under the ſame indulgent protection which he himſelf is obliged to ſolicit.

In an elegant and diſcurſive preface, the author ſteps forth to vindicate metaphyſic ſcience from the groundleſs prejudices, the vulgar depreciation, and the preſumptuous calumnies under which it has in theſe days moſt unmeritedly laboured. He combats the different claſſes of its opponents with the ſpirit of a ſcholar, aſſerting the dignity of thoſe purſuits which occupied the ſublime genius of a Plato and an Ariſtotle, a Cicero and a Seneca; whilſt in the varied uſe of his weapons he exhibits the ſkill of a practiſed dialectician. We would gratify our readers by preſenting to them ſome extracts from this preface, did not our limits compel us to haſten to the more important matter of the work itſelf.

The diſappointment (already alluded to) which the peruſal of the firſt chapter ſuggeſted to our minds, and which the ſecond too fully confirmed, we will not attempt either to ſoften or diſguiſe. The doubts reſpecting the object of the work which the title of "Academical Queſtions" at firſt inſpired, had been baniſhed by the ſatisfactory recital of the great purpoſes of metaphyſic ſcience which the preface expreſsly unfolded; and we indulged the high expectation of contemplating the enlargement of its boundaries, on the ſolid ground of legitimate inveſtigation. A ſevere judge, however, might be tempted, in the freedom of criticiſm, to declare, that throughout the greater part of his inquiries, the author has either diſregarded or intentionally relin-

relinquiſhed the means of attaining thoſe truths which conſtitute the *genuine* object of moral reſearch; whilſt purſuing his lofty theme of ſpeculation and counter-ſpeculation through the trackleſs regions of irretrievable doubt, he appears to have diſmiſſed the guide of inductive reaſon, and with it to have reſigned a large ſhare of thoſe pretenſions to the nobler aims of philoſophy which are vaunted with ſo much eloquence in the prefatory remarks. In truth, the frivolous diſputes concerning the diſtinct eſſences of mind and matter, the intrinſic nature of ſubſtance, and the connection ſubſiſting between qualities and their ſuppoſed ſubſtrata, together with a multitude of topics of a ſimilar deſcription, we have ſo long been accuſtomed to conſign to their proper place in the dreams of babbling conjecturers, that we acknowledge ourſelves to have felt no ſmall degree of mortification on finding them revived in a work poſſeſſing ſo many claims to the rank of extraordinary excellence. Nor has it been without painful reluctance that we have traverſed through many an ingenious hypotheſis, and many a recondite ſpeculation, on matters confeſſedly beyond the reach of human inveſtigation.

It is an honour which has been reſerved to the preſent age to have pointed out the true object and legitimate means of metaphyſical diſquiſition, to have recalled the ſpeculative from their reveries, and to have directed the ſagacious obſerver of the phenomena of mind into the genuine path of rational inquiry. What Lord Bacon effected in phyſics, has, in a great meaſure, been accompliſhed in moral ſcience, by writers whoſe names are not unworthy of being aſſociated with that of their illuſtrious predeceſſor. The philoſophy of Reid, however incumbered with difficulties, and liable to fundamental objections, has done more than the writings of any preceding inquirer, in correcting plauſible errors, in ſubduing the ſpirit of hypotheſis, and in reclaiming ſcioliſts from the miſchievous luxury of doubt and fancy, to the patient inveſtigation of *facts* which come under the cognizance of ſenſe, and of *truths* which are revealed by the faculty of conſciouſneſs. But a ſtill more eminent and living writer has effected a ſeverer taſk in aſſigning *limits* to the ſcience itſelf, and *laws* to the boundleſs freedom of inveſtigation. Diſtinguiſhing carefully between the accurate ſcrutiny and faithful hiſtory of the phenomena of intellect as they are preſented to our obſervation, and the ſame hypothetical ſpeculations, concerning their nature or eſſence, or the efficient cauſes by which they are produced, he has aſſigned to the latter their proper character of fruitleſs perplexity, whilſt to the former he has reſtored the noble attributes of genuine philoſophy. Our readers will pardon us for digreſſing into a ſingle quotation from that admirable digeſt of metaphyſic ſcience, "Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind."

"In the writings of ſeveral modern metaphyſicians," its profound author obſerves, "we meet with a variety of important and well aſcertained facts: but in general theſe facts are blended with ſpeculations upon ſubjects placed beyond the reach of the human faculties. It is this mixture of fact and of

hypothesis," he continues, "which has brought the philosophy of mind into some degree of discredit; nor will ever its real value be generally acknowledged, till the distinction I have endeavoured to illustrate be understood and attended to by those who speculate on the subject. By confining their attention to the sensible qualities of body, and to the sensible phenomena it exhibits, we know what discoveries natural philosophers have made; and if the labours of metaphysicians shall ever be rewarded with similar success, it can only be by attentive and patient reflection on the subjects of their own consciousness."

We are compelled to pronounce an opinion unfavourable to the work before us, by classing a great part of it with those writings which "mingle fact with hypothesis," which involve doubt with certainty, and entangle the sublimest truths with the most fanciful errors. But we repeat that we are far from withholding from it the praise of distinguished ingenuity, or of disputing its privilege to be ranked with the most eminent of those works to which we have alluded.

Our views will be illustrated by an examination of the topics which the first chapter comprehends: they are chiefly the following; a disquisition on the nature and essence of mind, definitions of substance, the proper character of power, the unity of intellect, and the causes which regulate its active energies. Through each of these curious and abstract topics of speculation the author ranges without any apparent and with little intrinsic design. He takes an early opportunity however of announcing his opinion with regard to the present state of the science which he undertakes to unfold.

"Modern philosophers," he observes, "have rejected many of the rash surmises of the Greeks. There may, however, be reason to fear, that the spirit of dogmatism is still the same, though it speak by other oracles. In physics it is true," he continues, "the sage precepts of Bacon, and the modest example of Newton, have tended to establish practice and experience in the place of hypothesis and speculation: but in metaphysics the measure for conjecture has not yet been found. Philosophers seem, indeed, to consider this as a field where fancy may range without controul, and where genius having already built a thousand systems can do no harm if it should build a thousand more."

With the statement of these painful and discouraging views respecting the progress of metaphysical inquiry the author appears to rest satisfied, neither labouring to ascertain the real nature of the errors which he exposes, nor attempting to trace them to their proper source. This indifference or omission is detrimental no less to the aim of the writer than to the advancement of the science of which he treats; whilst it constitutes, in truth, the very circumstance to which all the errors and all the visionary wanderings of speculative men are to be ascribed. From the want of clear and distinct views of the appropriate nature of the subjects which they investigate, and being unprovided with definite rules, and a fixed standard of moral evidence, they have roved with impunity indeed, but without benefit, into the paths whither fancy and ingenuity alone have directed them; and secure from

from ſelf-detected fallacies, have abandoned themſelves to the ſports of invention and the follies of ſophiſtry. Whether, in declining the taſk of diſcriminating between the true and falſe methods of philoſophiſing, the author of the Academical Queſtions was actuated by motives of diffidence or diſbelief in the efficacy of ſuch a preliminary ſtep, we are not authorized to decide. But whilſt either motive might furniſh ſome apology for the writer, his readers are not therefore called upon to abate any portion of their zeal in contending for its importance and neceſſity.

We differ from the ingenious author moſt eſſentially when he aſſerts that "the ſpirit of dogmatiſm is the *ſame*" now as it exiſted in the antient ſchools of philoſophy; and we differ from him not leſs decidedly when he aſſumes that "in metaphyſics a meaſure for conjecture has *not yet* been found." It were uncandid to ſuppoſe him not fully aware that the grounds on which metapyhſical ſcience reſts in theſe days, have been totally changed from thoſe which it occupied, when the learning and genius of antiquity were employed in rearing thoſe ſplendid fabrics of philoſophical invention, which, at this day, can be conſidered only as objects of harmleſs admiration; where error and abſurdity are amply atoned for by unparalleled exquiſiteneſs of ingenuity. It may not, however, be preſuming too far to expreſs our doubts whether the author has not ſuffered his mind to be ſeduced by the ſpecious ſhew of claſſical illuſions, to turn aſide from the path of ſober inquiry, and to look with averſion on the arduous taſk which modern writers have daringly begun. Rejecting hypotheſis they have recurred to fact, and have aſpired only to terminate *their inveſtigations* where the ancients commenced their *ſyſtems*. Ceaſing to *dogmatize* they have begun to reaſon, and arguing from what is known to things which are unknown, they have endeavoured to aſcend by patient labour through the progreſſive gradations of probability to the higheſt moral certainty. Quitting the falſe foundations of antient ſophiſtry, the doctrine of univerſals, of ſubſtrata and of eſſences, they have boldly conſigned the ſynthetical explanations of the conſtitution of the mind derived from reaſoning *a priori*, to neglect as ſubjects fitted only for the idle and unprofitable exerciſe of fancy. We do not maintain that they have rejected indiſcriminately all that their predeceſſors have atchieved by the ſublime efforts of their genius, nor that they themſelves have perfected the work which their own ſkill has deſigned. But we are of opinion, that, in genuine importance, in dignity and reſearch, the reſults which they have already attained ſtand unrivalled in the vaſt circle of truths which moral ſcience comprehends. They *have* found, (we repeat) "a meaſure for conjecture," which, though not hitherto brought to the perfection of which it is capable, promiſes, in no long period of time, to afford a ſtandard of philoſophical preciſion, for the regulation of our inquiries. We refer without heſitation to the greater part of the writings of Reid, and to the entire works of Stewart; where the metaphyſician may at the ſame time be inſtructed in the proper objects of his ſcience, and the legitimate means

of their attainment. The profound inveſtigations of the latter eſpecially, have been directed more peculiarly to the eſtabliſhment of the "meaſure" here alluded to, than to any other purpoſe whatever; and the ſucceſs which has crowned his labours, might have drawn from our author a more conſiderable attention to his writings than he appears to have beſtowed upon them.

We wiſh, however, not to be deemed unneceſſarily rigorous in thus explicitly condemning what we conceive to be a fundamental error in the work before us. Its title and general aſpect announce the intention of the author to avoid the conſtruction of dogmas, and the fabrication of ſyſtems. It appears rather to be his deſign to expoſe the futility of former hypotheſes, to make theory ſtruggle againſt theory, and to ſubſtitute doubt for confidence in matters purely ſpeculative. Of the uſe and merit of ſuch deſigns, even when executed with the beſt ability, different opinions may be entertained by men accuſtomed to different habits of mental employment. For our own part we are diſpoſed to eſtimate them by no means below their value; and where they encroach not on the higher department of *ſyſtematic* ſcience, they may be regarded as uſeful and commonly as amuſing auxiliaries. Let it not, however, be preſumed that diſcuſſions concerning the nature and definition of *ſubſtance*, or concerning the reality and abſolute conditions of the intercourſe between mind and matter, are worthy of any high rank in the *liſts* of philoſophy. Such diſputes may, indeed, ſerve to exerciſe the ſkill of the learned, and to confound the weakneſs of the vulgar; but they groſsly miſapprehend the proper objects of moral ſcience, who beſtow any conſiderable value on inquiries which extend thus far beyond the poſſible reach of human faculties—we dwell no longer on this part of our ſubject.

The following diſquiſition on the nature of power is extracted at large.

"Before accounting for all mental phenomena by ſuppoſing the exiſtence of a number of intellectual faculties, it might have been, perhaps, worthy of philoſophical accuracy, to have examined and to have explained (if it could have been done) the nature of power. Is power a cauſe or an effect? Philoſophers do not appear to have decided this queſtion. Sometimes they ſpeak of power, as if it were the principle which had occaſioned all things, and by which the univerſe itſelf was produced; at other times they ſeem to conſider it as having reſulted from ſome being already exiſting; nor do they inform us, in what way they underſtand how any thing can exiſt, without the previous exertion of power. Is it poſſible to reconcile theſe different opinions? Power cannot be at once the principle and the attribute of being. It cannot be both the conſequence and the origin of exiſting ſubſtances, that by which all things were cauſed, and yet that which ſomething was neceſſary to cauſe.

"If we conſider power as the cauſe, by which we are ultimately to account for all effects, we muſt acknowledge that it is itſelf a boundary which we cannot paſs—a principle before which nothing can be placed. Where there are ſeparate powers then, there are ſeparate principles, and a principle is that which being derived of nothing can hold of nothing. 'Principio

cipio

cipio autem nulla eſt origo,' ſays Cicero, 'nam ex principio oriuntur omnia; ipſum autem nullâ ex re; nec enim id eſſet principium quod gigneretur aliunde.'

"According to this manner of conſidering power it is abſolutely contradictory to maintain the unity of the mind, and yet to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of diſtinct intellectual faculties or powers. If the primary cauſe in one ſeries, be different from the primary cauſe in another, we cannot refer both theſe ſeries to the ſame principle. If we trace an action to the will, a recollection to the memory, or a judgment to the underſtanding, how ſhall we pretend that there is yet a more remote principle? By what inference ſhall we conclude that the power of imagination is derived from any thing elſe; or that the faculty of comprehenſion is the delegate of any ſuperior intelligence? All theſe ſeparate powers are primary cauſes; at leaſt they are ſo to our underſtandings, if we can trace only to them any ſeries of cauſes and effects. To ſay then that power is a primary or creative cauſe, is to admit that it is a principle, and in admitting it to be a principle we muſt conclude againſt the unity of the human ſoul, while we continue to inſiſt upon the exiſtence of diſtinct mental powers.

"Other philoſophers are pleaſed to conſider power as an attribute of ſubſtance. Where there is no ſubſtance, ſays Newton, there is no power, and yet this great philoſopher has himſelf ſaid, 'quid ſit rei alicujus ſubſtantia minime cognoſcimus.' All power, according to Doctor Price, is the power of ſomething. According to theſe writers, then, to predicate the exiſtence of power, is to predicate the exiſtence of ſubſtance." Pp. 5, 6.

There is, doubtleſs, conſiderable acuteneſs in the ſucceſſive but unconnected and eluſory poſitions ſtated in the foregoing extracts. The author inquires, "is power a cauſe or an effect?" and whilſt the reader is expecting to be favoured with a ſolution, or at leaſt a further illuſtration of the ſcope of the queſtion itſelf, he is at once hurried into the very midſt of the controverſy reſpecting primary cauſation, and is afterwards dragged into the leſs important diſpute concerning the unity of intellect; the original inquiry being in the mean time left in ſuſpence. To us it appears that there is a palpable ambiguity in the terms of the author's propoſition. So various, in truth, are the ſenſes in which the word *power* is uſed (from the poverty of our language in this particular), that previous to any inquiry of the nature here propoſed, a definite ſignification, or at leaſt a ſtatement of the topics to which it is deſigned to relate, ought to be carefully expreſſed. Nor does it appear to us to be matter of any great moment in what way the queſtion propoſed by the author be decided; as it is highly probable that any difference of opinion that might ſubſiſt reſpecting it, may be derived intirely from the imperfection and the ambiguities of language; from which circumſtances the term *power* is aſſociated with others involving the notion, ſometimes of cauſation and ſometimes of effect. Why, it may be aſked, (on our author's principle of inquiry) may not power be delegated? and why, alſo, may not power be deemed capable of begetting power? Upon either of theſe ſuppoſitions, power muſt be denominated both cauſe and effect. But on ſuch

ſchemes of ſpeculation whither is inquiry to be carried, and where are our reaſonings to terminate?

Let us conſider for a moment, what conſtitutes the proper character of power, as it relates to the faculties of the mind.

"If," ſays our author, "we conſider power as the cauſe by which we are ultimately to account for all effects, we muſt acknowledge that it is itſelf a boundary which we cannot paſs, a principle before which nothing can be placed. Where there are ſeparate powers, then there are ſeparate principles; and a principle is that which being derived from nothing, can hold of nothing."

Now it is apparent that in the preceding part of this paragraph the author uſes the term power in its perfect and abſtract ſenſe; whereas in the latter part, (which is expreſsly intended to refer to the mind) an idea of its popular and appropriate ſignification is indiſcriminately involved with the original meaning. The conſequence of this confuſion is, that the ſyllogiſm is inefficient, and the author has proved nothing. Power in its primary and abſtract ſenſe, we apprehend, has never been divided or ſeparated by any writer of ordinary diſcrimination; its definition places it at once beyond the reach of partition. But when uſed in its popular ſignification, that is, when deſignated according to its reſults, the diviſion and even claſſification of its properties, is an obvious contrivance ſuggeſted by the convenience of ſuch diſtinctions. Whether there exiſt ſuch a principle as power in the abſtract, may reaſonably be queſtioned: but it were the height of folly and preſumption to contend about a matter ſo entirely removed from the province of human reſearch. The *term* power, when accurately defined, may nevertheleſs be uſed with ſafety and advantage in our reaſonings concerning the nature of mind; as it may be applied alike to the various phenomena, which we conſider as its *particular* reſults. It is at the ſame time acknowledged to be almoſt demonſtrable, that we are incapable of forming any ideas correſponding to abſtract terms; they are the creatures of language, and the artificial inſtruments of reaſon. Power *may* be a principle which manifeſts itſelf by various and diſtinct agency; its nature *may* be uniform, and its ſigns various. But it is of theſe ſigns or phenomena only that we can form our conceptions, and from them alone that we can derive definite concluſions.

The foregoing obſervations apply with entire force to our author's diſcuſſion of the queſtion reſpecting the unity of intellect. Admitting, indeed, that we have ſhewn the unſoundneſs of his reaſoning, it follows that the hypotheſis to which it refers, if it be the true one, is not demonſtrated to be ſo, by the proceſs which he has adopted. A far more obvious and ſatisfactory ſtatement of the ſubject in queſtion might be derived from this conſideration, that, as we have no direct evidence of the *ſeparate* exiſtence of the mental faculties, there is no reaſon for doubting the unity of the mind; and further, as even the

ſuppoſition

ſuppoſition of ſuch diſtinct exiſtences would not contribute any aid to the progreſs of uſeful inquiry, it would ſeem adviſeable to baniſh it even from hypotheſis. The actual phenomena of mind, as preſented to our conſciouſneſs, are indiſputable facts, which muſt remain the ſame in their nature whether we refer them to a variety of powers, or to one undivided faculty of ſenſation and intelligence. The ſubdiviſion and appropriate appellation of theſe ſuppoſed powers, are therefore to be aſcribed ſolely to the artificial uſages of language.

The author next enters on the interminable diſcuſſion concerning the exiſtence and nature of *ſubſtance.*

"What," he inquires, "is the ſubſtance of the ſoul? if reaſon, perception, underſtanding, volition, memory, and imagination be powers of the ſoul, what is the ſoul itſelf? If it be anſwered," he continues, "that the ſoul is *that in which all theſe powers inhere*, and that ſubſtance can be deſcribed in no other way, than as *that in which certain qualities exiſt*, I aſk if it be not evident that all diſtinction muſt be made, not between things but between their qualities. Material ſubſtance conſidered as ſubſtance could not be diſtinguiſhed from ſpiritual ſubſtance; and we could not aſſert, that the ſubſtance of the Deity is different from that of the world which he has created. The Theiſt will not probably chooſe to come to this concluſion; and will therefore rather ſay, that the qualities are determined by the nature of the thing, than that the thing is determined by the nature of the qualities."

Now we apprehend that moſt of our author's readers on peruſing the foregoing paragraph, will exclaim, that he has needleſsly involved an undeniable, and by no means novel truth, in doubt and uncertainty. Were we aſked, what is ſubſtance? we ſhould reply, without heſitation, that it is an abſtract term in language to which there is no correſpondent conception in the mind; it is uſed to ſignify *that* of the nature and even exiſtence of which we are unable to affirm any thing, and of which, therefore, we cannot be ſaid to have any appropriate idea. Nevertheleſs, as many things may exiſt, nay, as we are aſſured that many things do exiſt, of which we can form no adequate (and, therefore, perhaps no *real*) conception whatever, it is clear, that we are not authorized to deny either the exiſtence or the diſtinct natures of material and ſpiritual ſubſtance. If, then, the term ſubſtance be uſed at all by metaphyſical writers, it *is* properly defined as *that in which certain qualities exiſt*; and in the ſame manner the ſubſtance of the ſoul is correctly defined as *that in which all its powers or qualities inhere.* There is no reaſon why the Theiſt ſhould object to the aſſertion, that we are not competent to affirm of the Deity, *that his ſubſtance is different from that of the world which he has created*, ſince ſuch an acknowledgment by no means tends to eſtabliſh even their ſimilitude, but is only a corollary from the more comprehenſive truth, that we are utterly ignorant of the nature of all ſubſtance whatever. The author would have proceeded more philoſophically had he argued more ſimply, and endeavoured to diſentangle inſtead of involving *truth* with *hypotheſis.*—Reverting to his former theme, the origin of power, he continues, "if power have reſulted from ſubſtance, it is evident that ſubſtance

ſtance had the prior exiſtence. Power only exiſts when action is begun; and God was before he acted." Let us examine (if it be intelligible) the meaning of this extraordinary poſition. In the firſt clauſe power (a principle or a term which our author has not defined) is hypothetically derived from *that* of the very exiſtence of which he has almoſt explicitly informed us there is not a ſhadow of evidence. In the ſecond clauſe a very diſputable attribute is affirmed of this undefined ſomething, denominated power; whilſt in the adjunct, viz. the aſſertion that "God was *before* he acted," two things are involved, viz. duration of time, and infinity of capacity, to neither of which has it been, or, perhaps, can it be demonſtrated, that we are able to affix a diſtinct idea. If this expoſition of our author's ſyllogiſm be correct, we need not detain our readers by offering a formal demonſtration of its fallacy, and, if it be not correct, we confeſs ourſelves incapable of unravelling the enigma. Little aware, however, of the inexplicable myſtery in which he has involved the preceding dogma, the author proceeds:

"In the ſame manner we may reaſon concerning the human mind. The diſtinction which we make between the attributes of the ſoul and the body would not prove the difference between the mental and material ſubſtances. The ſoul muſt alſo have been before its faculties. We are therefore under the neceſſity of admitting, that if there be any ſpiritual ſubſtance within us, it is not properly deſcribed as that in which certain qualities are contained."

Now to all this we object, that there is no proof, or ground of preſumption, that the ſoul *was*, before its faculties; and that, even admitting the fact to be ſo, we are unable to ſee by what ſort of connection, or inference, the ſucceeding aſſertion is maintained. Of this difficulty the author himſelf appears to have been ſenſible, by bringing to its ſupport the following additional arguments; "firſt," he declares, "becauſe this definition would not enable us to diſtinguiſh this ſubſtance as ſubſtance from any other; and, ſecondly, becauſe it is ſhewn that the ſubſtance has an exiſtence prior to the qualities which reſult from it." The latter poſition, it is clear, has not been "*ſhewn*," but *aſſumed*, and the former reaſon is merely a ſtatement, in other terms, that we are abſolutely ignorant of the nature of ſubſtance; a ſtatement indiſputably true indeed, but in no way interfering with the proper *definition* of an abſtract term. The diffuſe and undiſciplined method which the author has adopted in diſcuſſing theſe intricate matters, has unqueſtionably led him into ſome errors and inconſiſtencies; and he appears to have been altogether unaware of the diſtinction between the deſcription of a poſitive idea or conception of the mind, and the definition of an arbitrary and conventional term;—ſuch a diſtinction, however, is eſſentially connected with every department of metaphyſical diſquiſition.

In the following reaſoning the accurate obſerver will detect the ſame want of philoſophical aim, and the like indiſtinctneſs in the author's views

views of the proper objects of ſcientific reſearch, which we have already had occaſion to point out.

" When we are told," ſays he, " that intellectual faculties inhere in an immaterial ſoul, we ought to enquire what ſenſe can be affixed to the poſitive aſſertion. We underſtand, or we believe we underſtand, what is meant by corporeal ſubſtance, and we are accuſtomed to ſpeak of certain qualities which are inherent in matter. Extenſion is attributed to material ſubſtances, and, it ſeems poſſible, therefore, at firſt ſight, to ſpeak of things inherent in them, without offering any violence to language; but, where there is not extenſion, it is difficult to admit the analogy, or to comprehend how the material qualities inhere in the ſpiritual ſoul. May it not, however, be aſked how material ſubſtance itſelf can be deſcribed, as that in which certain qualities inhere, for, in order to do this, we muſt firſt ſuppoſe the quality of extenſion. Where nothing is extended (it is univerſally admitted, when we ſpeak of the material world) nothing can be inherent, nor contained in another. How then, I aſk, can we allow it to be a definition of material ſubſtance, when we are told, that it is *that* in which certain qualities are inherent, ſince we are *obliged* to preſuppoſe one of theſe qualities, namely, extenſion, in order to aſſume, that this material ſubſtance is capable of containing that very quality itſelf."

Now, pleaſing and appropriate as may appear the veil of academic doubt, when thrown with judgment over matters neceſſarily uncertain; we, yet, cannot profane our admiration of that claſſic garb, by reſpecting it when employed to conceal the deformities of error, or to ſhelter the nakedneſs of contradiction. When the author aſſerts, with equivocal reſerve, that " we underſtand, *or we believe, we underſtand*, what is meant by corporeal ſubſtance" (that is, its *ſpecific nature*), he aſſerts what no man accuſtomed to metaphyſical inquiry, ever, yet, acknowledged, and what we believe, the moſt vulgar of quibblers never affirmed. The reſource to which he then applies, is equally ſtrange and futile. " Extenſion" he declares " is attributed to material ſubſtances; and it *ſeems poſſible*, therefore, *at firſt ſight*, to ſpeak of things inherent in them, *without offering any violence to language*. But where there is not extenſion, it is difficult to admit the analogy, or to comprehend *how* the immaterial qualities inhere in the ſpiritual ſoul." Thus we paſs at once, from the diſcuſſion of the fact, whether or not, qualities do inhere in ſubſtance, to the queſtion *how* this inherence takes place; and by a tranſition equally violent, but infinitely more detrimental to the cauſe of legitimate reaſoning, we are hurried, from what *ſeems poſſible, at firſt ſight, to be expreſſed, without offering any violence to language*, to an inference, that becauſe analogy fails, the queſtion is, therefore, ſunk into deeper perplexity. " May it not, however, be aſked" continues our author, " how material ſubſtance itſelf can be deſcribed, as that, in which certain qualities inhere, for, in order to do this, we muſt firſt ſuppoſe the quality of extenſion." A more needleſs ſuppoſition, or a more extraordinary aſſumption, we do not recollect to have encountered in the wildeſt dreams of the moſt inveterate theoriſt. How the author has brought himſelf to conſider the *quality* of extenſion, to be in the remoteſt degree

gree eſſential to the ſuppoſed inherence of other *qualities*, in what is termed ſubſtance, we are truly at a loſs to conceive, without concluding that he has ſuffered himſelf to be impoſed upon, by a palpable error ſpringing from the groſſeſt analogy. The paſſage ſtands alone in the character of unqualified fallacy; and, is ſo diſtinctly marked from the luminous reaſoning, and profound reſearch, which the author elſewhere diſplays, that our attention was unavoidably attracted by it.

"We are impelled to action," ſays our author, at the concluſion of his firſt chapter "or we deſiſt from it, as we are conſtrained by the ſtronger motive. Our paſſions are not the children of our choice. We neither feel, nor ceaſe to feel, according to any ſuppoſed power of the will. What, indeed, is the will, but the ſentiment of deſire which prevails in our minds."

The queſtion reſpecting the influence of the *will* over the actions of men, is treated by the author in another part of his work, in the moſt able and philoſophical manner; and we reſerve to our inveſtigation of that part, the obſervations which we may have to offer on this difficult and diſputed ſubject. In the mean time we may acknowledge, with a ſlight qualification, our aſſent to the truth of the foregoing ſpeculations. *Volition*, as a faculty the exerciſe of which is independent of motive, has been rejected from all recent ſyſtems of philoſophy. When we are told, however, that it conſiſts only in the ſentiment of deſire, which prevails in our minds, we have, in fact, little more than a ſubſtitution of ſynominous terms. Were volition, on the other hand, to be defined the predominating and active influence of the ſtronger motive, the denial of its exiſtence as an independent principle of the mind, would be involved in the definition, and even the term itſelf might thus be ſhewn, to be ſuperfluous in metaphyſical language. Had the author, then, carried his reaſonings to this concluſion, their merit would have been enhanced; ſince the inference may be fairly deduced from the premiſes which he adopts.

The author proceeds to the following obſervations, as legitimate corollaries from his previous inveſtigations:

"Moral writers have in vain declaimed upon the government of the paſſions, where they have failed to *ſhew*, that it is *only one ſentiment which can ſubdue another* in the human breaſt. If you wiſh to make men virtuous, endeavour to inſpire into them the love of virtue. Shew them the beauty of order, and the fitneſs of things. Seek to elevate the mind to the contemplation of divine perfection, in which alone is aſſembled, whatever is moſt excellent in intellectual nature. Repreſent vice, as indignant virtue always will repreſent it, as hideous, loathſome, and deformed. But do not hope that your precepts can avail you, if you forget, that *will cannot be changed while ſentiment remains unaltered.* There is no power by which men can create, or deſtroy their feelings. *Senſation alone, overcomes ſenſation.* Belief cannot be forced, nor can conviction be coerced; and, when one ſentiment effaces another in the human mind, the change cannot be aſcribed to any thing elſe than to the prevailing ſentiment itſelf."

We

We do not purpoſe, in this place, to enter at large on an examination of the principle adopted in the foregoing reaſoning; but ſhall reſerve our remarks upon this part of the ſubject, for the opportunity to which we have juſt alluded. We cannot, however, ſuffer the bold and unqualified aſſertions, comprehended in it, to paſs without ſome animadverſion. It could hardly have been the intention of the author, to deny the habitual or even occaſional controul of reaſon (in the ſtricteſt philoſophical acceptation of the term) over the paſſions, and thus to leave the mind "without chart or compaſs" the ſport of every varying *ſentiment.* If ſuch be his deſign, how different from the ſublime views of the ancient maſters of philoſophy! or the ſagacious maxims of their illuſtrious ſucceſſors! In truth, no extenſive acquaintance with moral ſcience is required to demonſtrate its inconſiſtency; the facts which diſprove it, are daily and hourly obtruded, not only on the obſervation, but on the conciousneſs, of every individual. Until theſe mighty opponents of lawleſs ſpeculation are ſilenced, we cannot ſubſcribe to the opinion, that in the purſuit of virtue, paſſion is required to countervail paſſion, and impulſe to overcome impulſe. The minds of men who have engaged in the cultivation of virtuous habits, may, indeed, become gradually leſs and leſs ſubject to the inroad of *ſentiments* hoſtile to virtue; but in the diſcipline which precedes this fortified condition, it is well known by every one, that paſſion and impulſe are oppoſed by calm and deliberate reſolution, that the maſtery over them is obtained, not by violence, but by perſeverance, not by occaſional diſruptions, but by ſteady and ſober determination. A more erroneous, or perilous principle of conduct can hardly be conceived, than that which renders the practice of virtue dependent, chiefly on the exquiſiteneſs of moral feeling. Few, indeed, is the number of thoſe who are capable of reliſhing the *beauty of order,* or delighting in the *fitneſs of things,* whoſe minds can be elevated to an adequate *contemplation of divine perfection,* or whoſe averſion from vice in all its gay and alluring forms, is ſufficiently intenſe to paint it to their minds invariably, as *loathſome, hideous, and deformed.* Few, we repeat, even of cultivated underſtandings, cheriſhed in the tranquility of retirement, are capable of preſerving without decay the energy of ſuch ſentiments. Were the great maſs of mankind to indulge the idea of leaving the evil propenſities of their nature to the precarious controul of their appetite for good, melancholy indeed would be the conſequence to the intereſts of virtue!

The truth is, that the hypotheſis is equally liable to vulgar and to philoſophical objections; it is derived from a miſapprehenſion of the original conſtitution of the mind. The ſentiment which accompanies action, and which ſome metaphyſicians have denominated volition, others motive, and a third claſs, deſire, is eſſentially different in its nature from the ſimpler qualities, or conditions of the mind, which are uſually termed paſſions. Thus, anger, love, diſdain, are conditions of the mind, the exiſtence of which is independent of the preſence of any other rational or active faculty. They are ſelf-ſuſtained,

and

and ſubject to no alteration in their intrinſic nature, by any other power of the mind. They may, however, be blended with each other, ſo as to produce a reſult different from that which proceeds from them when acting individually and ſucceſſively.—On the other hand, that principle of action which has been termed volition may be the reſult of the combined influence of reaſon and feeling, the concluſion from compariſon and judgment, from retroſpective and proſpective obſervation. Though complex in its nature, it may with propriety be ſaid to be ſimple in its operative power; it may be calm and deliberate, or violent and overbearing; but its violence is ſeldom proportioned to the countervailing force of oppoſing motives, nor is its gentleneſs always overcome by the ſtrength of adverſe propenſities. To maintain, therefore, that paſſion is required to controul paſſion, and impulſe to counteract impulſe, is to preſuppoſe a capacity of counteraction in theſe agents; an hypotheſis not leſs groundleſs in its origin than it is pernicious in its tendencies.

The ſecond chapter, opens with a brief diſcuſſion of the ideal theory, and the doctrine of external exiſtences.

"It is unneceſſary for me," ſays the author "to repeat the arguments by which Locke, and other celebrated writers have proved, that the ſenſible qualities of matter exiſt only as they are perceived. They muſt be ignorant of the firſt principles of philoſophy, to whom it is requiſite to ſhew that ſenſation can alone be found in ſentient beings. Let us examine, what are, and in what conſiſt the changes which we really perceive, when we ſay, that a piece of wax is melted by heat. In its firſt ſtate the piece of wax amounts to a complex idea, compounded of a certain number of ſimple ideas, ſuch as figure, colour, ſmoothneſs, hardneſs, and a certain temperature not equal to heat. In its ſecond ſtate, the complex idea of the wax is no longer the ſame, but partakes, both of heat and fluidity. We have in each inſtance two diſtinct complex ideas, becauſe all the component ſimple ideas are not the ſame. We are ſenſible of hardneſs in the firſt, and of fluidity and heat in the ſecond; but the change has taken place in our own feelings, and it would be *absurd* to ſay, that a difference in our ſenſations is a difference in an external object."

Thus far our opinions coincide eſſentially with thoſe of the author; although there is room for objection againſt the mode in which he has ſtated them. He proceeds:

"When we deſire to analyſe what any thing is, which we denominate an external object, we always find that it may be reſolved into certain ſenſible qualities. If I be deſired to explain what I perceive when I examine a fine marble ſtatue, I can only repeat the catalogue of my own feelings. I ſay that I am ſenſible of the whiteneſs of the ſtone, of the beauty of the form, and of the juſtneſs of the proportions, that I feel hardneſs and ſmoothneſs; and that I judge differently of its magnitude, while I obſerve that magnitude under different viſual angles. Thus, then, inſtead of deſcribing the external ſtatue, I am in fact expreſſing my own ſentiments, ſtating my own feelings, declaring my own judgments and detailing preceptions, which exiſt only in my mind. The active and paſſive ſtate of external objects, are determined by changes which take place in their ſenſible qualities.

qualities. But what are theſe qualities of external objects, unleſs they be ſenſations in our own minds, which we have attributed to things ſuppoſed to exiſt around us? We cannot define nor deſcribe what we neither feel nor perceive. Nothing can be felt nor perceived where it is not. The changes which exiſt in our own feelings, and in our own perceptions, muſt be *erroneously* ſtated to have had place in remote and exterior objects."

There is a ſingular obſcurity, and even queſtionable ambiguity, in the manner which the author has adopted in the foregoing ſtatement of a much controverted ſubject. In one clauſe he labours to eſtabliſh the identical propoſition, that percipients alone can perceive; in another, he makes his readers aware that ideas exiſt only in the mind; and in a third he inſinuates cautiouſly, but dogmatically, that the notion of external exiſtences is an *error* and an *abſurdity*, whilſt, at the ſame time he is compelled, in the courſe of his own deſcription of intellectual conception, to refer at almoſt every ſtep, to ſuch a notion, as to an acknowledged truth. Now, although we might accord with our author, that "it would be abſurd to ſay, that a difference in our ſenſations *is* a difference in an external object," that is, to affirm that theſe two eſſentially diſtinct propoſitions are one and the ſame; yet we are far from maintaining it to be *impoſſible*, or even *improbable*, that they may not ſtand towards each other in the intimate relation of cauſe and conſequence. In the ſame manner we object to the obvious influence which may be drawn from the ſentence which cloſes the preceding quotation. "The changes" ſays the author "which exiſt in our own feelings, and in our own perceptions, muſt be erroneouſly ſtated to have had place in remote and exterior objects." If the writer mean to aſſert that the changes taking place in theſe different circumſtances are not, or cannot be, identical, we apprehend that he will meet with few opponents to ſo ſelf evident a poſition. If, however, in this concluding ſtatement of the reſult from the foregoing arguments, he deſigned to have it underſtood, as his opinion, that the changes which exiſt in our own perceptions are *erroneouſly* conceived, to be accompanied by correſponding changes in remote and exterior objects, we maintain that he affirms that of which there is not a ſhadow of direct evidence. The truth is, that the queſtion reſpecting external *exiſtences*, no leſs than the difficulty reſpecting the *mode* of communication (were the fact admitted) between the material and the intellectual world, muſt from the very conſtitution of our minds remain to all eternity an inexplicable myſtery. Our doubts and perplexities about it, may, indeed, be dreſſed in new ſhapes, and aſſume an infinite diverſity of aſpects; but the fact remains unaltered; and *they* evince the juſteſt principles of philoſophy, who exhibit the fact in its genuine form, and relinquiſh at once the preſumptuous and unavailing taſk of combating its difficulties. We are again and again compelled to cenſure, in terms of unqualified reprobation, the unpardonable error of indulging in the purſuit of ſuch viſionary trifles.

The author aſſerts that "we cannot define or deſcribe, what we neither feel nor perceive," and we are not diſpoſed to deny the truth of

of his poſition; but to the ſentence which ſucceeds, we have one material objection to offer. "Nothing," he declares "can be felt or perceived, where *it* is not." Does the pronoun *it*, refer to the *thing* or to the perception? According to the ordinary conſtruction of language, the reference is to the object perceived; and, if this be true of the preceding clauſe, the aſſertion involved is without adequate proof, or ſupport. What may be the *conditions* of the ſuppoſed intercourſe between mind and matter, we are utterly ignorant; nor is it at all more *certain*, that preſence, contact, or any other plauſible circumſtance (ſuggeſted by analogy from the material world) is more requiſite for perception, than the moſt fanciful and irrelative condition that can be conceived.

The following paſſage comprehends the ſcope of the author's views, concerning the doctrine of active and paſſive faculties.

"The doctrine of paſſive mental power is one of the moſt ſingular among the fallacies, which deceived the excellent judgment of Locke. A common reaſoner may be permitted to think, that the obſcure paſſage is nothing leſs than a contradiction in terms. If there be always a power by which the mind perceives, power muſt be exerciſed, when the mind does perceive. Now the exerciſe of a power implies preciſely that, which is commonly called an action. Provided that there be any ſuch ſtates as active and paſſive, it ſeems evident that the mind muſt be paſſive when it is percipient. *There can be no doubt*, indeed, that this *muſt* be the caſe if the ſoul receive impreſſions from external objects. But we need only appeal to experience, in order to be convinced, that all original ſenſations, and all immediate perceptions exiſt in our minds independently of the will, *without any agency of intellect*, and without the exertion of that power, which philoſophers have termed paſſive."

There are much confuſion and uncertainty, both in the language and in the argument of the preceding diſquiſition; and in one place (which we have marked by italics) the author appears to have involved himſelf in a contradiction of hypotheſes.

Admitting the unity of mind, on the ground of there being no *direct* evidence of the ſeparate exiſtences of diſtinct faculties, the queſtion which is here agitated, reſolves itſelf in ſtrict propriety into an inquiry reſpecting times and occaſions, viz. is the mind *ſometimes* active and *ſometimes* paſſive? or is its condition uniform during the intellectual changes and operations which are obſerved to take place? Now, as our acquaintance with mind extends only to the operations which are attributed to it, and as our knowledge of theſe operations conſiſts merely in the obſervation of their reſults, it follows, that concerning theſe *reſults*, and them only, are we capable of reaſoning, or even of forming any diſtinct conception. In what terms, then, ſhall we ſpeak of the feeble and miſtaken efforts to penetrate the veil of irremediable obſcurity, or of the viſionary wanderings through unmeaſured ſpace, of which the foregoing diſquiſition is an example: ſuch purſuits, let it be obſerved, once for all, are unworthy of the philoſopher, baneful to the intereſts of ſcience, and ſubverſive of the fundamental

fundamental principles of moral inquiry.—To reſume the ſubject in queſtion, we are of opinion, that ſince it is concerning the actual phenomena of the mind, alone, that we can argue rationally, it ought to be the buſineſs of metaphyſicians to inveſtigate their peculiar properties and relations. Now, there are, evidently, two diſtinct claſſes of mental operations (to adopt the common language on the ſubject) which philoſophers have uſually diſtinguiſhed by the terms *active* and *paſſive*, and which are too familiarly known, to require an explanation of them in this limited inveſtigation. The *terms*, therefore, being once defined, and the ſubjects to which they are applied, being fairly ſtated, the whole queſtion amounts to this, are we warranted, by philoſophical accuracy, in the general uſe of them? In ſupport of the affirmative, let it obſerved, that the indiſputable importance of a proper claſſification of the phenomena of mind authoriſes the employment of *ſome* terms of diſtinction; whilſt analogy, often an erroneous, but ſometimes an indiſpenſible, guide, leads us to the adoption of thoſe terms, which are now univerſally received. It might, indeed, be objected, that there is a fallacy in the very analogy which is aſſumed; for we are, in truth, no more authoriſed to aſcribe (for example) a paſſive *quality* to the wax which receives an impreſſion from any ſolid body applied to it, with a certain force, than we are in aſcribing an active or paſſive quality to the mind when it receives impreſſions without the exertion of will. Our knowledge extends only to the fact, that each of them is liable, in its own way, to what we call impreſſions; but of the intrinſic nature of that capacity by which ſuch impreſſions are received we know abſolutely nothing. *Active* and *paſſive*, then, are mere arbitrary terms of claſſification; and it is altogether a vulgar error to imagine, that any correlative quality in the objects to which they are applied, is cognizable to our obſervation. They who diſpute, therefore, about the abſolute exiſtence, or nonentity of paſſive faculties, miſtake a fundamental diſtinction in the genuine object of moral inquiry; whilſt thoſe, on the other hand, who would argue for the rejection of the terms altogether, proceed on principles hoſtile to the beſt methods of ſcientific reſearch.

Let us apply the foregoing obſervations to the ſubject in queſtion, and ſee how far philoſophy is likely to be benefited by rejecting the term *paſſive*, when deſcribing certain operations of the mind. "If there be always," ſays the author, "a power by which the mind perceives, power muſt be exerciſed when the mind does perceive. Now the exerciſe of a power implies preciſely that which is commonly called an action." The author has here furniſhed a caſe, in which, what is uſually termed the paſſive faculty is employed, viz.—ſimple perception; and he wiſhes to fix upon it the eſſential character of *activity*. A very ſimple proceſs may ſerve to ſhew the fallacy of his poſition. If, inſtead of the term *exerciſe*, we uſe the term *affection*, which, as bearing a more general ſignification, and not involving a *preſuppoſed* condition of activity, muſt be allowed to be more philoſophically correct, the clauſe might then ſtand thus: if there be always a power by which the mind perceives, that power muſt be *affec-*

ted (in ſome mode or other) when the mind does perceive. Now the *affection* of a power, may, or may not imply its own *active* agency—Again; let the following ſentence be examined. "But we need only appeal to experience in order to be convinced, that all original ſenſations, and all immediate perceptions exiſt in our minds independently of the will, without any agency of intellect, and without the exertion of that power which philoſophers have called paſſive." Now, beſides that this paſſage appears to us to contain within itſelf a contradiction of hypotheſis, the error which is committed in the laſt clauſe is of the ſame nature, and equally palpable, as that which has juſt now been expoſed. By a figure of ſpeech, not leſs convenient to the writer, than perplexing to the reader, the author has ingeniouſly contrived to involve the concluſion in the premiſes of his ſtatement. Let the term *uſe*, or *intervention*, be ſubſtituted (for the ſame reaſons as we have before explained) inſtead of *exertion*, and the purpoſe of the ſentence is entirely changed, and the influence rendered nugatory. From the failure, then, of theſe efforts, ſubtle as they might appear, to expoſe the futility of aſcribing a paſſive faculty to the mind, is it not reaſonable to maintain the juſtice and propriety of ſo long acknowledged a diſtinction?

In the third chapter our author treats of the reality of external exiſtences; and enters upon an examination of the opinions of different philoſophers with regard to that ſubject. He attempts to refute the notions of Locke in the following terms.

"It is obſerved by Locke, that *ſenſation convinces us that there are ſolid and extended ſubſtances*. I ſhall examine, in this chapter, the truth of Locke's aſſertion, and ſhall likewiſe endeavour to ſhew that it cannot be admitted upon the principles of his own ſyſtem. We are informed by this philoſopher, that all our knowledge, and all our thoughts may be traced to ſimple and reflex ideas. By ideas in general, he tells us he means whatſoever are the objects of the underſtanding. If we be acquainted with the cauſes of ideas, and with ſubſtances which excite ſenſations, ſimple and reflex ideas are not the *ſources* to which we may trace all our thoughts, nor are ideas the only objects of underſtanding: for *firſt*, as the cauſe is prior to the effect, ſo if we can tell what excites ſimple ideas, theſe cannot be the *ſources* of our knowledge: and *ſecondly*, if the mind be ſuſceptible of diſcerning external ſubſtances, ideas cannot be ſaid to be the *only* objects of intellect. To maintain, then, that we can be convinced by ſenſation of the exiſtence of ſolid and extended ſubſtances, is to contradict two principles which Locke himſelf has eſtabliſhed."

To the firſt argument which our author adduces againſt Mr. Locke's hypotheſis, we object, that he has entirely miſtaken the purpoſe of that philoſopher in the uſe of the term *ſource*; the meaning of which is not *primary cauſe*, but ſpecific and appropriate *origin*. Thus, when we inquire (for example), whence is the ſource of any particular river, we ſeek it not in the clouds from whence the rain deſcends, nor in the waters the evaporation of which ſupplies the atmoſphere with clouds, ſtill leſs do we ſeek it in that chemical union of caloric with moiſture,

moiſture, which occaſions the ſolution and ſuſpenſion of water in the air, but we trace its ſource to that point where the ſpecific and appropriate qualities of a river are firſt perceived, and that we denominate its ſource or origin. In the ſame manner Locke, when treating of the vaſt number of, the variouſly combined and diverſified, ideas which are the objects of our intellectual operation, traces their origin to that primary condition in which they firſt become objects of mental cognizance. According to this method, he derives all our thoughts from ſimple and reflex ideas; and, with the ſagacity of a profound reaſoner, he preſumes not to ſtep beyond the ſphere of intellect in ſearch of anterior cauſes; as in truth no other limit, till he arrived at the great firſt cauſe of all things, could with propriety be interpoſed to the range of infinite ſpeculation. Without, therefore, acknowledging the intrinſic juſtneſs or value of Locke's derivatory concluſions, with reſpect to the origin of ideas, we may ſafely pronounce, that our author's *firſt* objection is totally unfounded, and that it proceeds from a miſapprehenſion of the proper object of philoſophical arrangements.—The *ſecond* objection we think not leſs liable to diſpute than the firſt. "If the mind," ſays the author, "be ſuſceptible of diſcerning external ſubſtances, ideas cannot be ſaid to be the *only* objects of intellect." Now it is that very *diſcernment* of external ſubſtances which Locke denominates ideas. Preſuming the reality of external exiſtences, and preſuming alſo, that material ſubſtances cannot *themſelves* be preſent to the mind, he reſolves theſe two circumſtances, which our author contradiſtinguiſhes, viz. the diſcernment of external objects, and the perception of an idea, into one and the ſame operation. Idea is the generic term, which is applied by him both to the cognizance of material forms, and the ſuggeſtions of internal conſciouſneſs.—If Mr. Locke's ſyſtem, therefore, be erroneous, its fallacy muſt be demonſtrated upon grounds widely different from thoſe which our author has adopted.

The inveſtigation of the doctrine concerning the exiſtence of *ſubſtance*, which occupies the remaining part of this chapter, is marked equally by ingenuity, perſpicuity, and elegance. We acknowledge that the peruſal of it has done more to ſhake our perſuaſion of the probability of ſuch an exiſtence, than the reaſoning of any preceding author, with whoſe writings we have been acquainted. We ſhall favour our readers with a conſiderable extract from this part of the work.

"Locke is of opinion," ſays our author, "that *we have an obſcure idea of ſubſtance.* Were even this true, it would remain to be proved, that ſubſtance is an external being. To know the idea is not to know its architype; and how does Locke explain this obſcure idea? He ſays *it is a ſuppoſition of one knows not what ſupport of ſuch qualities as are capable of producing ſimple ideas in us.* Now, a ſuppoſition of one knows not what, does not give an obſcure idea, but rather no idea at all. It is ſaid that material ſubſtances muſt exiſt, becauſe they are the cauſe that excite certain ſimple ideas in our minds. Now, by cauſe and effect, we underſtand a relation between

two things, we muſt then be able to ſhew at leaſt the probable exiſtence of the two things between which we aſſert there is a relation; for we cannot predicate any thing of a ſubject of which we have no knowledge at all. But we who have no notion of ſubſtance, muſt either ſhew at leaſt the probability of its exiſtence, or admit that we cannot point out any relation between it and our ſenſations—The being of ſubſtance is an improbable conjecture. It is a thing ſuppoſed, of the neceſſity of which we can be by no means certain; and it helps to explain nothing, ſince it can neither be defined, nor imagined, nor underſtood.

"To aſſume any thing as a cauſe of which we have no notion, and of which it is impoſſible to form any conception, is certainly not very philoſophical, unleſs we can firſt infer the exiſtence of the thing, and afterwards its connection with known objects, by the aid of reaſoning, which may at leaſt amount to probability. Now, by what argument do philoſophers endeavour to eſtabliſh the being of their material ſubſtance? I know of none, unleſs it be, that after having taken for granted the exiſtence of external qualities, they contend that *ſomething* is neceſſary to ſupport theſe qualities. Now I deſire to know what ſupports that ſomething? If it be anſwered, that it ſupports itſelf, I aſk for the proof. How has the Hyloiſt diſcovered this property in material ſubſtance? Is the Theiſt prepared to acknowledge the being of a ſelf-ſuſtaining world of matter? But it may perhaps be ſaid there are ſeveral *ſubſtrata*. I deſire then to aſk where we ſhall find their ultimate ſupport? Shall we invoke the ſhade of Chryſippus to teach us how to ſet a bound to numbers, and a land-mark to infinity? Or ſhall we reſt with our ſubſtances where the Indian reſted with his tortoiſe—on ſomething, we know not what?

"There are perhaps ſome philoſophers who will tell us that God has ſo conſtituted the world, that he is himſelf the cauſe by which all eſſences exiſt, and is himſelf the ſupport of material ſubſtance. The ſuppoſition is bold, and the *hypothesis* doubtful. We cannot go from one cauſe which we know, directly to that, which we aſſume to be the firſt. Man cannot count the links in a chain which infinity alone can meaſure. He cannot trace the ſeries of events to the origin of time. He may think that a God exiſts and had being before nature and the world, but he can place no ſecond cauſe after the firſt. His eye cannot reach immeaſurable diſtance; it can neither ſee beyond the chaſm which ſeparates finite from infinite, nor deſcry a limit to unbounded viſion.

"It may be aſked how I account for ſenſations, if I queſtion the exiſtence of a material *ſubſtratum?* I might aſk, in my turn, how we can account for them with it; To aſſign cauſes for every thing has been the vain attempt of ignorance in every age. It has been by encouraging this error that ſuperſtition has enſlaved the world. In proportion as men are rude, uncultivated, and uncivilized, they are determined in their opinions, bold in their preſumptions, and obſtinate in their prejudices. When they begin to doubt, it may be concluded that they begin to be refined. The ſavage is ſeldom a ſceptic—the barbarian is rarely incredulous. The leſs men know, the leſs they are embarraſſed to find a cauſe for any event."

We acknowledge the force, and admire the ingenuity of the preceding argument. We do not, however, ſubſcribe our aſſent without many qualifications, to the inference which the author has deduced. It is a truth which admits of no controverſy, that the abſo-

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lute exiſtence of *ſubſtrata* cannot be poſitively affirmed or denied by any mode of proof which has hitherto been diſcovered. The queſtion at iſſue, therefore, reſpects not the certainty, but the probability of ſuch exiſtences; and the author has availed himſelf with dexterity of every argument, adverſe to ſuch a probability, which occurred to his reaſon or his fancy. One apparent objection, however, to the hypotheſis which he eſpouſes, has neither been noticed, nor incidentally obviated by him. We refer to the univerſal *belief* in ſuch exiſtences, which men of all claſſes and habits ſeem to have poſſeſſed from the earlieſt period of active intelligence. To this circumſtance ſome writers of conſiderable celebrity have adverted with particular force; nor is it improbable that an inquiry into the origin and nature of ſuch a *belief* might throw important light on theſe very obſcure inveſtigations. Perhaps, indeed, the fact itſelf may admit of diſpute; but as the doubts reſpecting it relate to the actual conſtitution of the mind, an examination of them cannot fail to contribute ſome aid in the material work of elucidation. For our own part, we are diſpoſed to adopt the argument and the language of the author himſelf, and to inquire, if a *belief of we know not what*, be in ſtrict truth, *any belief at all?* Might it not on the other hand be queſtioned, whether the idea of a common principle or centre of inherent union for the different qualities of matter, be not a diſtinct and palpable idea?

In the next chapter, the author purſues the ſame inveſtigation reſpecting the exiſtence of *ſubſtrata*. We preſent to our readers the following lively refutation of Mr. Harris's notion reſpecting *primary matter*.

"*We gain a glimpſe of it* (obſerves the learned author *of Philoſophical Arrangements*), *when we ſay that the firſt matter, is not in the lineaments and complexion which make the beautiful face; nor yet the fleſh and blood which make thoſe lineaments and that complexion, nor yet the liquid and ſolid aliments which make that fleſh and blood, nor yet the ſimple bodies of earth and water which make thoſe various aliments, but ſomething which being below all theſe, and ſupporting them all, is yet different from them all, and eſſential to their exiſtence.*"

"This," our author reſumes, "is the *glimpſe* which the Peripatetics obtain of the primary matter by the aid of abſtraction. It may however be obſerved of mankind in general, that they do not commonly acquire knowledge by ſhutting their eyes on all the objects of their perception. He who would find ſomething, muſt be careful not to take away till nothing be left. We may abſtract from a complex idea, and reduce it to one that is ſimple and uncompounded; but the abſtraction of all known ideas can only leave a void in the underſtanding. We ſubtract, it is true, all quantity from the mathematical point; but in aſſuming its exiſtence, we do not pretend to have an idea of it. The geometrician muſt have keen eyes, who gains a glimpſe of that which has neither bulk nor magnitude; and the Peripatetic who gains a glimpſe of a beautiful face, cannot fail to excite the wonder of thoſe who are not accuſtomed to ſee where there ceaſes to be any object of viſion."

We entirely approve the object and the ſcope of our author's argu-

ments in refutation of the ſtrange notions reſpecting firſt forms, univerſals, and primary matter which had their origin in the ancient ſchools of philoſophy, and which in modern times have been revived chiefly in the learned writings of Lord Monboddo and Mr. Harris.

The author has not, however, purſued his argument to the extent of which it is ſuſceptible, and has therefore not arrived at thoſe important concluſions, by which the foundation of genuine philoſophy is in a great meaſure ſupported. This taſk, in truth, has already been fully and ably executed, by an author to whom we have before had occaſion to refer, in the "Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind;" a work to which we always feel a pleaſure in appealing, as to a model of legitimate reaſoning and philoſophical reſearch.

We ſhall cloſe, for the preſent, our obſervations on the "Academical Queſtions," by the following quotation from the author's diſquiſition reſpecting *firſt forms*.

"There is no word, in the language of the Peripatetics, more difficult to be underſtood than *form*. Sometimes the ſoul is itſelf a form; ſometimes it is the place of forms. It is form which makes body obvious to ſenſe; yet the firſt form is not cognizable to the ſenſes. Nothing can be diſtinguiſhed unleſs it be under ſome particular form. There is, nevertheless, a general form abſtracted from all individual things which is univerſal with reſpect to all beings. We are then to obtain a ſight of the primary matter, by ſaying, that it is to univerſal form what ſecondary matter is to peculiar form. The ſceptic," continues the author, "may be permitted to doubt, if he can indeed obtain any knowledge of a thing which has hitherto eſcaped all his reſearches by the repetition of a few words, which he may not, perhaps, underſtand; but the language of ancient philoſophy, like the language of ancient religion, was ſometimes purpoſely involved in obſcurity. It was not until the ἐποπτης had pronounced certain words of myſterious import, that the aſpirant could learn the ſecrets of Eleuſis, or was gratified with the divine αὐτοψία.

"It is difficult to perceive any analogy between two things, by the help of a third, of which we have abſolutely no notion at all. What is univerſal form? It is not to be found in the range of being with which we are acquainted. Nature diſowns it; and imagination purſues it in vain to the limits of exiſtence."

(To be continued.)

1. *Introduction to the New Teſtament.* By John David Michaelis, &c. *(Concluded from P. 387).*

2. *Remarks on* Michaelis's *Introduction, to the New Teſtament,* &c. *(Concluded from P. 387.)*

3. *The Evidence for the Authenticity and Divine Inſpiration of the Apocalypſe ſtated; and vindicated from the Objections of the late Profeſſor F. (J.) D. Michaelis; in Letters addreſſed to the Rev. Herbert Marſh, B. D. F. R. S. Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge.* 8vo. Pp. 92. 3s. Hatchard, 1802.

TO the author of this laſt tract, as well as to our readers, an apology is due for our delaying ſo long to take notice of a publication ſo truly valuable. The only apology that we can offer, was the impoſſibility of doing it juſtice till we had received Michaelis's obſervations on the Apocalypſe; and for the length of time that his learned work has been in our hands, we have already accounted, we truſt, to the ſatisfaction of all whom we are very deſirous to ſatisfy.

The reader has already had ſufficient evidence of the ability with which Mr. Marſh's hypotheſis concerning the origin of the three firſt goſpels has been overturned by the anonymous author of *the Remarks*; and he will perceive, by and bye, how exactly that author agrees with the *letter-writer*, in his reply to one or two of Michaelis's objections to the Apocalypſe; but he will have reaſon to regret with us, that neither of theſe champions of the truth has animadverted on the chapter in which Michaelis treats of the Epiſtle of St. Jude.

We believe it is generally admitted, that of the divine inſpiration of that epiſtle there is leſs *internal* evidence than of the inſpiration of any other book of the New Teſtament; and the difficulties which have been felt, perhaps, by every reflecting reader, our author has contrived to aggravate with great ingenuity and learning. He begins with inquiring whether the author of the epiſtle was the brother of James the ſon of Alphæus, in order to aſcertain whether he was himſelf an apoſtle; but as we have already expoſed the fallacy of the reaſoning by which he endeavours to prove that the apoſtles *only* were inſpired, it is not worth while to enter here into that diſcuſſion. It is proper, however, to obſerve, that Michaelis admits, that if Jude, the author of the epiſtle, can be proved to have been an apoſtle, all the objections, which he has ſo induſtriouſly brought together againſt the canonical authority of that epiſtle, muſt go for nothing. Now he acknowledges, what indeed he could not well deny, that Jude, the author of the epiſtle—*if the epiſtle be genuine*—was certainly the brother of James, called our Lord's brother; but, we truſt, that James, the brother of the Lord, has in our laſt number been proved to have been the ſame perſon with James the ſon of Alphæus; and if ſo, it follows undeniably, that Jude the author of the epiſtle was an apoſtle, and that the epiſtle itſelf is of canonical authority.

Aware, perhaps, that ſome ſuch inference as this might be drawn from his conceſſions, our author boldly declares, at the end of the chapter, that he "has really ſome doubts whether the epiſtle be not a *forgery*, made in the name of Jude, by ſome perſon, who borrowed the chief part of his materials from the ſecond epiſtle of St. Peter, and added ſome few of his own."

The objections ſhould be ſtrong which authorize ſuch a concluſion as this, concerning an epiſtle quoted as genuine by writers of ſuch eminence, and ſo high antiquity as Origen, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian; who flouriſhed, the lateſt of them in the third, and the other two in the ſecond century. Let us ſee what thoſe objections are.

In the firſt place, the author does not *call* himſelf an apoſtle; but as St. Paul has omitted his apoſtolical title in four of his epiſtles, of which the authenticity was never queſtioned, the profeſſor builds not much on this objection. He diſpoſes likewiſe very properly of the ill-founded objection which ſome critics have made to the 6th and 7th verſes; but, ſays he,

"It is much more difficult to vindicate the ninth verſe, in which the archangel Michael is ſaid to have diſputed with the devil about the body of Moſes. The whole ſtory of this diſpute, which has the appearance of a Jewiſh fable, it is not *very eaſy* (we ſhall ſee by and bye that it is *impoſſible*) to diſcover, becauſe the book from which it is ſuppoſed to have been taken by the author of our epiſtle, is *no longer extant*: but I will here put together ſuch ſcattered accounts of it as I have been able to collect.

"Origen found in a Jewiſh Greek book, called the "*Aſſumption of Moſes* *, which was extant in his time, though it is now loſt, this very ſtory related concerning the diſpute of the archangel Michael with the devil about the body of Moſes. And from a compariſon of the relation in this book with St. Jude's quotation, he was thoroughly perſuaded, that it was the book from which St. Jude quoted. This he aſſerts without the leaſt heſitation: and in conſequence of this perſuaſion, he himſelf has quoted *the Aſſumption of Moſes*, as a work of authority, in proof of the temptation of Adam and Eve by the devil †. But as he has quoted it merely for this purpoſe, he has given us only an imperfect account of what this book contained, relative to the diſpute about the body of Moſes. One circumſtance, however, he has mentioned, which is not found in the epiſtle of St. Jude, namely, that Michael reproached the devil with having poſſeſſed the ſerpent which ſeduced Eve." (P. 379.)

Lardner, whoſe learning is unqueſtionable, is of opinion that, in

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* Ανάληψις του Μωσεως.

† Et primo quidem in Geneſi ſerpens Evem ſeduxiſſe deſcribitur, de quo in *Aſcenſione Moſis*, cujus libelli meminit in Epiſtolâ ſua Apoſtolus Judæs; Michael archangelus, cum diabolo diſputans de corpore Moyſi (Moyſis), ait, a diabolo inſpiratum ſerpentem cauſam extitiſſe prævaricationis Adæ et Evæ.

De Principiis, lib. iii. cap. 2.

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the days of St. Jude, there was no ſuch book extant as that quoted by Origen; and that by the *body of Moſes* we ought to underſtand the *Jewiſh ſtate*, as by the *body of Chriſt*, is often meant the *Chriſtian Church*. Our author's objections to both theſe opinions are unanſwerable. Books were indeed forged in the name of the apoſtles, by ill-judging Chriſtians, during the hundred years that elapſed between St. Jude and Origen; but that is not the period, in which we ſhould look for the forgery of Jewiſh books *. That by the *body of Moſes* is meant the *Jewiſh Church and ſtate*, and that St. Jude refers, as Lardner ſuppoſes, to the viſion in Zechariah (chap. iii. 1—3.), is in itſelf ſo extremely improbable, that ſome, who have adopted the interpretation, have been forced to propoſe a critical emendation of the text, to make the quotation in the epiſtle tally with the records of the prophet.

A critical emendation of the text of a ſacred writer is ſo hazardous an experiment, that it ought never to be tried, but when the text is ſo manifeſtly corrupted as to be abſolute nonſenſe in all the ancient manuſcripts in which it occurs; but this is a caſe which we believe has never occurred in any text of the New Teſtament, and moſt certainly not in the text before us. There were various books, beſides the Old Teſtament, of high authority among the Jews, and the book which was ſeen by Origen *may* have been one of them. Whether it was juſtly held in authority is of no importance; for if St. Jude's epiſtle was addreſſed, as is commonly ſuppoſed, to Jewiſh Chriſtians in danger of being corrupted by the Gnoſtic hæreſy, he might in an *argumentum ad hominem*, quote that book to them with as much propriety as St. Paul certainly quoted heathen poets when preaching at Athens. St. Jude is exhorting thoſe to whom he wrote, not to ſpeak evil of dignities, as ſome of the ſenſual Gnoſtics did, and he could not more forcibly ſhew the impropriety and ſinfulneſs of ſuch evil ſpeaking, than by putting them in mind of what they firmly believed, that the archangel, when diſputing with the devil, did not even againſt him "bring any railing accuſation, but ſaid; the Lord rebuke thee."

"To the doctrine, which St. Jude inculcates by this quotation, that we ought not to ſpeak evil of dignities, not even of the fallen angels, but that we ſhould leave judgment to God, I have, ſays our author, no objection. And I really think, that they *transgress the bounds of propriety*, who make it their buſineſs, either in the pulpit or in their writings, to *repreſent the devil as an object of detestation*, ſince, notwithſtanding his fall, he is ſtill a being of ſuperior order." (P. 392.)

For being on much ceremony with the devil, when we have occaſion to ſpeak of him, the neceſſity is not very apparent, and is certainly

* Let not the ſecond book of Eſdras, which was forged during that period, be deemed an exception. It is forged, indeed, in the name of a Jewiſh prophet; but its object has evidently been to convert the Jews from Moſes to Chriſt.

not

not implied in the words of St. Jude; but we have often wiſhed that divines, when they repreſent the devil as tempting every man to every ſin which he commits, would recollect that *ubiquity* is one of the attributes of God, and not of the devil; and that ſuch repreſentations may lead the ignorant vulgar into a ſpecies of idolatry. This, however, is not the queſtion at preſent before us. That queſtion is what can have induced our author to object ſo ſtrongly to a quotation which, as he acknowledges, inculcates ſound doctrine, and certainly contains an argument unanſwerable by thoſe to whom it was addreſſed?

Why, he has read a Jewiſh book entitled *Phetiroth Moſhe*, i. e. *The Death of Moſes*, which ſome critics, eſpecially De al Rue, *ſuppoſe* to be the ſame work, as that which Origen ſaw in Greek. Now the Phetiroth Moſhe contains the moſt extravagantly abſurd account of Moſes's reluctance to die; of his diſputing on the ſubject with God; of the devil's joy at the approaching death of Moſes; of Michael's ſaying, "*Thou wicked wretch*, I grieve, and thou laugheſt;" of Joſhua's attempting to pray for Moſes, and being ſtopt by the devil repreſenting the impropriety of ſuch a prayer; of the mouths of the children of Iſrael being ſtopt by 1,840,000 devils, which on a moderate calculation, ſays our author, make three devils to one man; of Gabriel's and Michael's refuſal to fetch the ſoul of Moſes, becauſe Moſes was too ſtrong for the former, and had been inſtructed by the latter; of the devil's offering to fetch it, and being ſeized with a violent pain like that of a woman in labour, as ſoon as he ſaw the ſhining countenance of Moſes; of the devil's being compelled to go again on the ſame errand, when he received from Moſes ſuch a blow with his miraculous rod, that he was glad to eſcape; of God himſelf at laſt kiſſing Moſes, and with that kiſs extracting his ſoul from his body, upon which God uttered a heavy lamentation!

"I ſeriouſly aſk, adds our author, every impartial judge, whether that perſon could be an inſpired writer, or an immediate diſciple of him, who made a manifeſt diſtinction between the hiſtory of the Old Teſtament and the fabulous traditions of the Jews, who has quoted ſuch a book as this, and ſelected from it a paſſage ſo apparently fabulous," (P. 385.)

Certainly no inſpired writer, nor indeed any writer of good ſenſe and the ſmalleſt tincture of ſcience, could quote as authority ſuch a book, he has deſcribed the *Phetiroth Moſhe* to be; but what evidence is there that the *Phetiroth Moſhe* is the book quoted by St. Jude and Origen? There is none. Nay (reader be not ſurpriſed), our author himſelf, before he deſcribes this farrago of impious nonſenſe, acknowledges that it *cannot* be the book quoted by Origen and the apoſtle. "I have carefully examined it, he ſays (p. 381.), and can aſſert, that it is a *modern* work, and that its contents are NOT the ſame as thoſe of the Greek book quoted by Origen;" and that its contents are not the contents of the book quoted by St. Jude is ſelf-evident, becauſe in the *Phetiroth Moſhe* the archangel *does* bring a railing accuſation againſt the devil, calling him *wicked wretch*.

But

But if all this be ſo, what has the *Phetiroth Moſhe* to do with an inquiry into the authenticity of the epiſtle of St. Jude? Why, it ſerves, by the manner in which it is introduced and deſcribed, to throw duſt into the eyes of a careleſs reader; and this it does ſo effectually, that the preſent writer, when he had firſt read the ſection, of which he has here given but a ſhort abſtract, was half inclined to adopt the concluſion of Michaelis.

The only other objection to the authenticity of the epiſtle which is of any weight, is drawn from the author's referring to the *prophecy of Enoch*, which is ſuppoſed to be an apocryphal book; but that objection is ſo completely obviated by Lardner in his Supplement, and by Cave in his Life of St. Jude, that nothing is left for us to ſay on the ſubject.

If our author's obſervations on the epiſtle of St. Jude have afforded us little ſatisfaction, he has made ample amends in the chapter which treats of the firſt epiſtle of St. John. By a critical analyſis of that treatiſe, for as ſuch he conſiders it rather than an epiſtle, and by his knowledge of oriental literature, he has aſcertained with greater preciſion than any other commentator with whom we are acquainted, the objects which the epiſtle had more particularly in view; and has thus been able to ſhew the true meaning, as well as the propriety of ſeveral expreſſions, which, among the ſacred writers, are peculiar to St. John.

"That the deſign of this epiſtle was to combat the doctrine delivered by certain falſe teachers, appears from chap. ii. 18—26. iii. 7. iv. 1—3; and what this falſe doctrine was, may be inferred from the counter-doctrine delivered by St. John, chap. v. 1—6. The apoſtle here aſſerts, that 'Jeſus is the Chriſt,' and that he was the Chriſt, *not by water only, but by water and blood.* Now theſe words, which in themſelves are not very intelligible, become perfectly clear, if we conſider them as oppoſed to the doctrine of Cerinthus, who aſſerted that Jeſus was by birth a mere man, but that the Æon, Chriſt, deſcended on him at his baptiſm, and left him before his death. But if what St. John ſays, chap. v. 1—6, was oppoſed to Cerinthus, the Antichriſts, of whom he ſpeaks, chap. ii. 18, 19; and who, according to ver. 22, denied that Jeſus was the Chriſt, as alſo the falſe prophets mentioned. chap. iv. 1—3, muſt be Cerinthians, or at leaſt Gnoſtics. That they were neither Jews, nor Heathens, may be inferred from chap. ii. 19, where St. John ſays, 'they went out from *us*.' Further, he deſcribes them, chap. ii. 18, as perſons, who had lately appeared in the world. But this deſcription ſuits neither Jews, nor Heathens, who, when this epiſtle was written, had not lately begun to deny, that Jeſus was the Chriſt." (P. 401.)

"In ſome places, eſpecially chap. iv. 2, 3, St. John oppoſes falſe teachers of another deſcription, namely, thoſe who denied that Chriſt was come in the fleſh. Now they, who denied this were not Cerinthians, but another kind of Gnoſtics, called Docetes. For, as on the one hand Cerinthus maintained, that Jeſus was a mere, and therefore, real man, the Docetes, on the other hand, contended, that he was an incorporeal phantom, in which the Œon Chriſt, as the divine nature, preſented itſelf to mankind, chap. i.

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1.; *our hands have handled*, appears likewiſe to be oppoſed to this error of the Docetes." (P. 409.)

Our author does not pretend to aſcertain the preciſe time when this epiſtle or treatiſe was written, but is inclined to think that it was before the deſtruction of Jeruſalem. He has a pretty long chapter, divided into ſeven ſections, on the remarkable verſe mentioning the three heavenly witneſſes, which, in his decided opinion, is ſpurious. As we do not think that controverſy of ſo much importance as many have thought*, we ſhall not here enter into the debate; though, we cannot avoid ſaying that Michaelis has treated Mr. Travis with a degree of contempt from which that gentleman's unqueſtionable learning and ingenuity ſhould have ſcreened him; and that the arguments by which he himſelf attempts to prove that the diſputed verſe was not in the Latin verſion read by St. Cyprian, are ſuch as he would have laughed at, and very properly laughed at, had they been employed on the other ſide of the queſtion.

On what he ſays of the ſecond and third epiſtles of St. John we have very few remarks to make. That they were written by the apoſtle, and not, as has been ſuppoſed, by an Epheſian preſbyter of the name of John, he proves we think completely, and anſwers the objections that have been moſt generally made to them. That the ſecond was addreſſed to a Chriſtian *community*, and not to an individual, is an opinion which, though he has plauſibly ſupported it, we cannot adopt; but we are ſtrongly inclined to believe with him, that the perſon to whom the third is addreſſed, was a member of the Church at Corinth, remarkable for his hoſpitality to ſtrangers. When he affirms, that, in the apoſtolic age, the power of excommunication was lodged in the congregation at large, he advances an opinion, which, though even Moſheim himſelf ſeems to have adopted it, is directly contradicted by the author of the Apocalypſe. If the power of excommunication had then been in the Chriſtian congregations, the angels of Pergamus and Thyatira could not have been reproved for ſuffering falſe doctrines, which, on that ſuppoſition, they had no authority to ſuppreſs. Without entering here into the controverſy concerning the conſtitution of the primitive church, on which we have had repeated occaſions to deliver our opinion at great length, we ſhall only ſay that the apoſtles would not have acted like men of *common ſenſe*, had they entruſted "the power of the keys," as it has been called, to men ſo very little acquainted with the genius of Chriſtianity as the greater part of almoſt every Chriſtian congregation muſt then have been.

Michaelis is a remarkable inſtance how far a deſire of ſingularity will carry a man even of great learning and of no apparent heretical bias, from the plain path, only becauſe it hath been trodden by thouſands before him. This propenſity diſcovers itſelf in his objections to the inſpiration of the ſecond and third goſpels; in his objections to

* See our 18th Volume, p. 133,

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the canonical authority of the epiſtle to the Hebrews, and of the general epiſtle of St. Jude; and in the contempt with which he is diſpoſed to treat thoſe who think differently from himſelf of the conteſted verſe of the firſt epiſtle of St. John. It appears, however, nowhere ſtronger than in his obſervations on the Apocalypſe.

He introduces theſe obſervations by an apology for his own ſcepticiſm, and by pleading the authority of Luther, who expreſſed his contempt of the Apocalypſe in very unbecoming terms. In England the *authority* of Luther is nothing; and we hope that it is nowhere equal to the authority of Michaelis; for without detracting or wiſhing to detract from the merits of that bold reformer, we may ſafely ſay that his opportunities of forming a correct judgment of the queſtion in debate were very inferior to thoſe enjoyed by our author. Luther and the foreign reformers are indeed often appealed to by ſome injudicious polemics among ourſelves on other ſubjects; but why ſhould we look up to them as to *authorities* on any ſubject? The church of England, as the author of the letters in vindication of the Apocalypſe well obſerves, "was bleſſed with the privilege of ſettling her articles and her canon at a later period; at a time when the teſtimonies of the antients, concerning the books of ſcripture, were more accurately aſcertained, and when the firſt *crude notions* of the honeſt reformers had been matured into ſafe opinions by the progreſs of time and truth. This is a remarkable inſtance of good coming out of evil. The advantage aroſe from the ſubjugated ſtate in which this Church was holden, at the beginning of the reformation, by the tyrannical hand of Henry VIII. which kept back the ſettlement of our eccleſiaſtical opinions till they were more maturely conſidered."

Without regarding the authority of Luther, therefore, let us accompany our author in his inquiry into the evidence that we have for the authenticity and divine inſpiration of the Apocalypſe; and as that evidence is divided into external and internal, let us conſider each ſeparately and then form our judgment from the whole.

Michaelis, in examining the external evidence, begins with Euſebius, whom he repreſents as not having been able to obtain any hiſtorical certainty on the ſubject, and as therefore taking a middle courſe, neither pronouncing it a forgery, nor aſcribing it to St. John the Apoſtle. We have many witneſſes, however, anterior to Euſebius, whoſe teſtimony we can examine for ourſelves unbiaſſed by his opinion; and, therefore, our author very properly appeals to them, whether they received the Apocalypſe; openly rejected it; or have paſſed it over in ſuch ſilence as in effect amounts to a rejection.

"The moſt antient evidence, and who belongs perhaps to the laſt mentioned claſs of writers, is Ignatius. For he wrote epiſtles to the Chriſtian communities at Epheſus, Philadelphia, and Smyrna, which are thoſe of the ſeven churches, to which the ſeven epiſtles in the book of Revelation are addreſſed in the name of Chriſt. Yet Ignatius, though he particularly reminds the Epheſians of the praiſes beſtowed on them by St. Paul, is totally ſilent both in his epiſtle to the church of Epheſus, and in his epiſtles to the churches

churches of Smyrna and Philadelphia, of the praiſes, which according to Rev. ii. 1—7, 8—11. iii. 7—12. their biſhops had received from Chriſt himſelf. Under theſe circumſtances may we not conclude, either that the Apocalypſe was unknown to Ignatius, or that, if it was known to him, he did not believe it to be genuine? And may we not likewiſe infer, that, if it was a genuine work of St. John the Apoſtle, it could not have remained unknown to Ignatius?" (P. 462.)

This argument has a plauſible appearance to him who reflects not on the circumſtances under which the epiſtles of Ignatius were written; but that it ſhould be urged by Michaelis, ſhews only to what ſhifts even the moſt vigorous mind will have recourſe in ſupport of a favourite hypotheſis. Michaelis, as we have ſeen *, queſtions the authenticity of the epiſtles of Ignatius when they are produced in evidence that the books of the New Teſtament were written by thoſe to whom they are attributed; but he expreſſes not the ſmalleſt doubt of their authenticity, when, from the mere *ſilence* of Ignatius, he infers, or wiſhes to infer, that the Apocalypſe was *not* written by the apoſtle St. John! Yet "the ſilence of Ignatius," as the learned author of *the Remarks* obſerves, (p. 38) "proves nothing, unleſs we make it incumbent on the author of a few Epiſtles, (when on a journey and under ſentence of death) to quote every authentic book known to the churches to which he writes."

But does Ignatius really obſerve, with reſpect to the Apocalypſe, ſuch a ſilence as amounts to a rejection of it? This queſtion the author of *the Letters to Mr. Marſh in Vindication of the authenticity and divine Inſpiration of the Apocalypſe* has anſwered in the moſt ſatisfactory manner.

"We are to take into our account, the peculiar circumſtances under which this Father of the Church wrote his epiſtles, which are the only remains of his works. He was a priſoner, upon travel, guarded by a band of ſoldiers, whom, for their ferocity, he compares to leopards, and by them hurried forward in his paſſage from Antioch to Rome, there to be devoured by wild beaſts. In ſuch circumſtances, he would write only at uncertain ſeaſons, and with frequent interruption; his train of thoughts neceſſarily broken: and his quotations depending probably on memory alone, would be inaccurate. From theſe cauſes it has happened, that, in his haſty epiſtles, the references of Ignatius to ſacred ſcripture, may be ſtyled *alluſions*, rather than *quotations*, and to many of the ſacred books he appears not to allude at all. The epiſtle to the Epheſians is the only book expreſsly named by him. Of the goſpels he only quotes, or plainly alludes to, thoſe of St. Matthew and St. John. And it will appear dubious to thoſe who examine the quotations and alluſions of this Father, whether the Acts of the Apoſtles, or any of the epiſtles, are indubitably quoted, or alluded to by him, except that to the Romans, the firſt to the Corinthians, to the Galatians, Epheſians, Philippians, and the ſecond to Timothy. But ſhall we affirm, that Ignatius rejected two of the goſpels, and fourteen of the other books of ſacred ſcrip-

* See our 18th Volume, Pp. 9, 10.

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ture, becauſe no clear and evident alluſion to them can be found in theſe his haſty epiſtles? No one will make this affirmation. The authenticity and divine inſpiration of theſe ſcriptural books are ſupported by other and ſufficient evidence; and the concluſion which Michaelis invites us to draw, from the ſilence of Ignatius reſpecting the Apocalypſe, muſt appear raſh and unfounded. We can neither conclude, becauſe Ignatius has not mentioned the Apocalypſe, nor alluded to it, that therefore it was unknown to him; nor that, if it was known to him, he did not believe it genuine; nor yet that his ſilence concerning it amounts to a rejection of it. This anſwer may be applied, and I truſt effectually, in caſe it ſhall be concluded that Ignatius has paſſed over the Apocalypſe *in ſilence*. But there are ſome paſſages in his epiſtles, which may perhaps be admitted to allude to the Apocalypſe. It may be thought, that if Ignatius had not ſeen the Apocalypſe, he would not have uſed certain expreſſions, which he has employed in theſe paſſages. I ſhall preſent them at length, becauſe they have never yet been produced.

'Rev. i. 9.	'Ignat. ad Rom. ad fin.
Εν ὑπομονῃ Ιησου Χριστου.'	Εν ὑπομονῃ Ιησου Χριστου.'

"The text of the Apocalypſe is here taken from the approved edition of Grieſbach; and it is a confirmation to be added to his ſupports of this text, that it was thus read by Ignatius. This expreſſion, though the idea be quite ſcriptural, is to be found, I believe, in no other paſſage, but in this of the Apocalypſe only." (*The Evidences for the Authenticity and Inſpiration of the Apocalypſe*, Pp. 23, 24.)

This excellent letter-writer produces two other paſſages from Ignatius's Epiſtle to the Epheſians, which obviouſly allude, the one to Rev. xxi. 2, and the other to Rev. xxi. 3, ſo that we have the apoſtolical biſhop of Antioch not a ſilent witneſs, as Michaelis ſuppoſes, *againſt* the authenticity of the Apocalypſe, but a witneſs giving the very ſame evidence *for* its authenticity, that he gives for the authenticity of various other books of the New Teſtament.

"The old Syriac tranſlator," ſays Michaelis, "whom I mention immediately after Ignatius, becauſe in my opinion he lived in the firſt century, did not tranſlate the Apocalypſe: conſequently he either knew nothing of it, or did not believe it to be genuine." (P. 463.)

But, as the letter-writer obſerves, whoever has read Marſh's notes upon that part of Michaelis's work, in which he endeavours to prove the high antiquity of the Syriac verſion, muſt be convinced that there is no ſufficient evidence that it was made before the fourth century; and we ſhall preſently diſcover the reaſon for omitting the Apocalypſe in a verſion made in that century, and intended for popular uſe.

From the Syriac verſion Michaelis proceeds to Papias, without taking the ſmalleſt notice of Polycarp, who undoubtedly received the Apocalypſe as the genuine work of St. John. This is put beyond the reach of reaſonable controverſy by the teſtimony of his diſciple Irenæus; and that teſtimony is confirmed by other witneſſes firſt brought forward, we believe, by the author of *The Evidences*, &c. now under review.

"This apoſtolical and excellent man (Polycarp) ſuffered martyrdom, about

about the middle of the second century; that is, about sixty years after the Apocalypse had been published. An account of this event is given in a genuine and interesting epistle written from the church of Smyrna, over which Polycarp had presided, and in which city he suffered. In this epistle, part of which is reported by Eusebius,* there seems to be some allusions to the Apocalypse, which have escaped observation. And if the Apocalypse was received by the church of Smyrna at Polycarp's death, there can be no doubt but it was received by him their bishop and instructor.

'In Rev. i. 15.	'In the Epistle,
'The feet of the Son of Man are described.'	'The body of the suffering martyr is represented.'
'Ὅμοιοι χαλκολιβάνῳ ὡς ἐν καμίνῳ πεπυρωμένοι.'	'Οὐκ ὡς σαρξ καιομενη, αλλ' ὡς χρυσος και αργυρος εν καμινῳ πυρουμενος.'

"That the writer did not use the word χαλκολιβανος, may be accounted for, by his having in view, at the same time, another passage of scripture, 1 Peter i. 7, where the apostle compares the suffering Christian to *gold tried in the fire*; but why did he, after having used the word *gold*, omit the δια πυρος δοκιμαζομενου of St. Peter, to substitute εν καμινῳ πυρουμενος? Why? but because he was led to it by this passage of the Apocalypse?

"The pious and sublime prayer of Polycarp,† at the awful moment when the fire was about to be lighted under him, begins with these words, Κυριε, ὁ Θεος, ὁ παντοκρατωρ. They are not only remarkable for the change of case, from the vocative to the nominative, which is observable in the Apocalypse; but they are the identical words in the prayer of the Elders, Rev. xi. 17. Κυριε, ὁ Θεος, ὁ παντοκρατωρ." (Evidences, &c. Pp. 27, 28.)

From these instances we heartily agree with the annonymous

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* The entire epistle is published by Cotelerius in the second volume. *S. S. Patrum qui temporibus apostolicis floruerunt*, and translated into English by Archbishop Wake.—Rev.

† As this prayer is not long, and as it is the wretched fashion of the age to despise the taste and talents of the fathers of the church, the English reader may not perhaps be ill pleased with an opportunity of judging for himself how properly the epithets pious and sublime are applied by our author, to the composition of Polycarp.

"O Lord God Almighty, the Father of thy well-beloved and blessed Son Jesus Christ; the God of angels and powers, and of every creature, and *especially* of the whole race of just men, who live in thy presence: I give thee hearty thanks that thou hast vouchsafed to bring me to this day, and to this hour; that I should have a part in the number of thy martyrs, and in the cup of thy son Christ, to the resurrection of eternal life, both of soul and body, in the incorruption of the Holy Ghost (εν αφθαρσια πνευματος αγιου): Among which may I be accepted this day before thee, as a fat and acceptable sacrifice; as thou the true God, with whom is no falsehood, hast both before ordained, and manifested unto me, and also hast now fulfilled it. For this, and for all things else, I praise thee, I bless thee, I glorify thee with the eternal, and heavenly Jesus Christ thy beloved son; with whom to thee and the Holy Ghost, be glory both now, and to all succeeding ages. Amen."

Wake's translation.

writer,

anonymous author, that ſome confirmation is derived to the teſtimony of Irenæus, that Polycarp and his diſciples of the Church of Smyrna, received the Apocalypſe as a ſacred book; and as Polycarp was himſelf a diſciple of St. John, it ſeems to us that his teſtimony ought to be deciſive. We proceed, however, with Michaelis, who obſerves that—

"Papias, who is repreſented by Euſebius as a man of great credulity, would be an evidence of the utmoſt importance againſt the Apocalypſe, if it could be clearly and indiſputably proved, that he had never quoted it. For his very credulity, how great ſoever it might have been, would, in caſe he rejected the Apocalypſe, increaſe the weight of his teſtimony. Papias, who lived in the beginning of the ſecond century, was, as is well known, the founder of the Millenarian ſyſtem among the orthodox. His opinion was, that after the general reſurrection, Chriſt would reign a thouſand years upon earth with the faithful: and it was this opinion which induced Euſebius to aſcribe to him the character of credulity. Now it is certain, that in not any one book of the whole Bible the doctrine of the Millennium is taught in expreſs terms, though many Millenarians have pretended that ſeveral of the antient prophets have ſpoken of it. But in the Apocalypſe, and the Apocalypſe alone, this doctrine is diſcoverable, if we take all the expreſſions uſed in the 20th chapter in a ſtrictly literal ſenſe: and this is the chapter on which all the Millenarians of modern ages have principally grounded their opinions. If then Papias, the father of the Millenarians, who made it likewiſe his particular buſineſs to inquire into what had been ſaid and done by the apoſtles, has never quoted the Apocalypſe, this ſilence muſt imply, that at the beginning of the ſecond century the Apocalypſe was unknown in Aſia Minor, which is equivalent to its not then exiſting. For Papias was biſhop of Hierapolis, a town not far from Laodicea, to the angel of which church one of the ſeven apocalyptical epiſtles was addreſſed. Could then this prophetical book have remained unknown to him, if it had then exiſted? And if he had known it, would he have rejected a work which would have been the beſt ſupport of his favourite doctrine? And would not his very credulity have contributed to his acceptance of it, without ſufficient examination of it, even though it had not been genuine? (Pp. 463—464.)

Would not the reader of this extract naturally ſuppoſe that the works of Papias have come down to us, and that in ſuch of them as treat of the Millennium the Apocalypſe is never quoted? The truth, however, is, that of the writings of this antient father there have been tranſmitted to us only a few very ſhort fragments quoted and preſerved by Euſebius.

"In theſe we have no mention of the Apocalypſe. They treat of other ſubjects; of the goſpels chiefly. And to two only of the four goſpels has Papias given evidence. Yet no one has doubted for this reaſon, whether Papias received the other two. Yet, as the ſubject on which Papias was then treating, was the goſpel, it is ſtronger evidence againſt St. John's goſpel, that he did not mention that goſpel, than that he omitted to write on his Apocalypſe [is againſt it]. The ſame is the caſe with the quotations of Papias from the epiſtles of the New Teſtament. It is ſaid by Euſebius that Papias quoted from the firſt of Peter and the firſt of John, and no other

of the epiſtles are mentioned as quoted by him. Yet no notion has thence been entertained by the learned, that he rejected the other epiſtles of the ſacred canon. 'He confirms thoſe which he has mentioned," ſays Lardner, "without prejudicing the reſt."

"Upon the ſame footing ſtands his *ſilence* concerning the Apocalypſe. And this ſilence, in theſe ſhort fragments of his works, would be no evidence againſt it, even if we had no teſtimony that he received it as holy writ. But ſuch teſtimony we have from Andreas, biſhop of Cæſaria, who wrote in the fifth century. Michaelis collects, from ſome expreſſions of Euſebius, that Papias had no where cleared up the important queſtion, *whether John the Presbyter, who also lived at Ephesus, was the writer of the Apocalypse.* But how could our author expect ſuch determination from Papias, when it appears that in his time the queſtion was never agitated? Euſebius himſelf, in the fourth century, firſt ſtarted it. Dionyſius, of Alexandria, in the century preceding, had mentioned ſome other John, as *perhaps* the author; but even he does not mention John *the Presbyter.* Nor is there any evidence that it was aſcribed to any other than to John the Apoſtle, by any orthodox writer of the church, during the firſt century of its appearance in the world." (Evidences, &c. Pp. 29—30.)

The ſame excellent writer, after confuting ſome other cavils of Euſebius and Michaelis reſpecting Papias, concludes his fourth letter with two arguments, which, added to the teſtimony of Andreas, of Cæſaria, leave not in our minds a doubt but that the biſhop of Hierapolis received the Apocalypſe. For theſe arguments, however, we refer the reader to the letters themſelves, and ſhall conclude our obſervations on the teſtimony of Papias with the words of the able *Remarker on Michaelis's Introduction to the New Teſtament.*

"He builds an argument (for the ſpuriouſneſs of the Apocalypſe) on Euſebius's account of Papias; who is ſaid to repreſent him as grounding his doctrine of the Millennium, *not on the Bible, but on certain expressions of Christ and his apostles, handed down by oral tradition.* I am utterly unable to diſcover on what authority this aſſertion is made: Euſebius ſaw no ſuch concluſion; for he ſpeaks of the Apocalypſe in the very ſame chapter without queſtioning its authenticity. But the words in queſtion are,* α και πγουμαι, τας αποστολικας παρεικδιξαμενον διηγησις, ὑπολαβειν, τα εν ὑποδειγμασι προς αυτων μυστικως ειρημενα μη συνιωρακοτα.—τας αποστολικας διηγησις means in general *accounts of the apostles*, not excluding the Bible, or any part of it, as the Apocalypſe; which indeed ſeems particularly pointed out in the words which follow:—τα εν ὑποδειγμασι προς αυτων μυστικως ειρημενα. Euſebius uſes the general expreſſion, becauſe Papias affected to have learnt as much by word of mouth as from books. Andreas of Cæſarea therefore had good reaſon to conſider Papias as giving teſtimony to the Apocalypſe." (Remarks, &c. p. 38.)

That Juſtin Martyr, Melito, Irenæus, and Athenagoras, received the Apocalypſe as canonical ſcripture is admitted by Michaelis; but, as the author of the *Letters to M. Marſh obſerves*—

"He has paſſed over in ſilence the evidence to be found in that valuable remnant of eccleſiaſtical antiquity—THE EPISTLE FROM THE GALLICAN CHURCHES, which relates the ſufferings of their martyrs about the

the year 177, 80 years after the publication of the Apocalypſe. We are obliged to Euſebius for preſerving a conſiderable part of this letter, in which Lardner has remarked this paſſage—Ακολουθων τω αρνιω ὁπου αν ὑπαγῃ. They are the very words of the Apocalypſe, ch. xiv. 4. and ſo peculiar in idea and expreſſion, as evidently to be derived from no other origin." (Evidences, &c. p. 34.)

Our anonymous author gives two other quotations, which, added to this, render it impoſſible to doubt but that the Gallican churches, which employed the writer of the epiſtle to write in their name, received the Apocalypſe as divine ſcripture.

Michaelis admits that the Apocalypſe was undoubtedly received by Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, and "with their evidence," he ſays, "ends the ſecond century." But he forgets Apollonius, who is repreſented by Euſebius as ſupporting the Apocalypſe; who ſuffered martyrdom about the year 186, and whoſe teſtimony, as the author of the letters obſerves, is a valuable addition to our evidence.

Thus then we have, in the firſt and ſecond centuries, as witneſſes for the Apocalypſe, IGNATIUS, POLYCARP, PAPIAS, JUSTIN MARTYR, the GALLIC CHURCHES, IRENÆUS, ATHENAGORAS, MELITO, CLEMENT of Alexandria, TERTULLIAN, THEOPHILUS, and APOLLONIUS; whilſt there is not one unexceptionable witneſs produced againſt it. Marcian, the Gnoſtic, and a ſect called, from their antipathy to the word λογος, as employed to denote Chriſt's divine nature, *Alogi*, did indeed reject it as they rejected other books of ſacred ſcripture; but the rejection of the Apocalypſe by Marcian is greatly in favour of its pretenſions; for it is the teſtimony of an unwilling witneſs, that the Apocalypſe was in circulation before the year 127; whilſt the reaſoning by which the *Alogi* endeavoured to prove it the work of Cerinthus is abſurd and contradictory. According to them there was no Chriſtian church at Thyatira when the Apocalypſe firſt appeared; and yet they attribute the Apocalypſe to Cerinthus, who was contemporary with St. John, and lived in Epheſus amidſt the ſeven churches!

In the third century Hippolitus and Origen, two of the brighteſt luminaries of the antient church, received the Apocalypſe as the work of St. John the Apoſtle, though it is well known that the averſion of Origen to the Millenarian doctrines muſt have made him willing, as his unrivalled learning and acuteneſs made him able, to confute its pretenſions, had ſuch a confutation been poſſible. To this weight of evidence what does Michaelis oppoſe? Why, nothing but the teſtimony of Caius, a Roman Preſbyter, who ſpeaks of *an* Apocalypſe, as the work of Cerinthus; but that Apocalypſe, as our learned profeſſor himſelf acknowledges, was in many reſpects different from the Apocalypſe of St. John, and is therefore a work with which we have no concern. Dionyſius of Alexandria, whom Michaelis wiſhes to preſs into his cauſe, certainly received the Apocalypſe as a divinely inſpired book; though, from its obſcurity and certain peculiarities of

ſtyle and manner, he expreſſes ſome doubt, as he ſays others had expreſſed before him, whether it was written by St. John the Evangeliſt. It was for the ſame reaſons—the obſcurity of the prophecies and the peculiarities of its ſtyle, that Euſebius and ſome other critics of his time appear to have doubted whether St. John, the author of the Goſpel, could have been likewiſe the author of the Apocalypſe; but no one, however deſirous of invalidating the authority of the book, has ever produced any *external evidence* to ſuit his purpoſe. It has indeed no place in the catalogue of the ſacred books publiſhed by Cyril of Jeruſalem, and the council of Laodicea; but theſe catalogues contain only what was to be generally *read in the churches*,* omitting the Apocalypſe as the Church of England has likewiſe omitted it in the calendar which appoints the ordinary leſſons for the daily ſervice through the year. "That ſo myſterious a book, eſpecially after the abuſe of it in the controverſy concerning the Millennium, ſhould have raiſed doubts in the minds of ſome, ought not to ſurpriſe us. The church at large certainly decided for it." (Remarks, &c. p. 40.)

Intimately connected with the external evidence of the authenticity of the Apocalypſe, is the time at which it was written; for if it was not publiſhed before the year 96 or 97, no notice could be taken of it by Clement of Rome, or the apoſtolical Hermes, both of whom, probably, and the former certainly, wrote before that period. In this caſe too, a writer of the ſecond century becomes a much more important evidence than he could have been, had the Apocalypſe been in circulation ſeventy years ſooner, as ſome have ſuppoſed. Michaelis enumerates ſix different opinions which have been held with reſpect to the date of the Apocalypſe.

1. "It has been aſſerted, that the Apocalypſe was written in the reign of the Emperor Claudius. 2. Others refer it to the reign of Nero. 3. Others leave it undetermined whether it was written under Claudius or Nero, but contend that it was written before the reign of Domitian, and before the Jewiſh war. 4. According to the uſual opinion, it was written in the reign of Domitian. 5. It has been referred to the reign of Trajan. 6. To that of Hadrian." (P. 519.)

Michaelis eaſily demoliſhes the firſt of theſe opinions, and ſhews on how ſlender evidence the ſecond reſts, though it was adopted by the immortal Newton. The third he ſeems himſelf to prefer to all the

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* That this is the caſe with reſpect to the Laodicean Catalogue is indiſputable; for the canon in which it is given, begins thus:—"That pſalms compoſed by private perſons, or uncanonical books, ought NOT TO BE READ IN THE CHURCH; but only the canonical books of the Old and New Teſtament. What books of the OLD TESTAMENT MUST BE READ; *Geneſis, Exodus*, &c. OF THE NEW; *four Goſpels, Acts of the Apoſtles, ſeven Catholic Epiſtles, and fourteen of St. Paul*," which are enumerated as they are received in our church.—*Johnſon's Tranſlation.*

others,

others, labouring to prove that it is ſupported by the teſtimony of Irenæus, whoſe words he thinks have been generally miſunderſtood. He ſays, indeed, that one or other of the three firſt opinions *muſt* be adopted by thoſe who conſider the Apocalypſe as an inſpired book; for thus only ſhall we be enabled to ſhew that its firſt prophecies were fulfilled in a ſhort time. But

"If it be conſidered as a mere human compoſition, it may be either aſcribed to Cerinthus [this is utterly impoſſible] or attributed to ſome unknown writer who lived between the time of Papias and that of Juſtin Martyr: in the latter caſe it might have been written in the reign of Hadrian. But if it be really a forgery, if it contains prophecies of the Jewiſh war made after the events themſelves had taken place, we have *reaſon to wonder that the author did not prophecy more circumſtantially, and that he appears ſo little acquainted with the events of the war.*" (P. 528.)

This is indeed ſo wonderful that no man can ſuppoſe that the Apocalypſe was written after the deſtruction of Jeruſalem, and at the ſame time intended by its author to contain prophecies, as by St. John, of the Jewiſh wars! It is equally impoſſible to believe that it was written, with whatever intention, in the reign of Hadrian; for we have ſeen it plainly referred to by Ignatius, who ſuffered martyrdom in the reign of Trajan. But the date of the Apocalypſe has been ſo completely aſcertained by the author of *The Letters to Mr. Marſh*, that we ſhall be greatly ſurprized indeed, if we ever again ſee the queſtion agitated. This learned writer, after demoliſhing the three opinions firſt ſtated by Michaelis, proceeds thus in ſupport of the fourth.

"Irenæus was born, according to his own account, in the age immediately ſucceeding that in which the viſions of the Apocalypſe were ſeen. He was a Greek by birth, as his name and language import, and probably an Aſiatic Greek, for he was an auditor of Polycarp, who had been an auditor of St. John the Apoſtle, by whom Irenæus conſtantly affirms the Apocalypſe to have been written.* Accordingly, when Irenæus ſpeaks upon ſuch ſubjects as concern the external evidence of the church, he appeals for the truth of what he has advanced to Polycarp, and to others, who, he ſays, had ſeen the Apoſtle John. He appeals alſo to the Aſiatic Churches, in which he appears to have been educated. When removed from Aſia into Gaul, where, upon the martyrdom of Pothinus, he became biſhop of Lyons, he kept up a correſpondence with the brethren of the Aſiatic Churches, from whom he would receive the moſt genuine information then to be obtained concerning the Apocalypſe. He was in his own character the moſt learned, pious, prudent, and venerable prelate of the age in which he lived. He wrote largely in defence of the truth; and it has been a prevailing opinion in the Church, that he ſealed his teſtimohy with his blood.

"Here then is a witneſs, far ſurpaſſing in authority and credibility, any

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* The author from whom this extract is quoted, refers, at the bottom of the page, to the preciſe book and chapter where every thing will be found, which he affirms to have been ſaid by Irenæus.

that has hitherto been produced.* Accordingly his evidence and no other has been received by the writers nearest to his time, and, with the very few exceptions that have now been produced,* by the universal Church. And until these days there has not been the least doubt of the import of his evidence; no one has seen occasion to interpret his words, otherwise than according to their obvious and received meaning—*that the visions of the Apocalypse were seen in the times of Domitian.* But since a novel interpretation of these words has now been attempted, in order to press them into the service of a preconceived opinion, it will be necessary to produce them.

"Irenæus, speaking of the mystical name, ascribed to Anti-Christ in the thirteenth chapter of the Apocalypse, and of the difficulty of its interpretation, adds ει δε ιδει αναφανδον εν τω νυν καιρω κηρυττεσθαι το ονομα τουτο, δι' εκεινου αν ερρεθη του και την αποκαλυψιν ἑωρακοτος. Ουδε γαρ προ πολλου χρονου ἑωραθη, αλλα σχεδον επι της ἡμετερας γενεας, προς τω τελει της Δομετιανου αρχης: which is thus literally translated—*But if it had been proper, that this news should be openly proclaimed in this present time, it would have been told even by him who saw the Revelation. For it was not seen a long time ago, but almost in our own age* (*or generation*), *toward the end of Domitian's reign.*

"These words are plain and unequivocal; no variety of interpretation of them arose during sixteen hundred years, in which they were read by the Church: and, indeed, the only doubt concerning them *now* is, 'what is it that Irenæus affirms to have been *seen* in Domitian's reign?" What does the verb *seen* refer to, and agree with? What is the nominative case understood to the verb ἑωραθη? Now, I will venture to affirm, that no Greek scholar, unbiassed by any favourite opinion, can possibly suppose that the verb ἑωραθη, 'was seen' can be referred to any other nominative than ἡ αποκαλυψις. 'The Revelation.' But it is not a matter wherein a critical knowledge of the Greek tongue is required to enable us to decide. Plain common sense is [sufficient] to supply what is wanting. And no person possessed of that valuable qualification, can read this passage translated literally into any language, without perceiving that the thing represented to be *seen* in the latter clause, must be the same as was said to have been seen in the former. The same verb, used so nearly with a relative, must refer to the same noun. Otherwise, there is no dependence on common language; and we must, in all our writings, be driven to use the repetitions in vogue with the lawyers; and Irenæus, if he were to write in modern times, must be instructed to say, after the word *Revelation,* not *it* was seen but the *aforesaid Revelation* was seen." (The Evidences, &c. Pp. 14, 15, 16.)

This reasoning is unanswerable, and puts it beyond a doubt that the Apocalypse was written in the reign of Domitian, about the year 96 or 97; whence it follows, that the testimonies which we have in favour of its authenticity, in the second and third centuries, are entitled to even greater credit than an equal number of testimonies in

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* These are Epiphanius, who lived in the fourth century, on whose authority alone the Apocalypse has been supposed to have been written during the reign of Claudius; and the anonymous subscr ption to the Syriac version of the Apocalypse, which says, that it was written during the reign of Nero.

† Grotius, Newton, and Michaelis.

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the ſame centuries in favour of any one of St. Paul's epiſtles. Now, we have ſeen that in theſe two centuries there is in favour of the Apocalypſe a whole cloud of the moſt reſpectable witneſſes, with not a *ſingle teſtimony againſt it*, but thoſe of *Marcian* and the *Alogi!* Yet Michaelis affirms, that when we place in one ſcale the writers who either knew nothing of it, or rejected it, and in the other, thoſe who received it, the balance will remain in equipoiſe; and that the queſtion of its authenticity and divine inſpiration muſt be decided at laſt by the internal evidence furniſhed by the book itſelf!!

Into his diſquiſitions on the internal evidence our limits will hardly permit us to enter. The author of the letters to Mr. Marſh has faithfully accompanied him through them, and ſhewn that in the objections urged from the obſcurity of the predictions, and the peculiarities of the apocalyptic ſtyle, there is nothing which is not more than overruled by the irreſiſtible force of the external evidence. To theſe letters therefore we refer the reader, confident that, if he peruſe them with the attention and impartiality which the importance of the ſubject demands, his faith in the divine inſpiration of the Apocalypſe will not be ſhaken by all the learning and ingenuity diſplayed by Michaelis. Nay, with theſe letters at hand to guard him from error, he may read with great advantage to himſelf, the objections which are urged, from internal evidence, to the divine inſpiration of the Apocalypſe. Of theſe objections, ſome are indeed artful and unfair, and ſome, at firſt ſight, appear frivolous; but nowhere have we ſeen more perſpicuouſly ſtated the qualifications requiſite to a ſucceſsful interpreter of that myſterious book.

"In the firſt place," ſays Michaelis, "every man who attempts to comment on a work muſt be complete maſter of the language in which it is written. Now the Apocalypſe, though written in Greek, is at the ſame time full of Hebraiſms. Its language is figurative, and the figures have reference to Jewiſh cuſtoms; and the whole work has manifeſtly the form and manner of an Oriental compoſition. Conſequently an interpreter of the Apocalypſe muſt, with a knowledge of the Greek, unite a knowledge both of the Oriental languages and of Oriental antiquities; for mere Hebrew philoſophy, or ſuch as is derived only from the ſtudy of the Hebrew Bible, and the uſe of a Hebrew Lexicon, is inſufficient. But the commentators on the Apocalypſe, eſpecially thoſe who have taken the lead, and have ſet the faſhion to others, have for the moſt part been very deficient in this neceſſary qualification, and moreover have been biaſſed with prejudices, which are not well adapted to a diſcovery of truth." (P. 505.)

"A ſecond qualification, which an interpreter of the Apocalypſe ought to poſſeſs, is a taſte for poetry and painting; for in the Apocalypſe, notwithſtanding its uncouth Greek, we meet with very fine deſcription. But when a viſion is well repreſented, the rules of poetry and painting are uſually obſerved, and conſequently ſome knowledge of theſe arts is requiſite, in order to underſtand the repreſentation. Thus, if a painter deſigned to repreſent a dream, occaſioned by the particular interpoſition of Divine Providence, he would paint an angel ſtanding by the bed of the perſon who had the dream: and this he might do, without intending to ſignify, as a dog-

matical truth, that an angel in a bodily ſhape really deſcended to that perſon, and inſpired the dream. In like manner the angels, which act ſo conſiderable a part in the Apocalypſe, may be conſidered as poetical imagery, unleſs we ſuppoſe that its author intended to convert into articles of faith the fabulous notions of the Jews, that every land and every element had its peculiar angel. This is only one inſtance out of many, which might be alleged. But among the commentators on the Apocalypſe, where ſhall we find one *, who had a proper taſte for the explanation of poetical repreſentation?" (P. 507.)

"The third and moſt important requiſite is a complete knowledge of hiſtory, eſpecially the hiſtory of Aſia. A general knowledge of hiſtory is by no means ſufficient; it muſt be a knowledge which deſcends to the moſt minute particulars; for a propheſy, in which neither perſon nor place is named, we can underſtand only by knowing the diſtinguiſhing circumſtances of thoſe events to which it relates.——But the commentators on the Apocalypſe are ſo far from having poſſeſſed a complete knowledge of hiſtory, that the greateſt part of them have diſplayed only a moderate ſhare of it. Vitringa will, perhaps, be mentioned as an exception; but among the commentators on the Apocalypſe we can reckon only one Vitringa, and even Vitringa's hiſtorical knowledge was not ſufficiently extenſive. The ancient hiſtory before the birth of Chriſt is foreign to our preſent purpoſe; and the hiſtory of the ſeventeen laſt centuries was underſtood by Vitringa, in its full extent, only ſo far as it relates to Europe. But we cannot expect that prophecies, addreſſed to ſeven communities in Aſia Minor, ſhould be fulfilled only *in Europe*, or in the *Latin Church*. Chriſtianity flouriſhed under the Eaſtern, as well as under the Weſtern, Emperors: it was propagated likewiſe in Arabia, in Perſia, in the Great Tartary, from the Caſpian ſea to the borders of China, and even in China itſelf. Aſia has been the ſeat of the moſt important revolutions with which the hiſtory of Chriſtianity is cloſely connected. In Aſia was founded the religion of Mohammed; and out of Aſia emerged the Saracens, the Turks, and the Tartars. Whoever, therefore, is not acquainted with the Conſtantinopolitan and Aſiatic hiſtories of theſe nations, is by no means qualified to become an interpreter of the Apocalypſe. But among all, who have ventured to interpret it, not one can boaſt of this thorough acquaintance; and the principal reaſon is, that the beſt accounts of the Saracens, the Turks, and the Tartars, are contained in Syriac and Arabic authors, which very few hiſtorians can read in the original, and of which we have either no tranſlations at all, or not ſuch as an hiſtorian can appeal to as an original document.

"Further, as moſt men are acquainted with the hiſtory of their own country, and this hiſtory always appears of ſo much the importance, in proportion as we know the leſs of the hiſtory of other countries, the interpreters of the Apocalypſe have ſought at home for the completion of its prophecies; and as prophetical deſcriptions, without either names or dates, are applicable to various events, each interpreter has found, in a great part

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* Biſhop Hurd cannot be properly called a *commentator* on the Apocalypſe; but he has attempted, in his Warburtonian Lectures, an explanation of ſome parts of it; and he certainly poſſeſſes a taſte for the explanation of poetical repreſentation.——Rev.

of

of the Apocalypſe, the hiſtory of his own country *. And when we conſider that the paſſion for this mode of interpretation has been variouſly modified, ſometimes by religious zeal and a ſpirit of perſecution, at other times by a ſenſe of oppreſſion, and enmity to the ruling Church, we need not wonder that the Commentaries of the Apocalypſe have aſſumed ſuch various ſhapes, that what is affirmed as indiſputably true in the one, is as flatly contradicted in the other." (Pp. 510—511.)

If theſe reflections be juſt, and the greateſt part of them are incontrovertibly juſt, it follows that no illiterate man can, without the greateſt arrogance, obtrude his interpretations of the Apocalypſe on the public; and that the interpretations of men of even more than ordinary learning muſt often be falſe, and when true, be ſometimes true by accident. But it follows likewiſe, as the author of *the letters to Mr. Marſh* has obſerved, that the objection, deduced by Michaelis from the obſcurity of the prophecies, and the contradictory expoſitions of them by different commentators, falls to the ground; for the prophecies are particularly obſcure, only becauſe thoſe who have hitherto attempted to interpret them, have not been qualified for ſo arduous a taſk.

"We cannot know what ages of Chriſtianity are yet to come; in what manner the predictions of the book may yet be fulfilled; nor what portion of the Divine Spirit, or of human knowledge, may be granted to explain it. The prophecies, now dark, may to future generations become "a ſhining light," and the apocalyptical predictions rendered clear by their completion, ſerve as an impregnable bulwark of Chriſtian faith, during the later ages of the militant Church. Difficulties are found in the obſtruſer parts of every kind of ſpeculative knowledge. Every ſtudy has its dark receſſes, not hitherto penetrable by human wit or induſtry. Theſe apocalyptic prophecies are the deeper ſpeculations in the ſtudy of divinity. And are we to be ſurpriſed, that men meet with difficulties here, men whoſe bold, prying inſolence, is checked in the paths of every ſcience, by the incomprehenſible greatneſs of the works of God!" (Evidences, &c. p. 74.)

We have now exhibited to our readers as comprehenſive a view of what is contained in Michaelis's *Introduction to the New Teſtament*, as our limits would permit us to give; a much more comprehenſive view indeed than has been given by any of our brother journaliſts, or than has probably been reliſhed by ſuch as turn over our pages, only for amuſement, or to diſcover what is daily paſſing in the republic of letters. But this work is not one of thoſe fugitive publications which are talked of for a time, and then deſervedly neglected for ever. It

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* This may be true of the German interpreters of the Apocalypſe, but it is not true of the moſt celebrated interpreters of that book, who have flouriſhed in England, and been members of the Church. They have, indeed, for the moſt part, found Anti-Chriſt in Rome, and of courſe applied the prophecies to the hiſtory of the Weſtern Church; but they have not confined theſe to the Church of England.

will

will obtain a place in the library of every Clergyman who is really desirous of understanding those sacred oracles, from which every thing must be deduced that he inculcates on his audience as necessary to salvation. It contains, indeed, many things of which we highly disapprove; but it contains much more entitled to our warmest praise; and it is on this account that we have dwelt on it so long, and entered into its merits and demerits so minutely. We feel it to be our duty to recommend it to all who are entering on the study of theology; but it is likewise our duty to caution them not to suffer themselves to be unduly influenced by the authority, deservedly great, of the learned author, and his still more learned commentator.

"Let them learn, at an early stage of their progress, what questions are primary, and what secondary; and not proceed to a minute consideration of the latter, till they are well established in the first principles and leading truths of the former; and have acquired the habit of duly appreciating the various discussions which may be thrown in their way, lest otherwise they be untimely involved in numberless difficulties, and finish in endless doubts." *(Remarks on Michaelis's Introduction, &c. p.* 42.)

These are judicious reflexions; and indeed the whole pamphlet, of which they constitute a part, is so masterly a performance, that we recommend the purchase of it, as well as of the *Letters to M. Marsh*, to every purchaser of Michaelis's Introduction to the New Testament. They supply, in some degree, the want of the editor's notes on the second part of that work; though we hope, that, notwithstanding them, those notes will not be for ever withheld from the public. There is yet ample room for an additional volume by Mr. Marsh; and if he subjoin to it a copious Index, he will greatly enhance the value of a work, which, though it ought to be read once, at least, with the utmost care by every divine, will be found chiefly useful as a work to be occasionally consulted.

Essays in a series of Letters to a Friend, on the following subjects. 1. *On a man's writing Memoirs of himself.* 2. *On Decision of Character.* 3. *On the Application of the Epithet Romantic.* 4. *On some of the causes by which Evangelical Religion has been rendered less acceptable to persons of cultivated Taste.* By John Foster. 2 Vols. 12mo. Price 7s. Pp. 507. Longman and Co. 1805.

WE opened these volumes with no very sanguine expectations of instruction or of amusement; because we remembered how much stupid trash had formerly met us under the title of Essays. But we had proceeded only a very little way when we found that, in the present instance, at least, our prejudices were ill founded. To declare at once, our opinion of this book; we must say that we have seldom perused any publication with more pleasure. We do not mean that every sentiment of the author meets our approbation; for he holds some positions with which we cannot agree, as will, by and bye, appear

pear. He is, however, on the whole, a moſt maſterly writer; perſpicuous, acute, profound, and eloquent. He appears, in every page, the warm ſupporter of the beſt intereſts of mankind; he writes with a degree of feeling and energy which is highly captivating. His ſtyle (with ſome very few exceptions) is uncommonly excellent. It is chaſte, ornamented, and often ſublime. His ſtock of pleaſing imagery, and his richneſs of illuſtration, are ſo various that we hardly know an author by whom he is, in theſe reſpects, ſurpaſſed. We are ſorry that he has not given us any clue by which to know his profeſſion or rank in life. He would do honour, undoubtedly, to any rank or profeſſion. From ſome circumſtances which will appear in the courſe of our remarks, we have been led to ſuppoſe that he belongs to that denomination of Chriſtians who call themſelves *of the Connection of Wesley*.

The firſt of theſe Eſſays is very valuable. The author's idea is that a man ſhould write, for his own uſe, an accurate and faithful account of the great outlines of his life, particularly of thoſe circumſtances which have made his opinions, ſentiments, and habits what they now are. There can be no doubt that ſuch a retroſpective review as this would be highly uſeful. But, there are difficulties in the way of executing it which Mr. Foſter does not overlook. The following remarks are exceedingly impreſſive.

"One of the greateſt difficulties in the way of executing the propoſed taſk, will have been cauſed by the extreme deficiency of that ſelf obſervation which, to any extent, is no common employment either of youth or [of] any later age. Men realize their exiſtence in the ſurrounding objects that act upon them, and form the *intereſts* of ſelf, rather than in that *very ſelf*, that interior being which is thus acted upon. So that this being itſelf, with its thoughts and feelings, as diſtinct from the objects of thoſe thoughts and feelings, but rarely occupies its own deep and patient attention. Men carry their minds as they carry their watches, perfectly ignorant of the mechaniſm of their movements, and quite content with underſtanding the little exterior circle of things to which the paſſions like indexes, are pointing. They are like perſons looking at the enlightened world through a crevice of a dark room. Knowledge of ſelf can be gained only by a vigilant attention to ſelf. A man might have lived an age, and traverſed a continent, minutely exploring its curioſities, and interpreting the half-obliterated characters on its monuments, unconſcious, the while, of a proceſs operating, on his own mind, to impreſs or eraſe characteriſtics of much more importance to him than all the figured braſs or marble that Europe contains. After having explored many a cavern or dark ruinous avenue, he may have left undetected a darker receſs in his character. He may have converſed with many people, in different languages, on numberleſs ſubjects, but have neglected the inquiſitive converſations with himſelf, by which his whole moral being ſhould have been kept continually diſcloſed to his view." (Vol. I. Pp. 8—10).

Theſe Eſſays are in the form of letters to a friend, for which form the author apologizes in an advertiſement; but we do not perceive that the ſubject is at all hurt, by being put into this form. Among the

the different characters which come under his review, his remarks on that moſt daring of beings "*a contemner of God*" are ſuch as, we think, even the infidel or profligate could not read without emotion. With regard to the former he thus addreſſes his friend.

"If you were ſo unacquainted with mankind that this character might be announced to you as a rare or ſingular phenomenon, your conjectures at the proceſs through which the mind has been conducted would tend toward ſomething marvellous. You might expect for one thing, to behold the marks of an extraordinary antiquity, as the longeſt age would ſeem needful to have matured ſuch ſupreme and awful heroiſm. Surely the creature that thus lifts his voice, and defies all inviſible power within the poſſibilties of infinity, challenging whatever unknown being may hear him, and may appropriate that title of Almighty which is pronounced in ſcorn, to evince his exiſtence, if he will, by his vengeance, was not as yeſterday, a little child, that would tremble and cry at the approach of an inſignificant reptile.

"But, indeed, it is heroiſm no longer, if he *knows* that there is no God. The amazement then turns on that great proceſs by which a man could grow to the piercing and immenſe intelligence that can know, or without matchleſs preſumption aſſume, that there is no God. What ages and what lights are requiſite for THIS attainment! This intelligence involves the very attributes of Divinity, while a God is denied. For, unleſs this man is omnipreſent, unleſs he is, at this moment, in every place in the Univerſe, he cannot know but there may be, in ſome place, manifeſtations of a deity by which even he would be overpowered. If he does not know abſolutely every agent in the Univerſe, the one that he does not know may be God. If he is not himſelf the chief agent in the Univerſe, and does not know what is ſo, that which is ſo may be God. If he is not in abſolute poſſeſſion of all the propoſitions that conſtitute univerſal truth, the one which he wants may be that there is a God. If he cannot with certainty aſſign the cauſe of all that exiſts, that cauſe may be a God. If he does not know every thing that has been done in the immeaſurable ages that are paſt, ſome things may have been done by a God. Thus, unleſs he knows all things, that is, precludes another deity by being one himſelf, he cannot know that the being whoſe exiſtence he rejects does not exiſt. But he muſt *know* that he does not exiſt, elſe he deſerves ineffable contempt for the madneſs with which he firmly avows his rejection, and acts accordingly. And yet a man of *ordinary* age and intelligence may preſent himſelf to you with the triumphant avowal of being thus diſtinguiſhed from the crowd; and, if he would deſcribe the manner in which he has attained this eminence, you would feel a melancholy intereſt in contemplating that proceſs of which the reſult is ſo portentous." (Pp. 59—62.)

On the conduct of the *practical* infidel, who, without denying God in ſpeculation, hardly ever thinks of him, our author's reflections are equally fine. There is ſomething in them more powerfully intereſting than we have often ſeen. Our limits, however, will allow us to produce but a very ſhort ſpecimen.

"Oh why is it ſo poſſible that this greateſt inhabitant of every place frequented by man ſhould be the laſt whoſe ſociety is ſought, or whoſe vicinity is felt important? Why is it poſſible to be ſurrounded with the intelligent

gent reality which is infinite, and not feel all other things in the creation, by which our minds could be affected, as if retaining with difficulty their forms of exiſtence, and continually juſt on the point of vaniſhing, firſt into ſhadows, and then into nothing? Why is this ſtupendous intelligence ſo retired and ſilent in his preſence over all the ſcenes of the earth, and in all the paths of and abodes of man? Why does he keep his glory inviſible behind the ſhades and viſions of the material world? Why does he not to each generation diſcloſe for once ſome celeſtial ſpectacle, ſome awful viſage, to make an indelible impreſſion of ſacred fear. And why is it poſſible, in contempt of all that he has diſplayed to fear or to love, to advance toward him in the laſt confirmed ſtate of a character completed by the full aſſemblage of all thoſe unworthy acquiſitions, which he has ſeparately diſapproved through every ſtage of the accumulation! Why is it poſſible for little feeble creatures to maintain their poor dependent beings, fortified and invincible in ſin, amidſt the all pervading preſence of Omnipotent Purity? Why does not the awful thought of ſuch a Being ſtrike through the mind with ſuch intenſe, intolerable, antipathy to evil, as to blaſt with death every active principle that is beginning to pervert it, and render gradual additions of depravity, growing into the ſolidity of habit, as impoſſible as to build ſtructures of wood and ſtone amidſt the fires of the laſt day? How is it poſſible to forget the ſolemn ſolicitude which ſhould accompany the conſcioufneſs that ſuch a Being is continually darting upon us the mighty beams of obſervant thought, (if we may apply ſuch a term to Omniſcience), the piercing inſpection compared to which the concentrated attention of all the beings in the Univerſe beſides would be but as the powerleſs gaze of an infant? Why is faith, that ſpiritual faculty of ſeeing the inviſible, ſo abſent, or ſo incomparably more ſlow and reluctant to receive a juſt perception of the grandeſt of its objects, than the ſenſes are adapted to receive the impreſſions of theirs? Why have the few particles of duſt which the ſpirit inhabits, the triumphant atheiſtical power to avert from around it that ſacred eſſence, which diffuſes, through the world, its infinite intenſity of being, thus placing that ſpirit as in a vacuity and extinction of God?" (Pp. 72—75).

Our author reprobates with becoming ſeverity thoſe impudent and immoral narratives, with which, under the titles of Memoirs, Confeſſions, and Apologies, certain hiſtorians of their own diſgrace at once inſult and corrupt the public. Men who do not even pretend to virtue, but who glory in a continued courſe of profligacy; unprincipled tools of an unprincipled party; profane travelling coxcombs; players, and the makers of immoral plays; all theſe he obſerves, can deſcribe the whole tenor of a contaminated life with the moſt ingenuous effrontery. Profeſſed courtezans, aſſuming the tone of plaintive ſenſibility, entertain us with the whole nauſeous detail of their adventures.

"They can tell of the precautions for meeting ſome perſon of diſtinction, in a manner that ſhould not ſubject him to the reputation of ſuch a meeting; the hour when they croſſed the river in a boat; the arrangements of money; the kindneſs of the gentleman at one time; his contemptuous neglect at another; and every thing elſe that can turn the compaſſion, with which we deplore their firſt misfortunes and errors, into abhorrence at the

affrontery

affrontery which cannot be content without proclaiming the commencement, ſequel, and all, to the wide world." (Pp. 107, 108).

We ſhall cloſe our extracts from this ingenious Eſſay, with the following reflections of the author on the man who is perpetually changing his opinions. The deſcription is what (to adopt, for once, a very faſhionable term), may be called *pictureſque*; and the paſſage will exhibit a pretty accurate ſpecimen of Mr. Foſter's general ſtyle of writing.

"The publication of a luminous, mental hiſtory of a thinking man, remarkable for a number of complete changes of his ſpeculative ſyſtem, might, even without much aſſiſtance of incidents and action, be very intereſting to reflective readers. The general tenacity of opinions once deliberately adopted after the juvenile dreams are fled, throws the air of a curious phenomenon on a man whoſe mind has been a kind of caravanſera of opinions, entertained a while, and then ſent on pilgrimage; a man who has admired and diſmiſſed ſyſtems with the ſame fortunate facility with which John Buncle found, adopted, married, and interred his ſucceſſion of wives, each one being, for the time, not only better than all that went before, but the beſt in the creation. You admire the verſatile aptitude of a mind ſliding into ſucceſſive forms of belief in this intellectual metempſychoſis, by which it animates ſo many new bodies of doctrines in their turn. And as none of thoſe dying pangs, which hurt you in a tale of India, attend the deſertion of each of theſe ſpeculative forms which the ſoul has inhabited a while, you are extremely amuſed by the number of tranſitions, and eagerly aſk what is to be the next; for you never deem the preſent ſtate of ſuch a man's views to be for permanence, unleſs, perhaps, when he has terminated his courſe of believing every thing by ultimately believing nothing. Even then, unleſs he is very old, or feels more pride in being a ſceptic, the conqueror of all ſyſtems, than he ever felt in being the champion of one; even then, it is very poſſible, he may ſpring up again, like a vapour of fire from a bog, and glimmer through new mazes, or retrace his courſe through half of thoſe which he trod before. You will obſerve that no reſpect attaches to this Proteus of opinion, after his changes have been multiplied; as no party expect him to remain with them, nor deem him much of an acquiſition, if he ſhould. *One*, or perhaps two, conſiderable *changes* [this mode of ſpeaking, though altogether common, is not ſtrictly grammatical] will be regarded as ſigns of a liberal inquirer; and, therefore, the party to which his firſt or his ſecond intellectual converſation may aſſign him, will receive him gladly. But he will be deemed to have abdicated the dignity of reaſon, when it is found he can adopt no principles but to betray them; and it will be, perhaps, juſtly ſuſpected that there is ſomething extremely infirm in the ſtructure of that mind, whatever vigour may mark ſome of its operations, to which a ſeries of very different and ſometimes contraſted theories can appear, in ſucceſſion, demonſtratively true, and which imitates in ſincerity, the perverſity which Petruchio only affected, declaring that which was yeſterday, to a certainty, the ſun, to be to-day, as certainly, the moon." (Pp. 88—90).

We know not that our author's ſecond Eſſay, in depth and ſolidity of obſervation, or in excellence of compoſition, is, at all, inferior to the firſt. Every page of it diſplays a very intimate knowledge of the

the fineſt ſprings and movements of human nature. The different ingredients, features, and aſpects both of a deciſive, and of an indeciſive character, are inveſtigated and delineated with a maſterly ſkill; and the whole is illuſtrated by a great variety of pertinent examples. Our readers, we are ſure, will peruſe this Eſſay with much ſatisfaction, though our limits forbid us to indulge in quotation. We have room for only one ſhort ſketch, which is, indeed, a ſtriking one.

"Lady Macbeth may be cited as a harmonious character, though the epithet ſeems ſtrangely applied. She had capacity, ambition, and courage; and ſhe willed the death of the king. Macbeth had ſtill more capacity, ambition and courage; and he alſo willed the murder of the king. But he had, beſides, humanity, generoſity, conſcience, and ſome meaſure of what forms the power of conſcience, the fear of a ſuperior Being. Conſequently, when the dreadful moment approached, he felt an inſupportable conflict between theſe oppoſite principles, and when it was arrived, his utmoſt courage failed. The worſe part of his nature fell proſtrate under the power of the better; the angel of goodneſs arreſted the demon that graſped the dagger, and would have taken that dagger away, if the pure demoniac firmneſs of his wife, who had none of theſe counteractive principles, had not ſhamed and hardened him to the deed." (Pp. 173, 174).

The author's third Eſſay is particularly valuable, and examines what is called a *Romantic* character in a great variety of views. Mr. Foſter begins by remarking on the general bias, which is diſcovered in thoughtleſs or ſuperficial minds, of applying degrading and villifying epithets without due regard to propriety or juſtice. "It coſts no labour," as he well obſerves, "and needs no intellect to pronounce the words *fooliſh*, *ſtupid*, *dull*, *odious*, *abſurd*, *ridiculous*." (Vol. II. P. 1). But many perſons, not ſatisfied with terms ſo vague, are gratified when they are furniſhed with words which, apparently at leaſt, convey a more determinate kind of cenſure. "Puritan," he ſays, "was, doubtleſs, welcomed as a term of moſt lucky invention, when it was firſt applied, in contempt, to a claſs of men of whom the world was not worthy." (P. 3). The term, we ſuppoſe, was ſometimes miſapplied; and, unqueſtionably, among thoſe who went by the name were numbers of worthy well meaning men. But the ſtyle in which our author ſpeaks of them we cannot adopt. They were, certainly, pious and devout in their way; but their piety was not of the genuine ſtamp. Inſtead of being amiable, humble and quiet, it was forbidding, boiſterous, ſeditious and proud. The ingenious author is equally angry with the uſe of the term *Methodiſt*, "the vain and malignant ſpirit," he ſays, "which had deſcried the elevated piety of the puritans, fought about, as Milton deſcribes the wicked One in Paradiſe, for ſome vehicle in which it might again, with facility, come forth to hiſs at zealous Chriſtianity, and in another lucky moment fell on the term *Methodiſt*." (P. 6). To us this appears an unlucky ſentence; for, unleſs we have been grievouſly miſinformed the word *Methodiſt* was not originally impoſed, by enemies, as a nickname or appellation of reproach, but ſpontaneouſly choſen and appropriated

appropriated to themſelves by Mr. Weſley and his friends. *Jacobiniſm* is another word which, in Mr. Foſter's eſtimation, is frequently employed with no diſtinctneſs of meaning. In a ſimilar manner, the epithet *Romantic* is a ſtandard expreſſion of contemptuous reproach, though the claſs of abſurdities which it is meant to deride is left ſo undefined that it is not very eaſy to ſay how far they extend; "and yet the word," ſays Mr. Foſter, "*ſeems* to diſcriminate their character ſo completely as to put them out of argument." (P. 12).

What then is to be underſtood preciſely by the term *romantic*, when applied to human character? Its obvious etymology refers to thoſe qualities which characterized the perſons and tranſactions diſplayed in romances, Now "the great general diſtinction of the actors in thoſe books and times has been," ſays our author,

"The aſcendancy of imagination over judgment; and this is, therefore the main principle of every thing that may juſtly now be denominated romantic in human character. Perſons of ſtrong clear underſtanding, and of little or ſubordinate fancy, are never, in any great degree romantic. You would laugh to hear, for inſtance, of the romantic Dean Swift." (Pp. 13, 14).

Our author then proceeds, in a very pleaſing manner, to illuſtrate this predominance of fancy over judgment. He traces its influence in thoſe viſionary perſons who perſuade themſelves that they are reſerved for a deſtiny and courſe of life totally unlike the common condition of mankind; and in thoſe flattering hopes which parents are apt to indulge with regard to the future proſpects of their children. Some wild reveries which were lately much in vogue, and which threatened us, in truth, with confuſion and ruin, are finely expoſed in the following paſſage.

"The ſame charge of being unadapted to man ſeems applicable to the ſpeculation of thoſe philoſophers and philanthropiſts, who have eloquently diſplayed the happineſs, and aſſerted the practicability, of an equality of property and modes of life throughout ſociety. Thoſe who really anticipated and projected; the practical trial of the ſyſtem, muſt have forgotten on what planet thoſe apartments have been built, or thoſe arbours were growing, in which they were contemplating ſuch viſions. For, in theſe viſions, they beheld the ambition of one part of the inhabitants, the craft or audacity of another, the avarice of another, the ſtupidity or indolence of another, and the ſelfiſhneſs of almoſt all, as mere adventitious faults, ſuperinduced on the character of the ſpecies, and inſtantly flying off at the approach of better inſtitutions, which ſhall prove, to the confuſion of all the calumniators of human nature, that nothing is ſo congenial to it as moderation and diſintereſtedneſs. However, it is but juſt to acknowledge, that moſt of them have admitted the neceſſity of ſuch a grand transformation as to make man another being, previouſly to the adoption of the ſyſtem. This is all very well. When the proper race of *men* ſhall come from Utopia, the ſyſtem and polity may very properly come along with them; or may be carefully preſerved here, in volumes more precious than thoſe of the Sibyls, againſt their arrival. Till then the ſober obſervers of the human character will read theſe beautiful theories as romances, adapted to excite ſarcaſtic

ſarcaſtic ridicule in their ſplenetic hours, when they are diſguſted with human nature, and to produce deep melancholy in their benevolent ones, when they pity it." (Pp. 32—34).

Our author remarks that, in works of romance, ſcarcely any relation whatever is preſerved between ends and means. Sometimes the end propoſed is ſuch as no means on earth can be ſuppoſed to effect. At other times practicable objects are attained by means which bear no reſemblance to thoſe which muſt be employed in the economy of real life. The imagination of ſome men is conſtantly carrying them into fairy ground where they are employed (to uſe a common expreſſion), in building caſtles in the air. Such caſtle builders are highly romantic. A man of this turn reads in the newſpapers, that an eſtate of 20,000l. a year was lately adjudged to a labourer or pauper. He immediately realizes as ſplendid a fortune; for why ſhould not he have the ſame good luck! A gentleman travelling by the mail coach, met with a moſt intereſting young lady, whom he had never ſeen before: they were mutually enamoured, and were married in ſix weeks. Our caſtle builder, with rapture, anticipates a ſimilar adventure. This diſeaſe of the mind is uniformly inflamed where it already exiſts, and frequently produced where it did not previouſly exiſt by the reading of novels. On this ſubject Mr. Foſter's obſervations are moſt ſenſible.

"That claſs of fictitious works called novels, though much more like real life than the romances which preceded them, and which are now, with a few corrections, partly come into vogue again, is yet full of theſe lucky incidents and adventures, which are introduced as the chief means toward ultimate ſucceſs. A young man without fortune, for inſtance, is precluded from making his addreſſes to a young female in a ſuperior ſituation, whom he believes not indifferent to him, until he can approach her with ſuch worldly advantages as it might not be imprudent or degrading for her to accept. Now, how is this to be accompliſhed?—Why, I ſuppoſe by the exertion of his talents in ſome fair and practicable department; and perhaps the lady, beſides, will generouſly abdicate, for his ſake, ſome of the trappings and luxuries of rank. You really ſuppoſe [that] this is the plan? I am ſorry [that] you have ſo much leſs genius than a novel writer. This young man has an uncle, who has been abſent a long time, nobody knew where, except the young man's lucky ſtars. During his abſence the old uncle has gained a large fortune, with which he returns to his native land, at a time moſt opportune for every one but a highwayman; who attacks him in a path through a wood, but is frightened away by the young hero, who happens to come there at the inſtant, to reſcue and recogniſe his uncle, and to be in return recogniſed, and made the heir to as many thouſands as the lady or her family could wiſh. Muſt not the reader think it very *likely* that *he* too has ſome old uncle, or acquaintance at leaſt, returning with a ſhip load of wealth from the Eaſt Indies, and very *deſireable* that the highwayman ſhould make one ſuch attempt more, and very *certain* that, in that caſe, he ſhall be there in the nick of time to catch all that fortune ſends? One's indignation is excited at the immoral tendency of ſuch leſſons to young readers, who are taught to regard all ſober regular plans for compaſſing an object with diſguſt or deſpondency, and to muſe on improba-

bilities till they become ſooliſh enough to expect them, and to be melancholy when they find that they may expect them in vain. It is unpardonable that thoſe pretended inſtructors by example ſhould thus explode the calculations and exertions of manly reſolution, deſtroy the connexion between ends and means, and make the reward of virtue ſo depend on chance, that if the reader does not either regard the whole fable with contempt, or promiſe himſelf [that] he ſhall receive the favours of fortune in ſome ſimilar way, he muſt cloſe the book with the conviction that he may hang or drown himſelf as ſoon as he pleaſes; that is to ſay, unleſs he has learnt from ſome other ſource a better morality and religion than theſe books will ever teach him." (Pp. 43—45).

But we muſt haſten to Mr. Foſter's laſt Eſſay, which we might ſuppoſe intended to exhibit his religious principles; though we are under the neceſſity of ſaying that theſe principles are not very clearly expreſſed. We have already obſerved that he ſeems to be of Weſley's connection. The title of this Eſſay, indeed, might ſuggeſt that he belonged to that claſs of Evangelical "True Churchmen," who have lately made a figure in this Review. We ſee no reaſon, however, to believe that Mr. Foſter is a Calviniſt of any deſcription: in other words, we ſee no reaſon to believe that he embraces Calvin's doctrine of predeſtination, either in a *moderate* or in a *high* ſenſe. Before we proceed it is proper to produce the evidence on which we ground this concluſion.

"It would be going beyond my purpoſe," ſays our author, "to carry my remarks from the literary merits, to the moral and theological characteriſtics of Chriſtian books; elſe a very ſtrange account could be given of the injuries which the Goſpel has ſuffered from its friends. You might often meet with a ſyſtematic writer, in whoſe hands the whole wealth and variety and magnificence of Revelation ſhrink into a meagre liſt of doctrinal points, and who will let no verſe in the Bible ſay a ſyllable till it has placed itſelf under one of them. You may meet with a Chriſtian *polemic* who ſeems to value the arguments for Evangelical Truth as an aſſaſſin values his dagger, and for the ſame reaſon; with a *descanter* on the invisible world who makes you think of a Popiſh Cathedral, and from the vulgarity of whoſe illuminations you are exceſſively glad to eſcape into the ſolemn twilight of faith; *or with a grim zealot for a theory of the Divine Attributes, which seems to delight in representing the Deity as a dreadful king of furies, whose dominion is overshadowed with vengeance, whose music is the yell of victims, and whose angels are transformed into a legion of fiery dragons.*" (Pp. 179, 180).

No words could expreſs, we think, with more irreſiſtible force, Mr. Foſter's deteſtation of Calvin's theory, than thoſe which we have here printed in Italics. Yet our author is a moſt ſtrenuous advocate for what he calls *Evangelical Religion*. It is ſtrange that he ſhould not have thought it incumbent on him to tell us at once what he means by theſe terms. It is ſtranger ſtill that, after reading the whole Eſſay, we find it impoſſible to ſay preciſely what his meaning is. He talks, indeed, again and again, of the "*diſtinctions*," and of the "*peculiar diſtinctions*," of the Chriſtian religion. "Theſe," he ſays, "are chiefly comprized in that view of Chriſtianity which, among

among a large number of the profeſſors of it, is denominated, in a ſpecific ſenſe, *Evangelical.*" (P. 107). But he ought to have been more explicit. A man of his information cannot be ignorant that every claſs of profeſſing Chriſtians conſider their own view of Chriſtianity as *Evangelical*; indeed if they did not, they could not pretend to be Chriſtians at all. The term *Evangelical*, therefore, as expreſſive of any particular ſet of notions, is injudiciouſly choſen. We know exactly the tenets of the Calviniſts, of the Arminians, of the Roman Catholics, of the Socinians, &c. But our author himſelf is a luminous inſtance of the ambiguity which may be concealed under this equivocal word *Evangelical.* It is, however, but juſtice to obſerve, that we have not diſcovered, in Mr. Foſter's volumes, any views of Chriſtianity brought prominently forward to which we ſhould greatly object. In one or two places he ſeems to conſider the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit as the only cauſe of all that is good in man. It is chiefly on this account that we have been led to ſuppoſe him a follower of Weſley. But, whatever his peculiar notions may be, they are never propoſed with arrogance or ſpleen.

In tracing the cauſes by which Evangelical Religion is often rendered unacceptable to perſons of cultivated taſte, our author diſplays his uſual knowledge and ingenuity. We cannot attend him ſtep by ſtep; but we lay before our readers the following paſſage, with which, we doubt not, they will be highly pleaſed.

"It was eſpecially unfortunate, if ſuch a man's *education* was in the ſociety, and under the inſpection and controul, of perſons, whether parents or any other friends, whoſe religion was in a form ſo unattractive to taſte. In that caſe the counteractive effect of aſſociation muſt have been almoſt inceſſant, after he had begun to acquire the more refined intellectual habits, which even this feeling of incongeniality would but incite him to cheriſh and cultivate with ſo much the more intereſt. Theſe, perhaps, he began and continued to acquire from books of elegant ſentiment, or philoſophical reſearch, which he read in diſregard of the advice or injunction to read none but works ſpecifically religious. To ſuch ſtudies he has again and again returned, with an animated rebound from ſyſtematic common places, whether inculcated in private or in public inſtruction, and has felt the full contraſt between the tone of the moral ſpeculations or poetical viſions of genius, and the manner in which the truths of the Goſpel had been conveyed. He was not ſerious and honeſt enough to make, when in retirement, a candid effort to abſtract theſe truths from the form in which they were thus unhappily exhibited, and try how they would appear in a better. He could eaſily have transferred them into this better form; or at leaſt, if he could not, he had but a very ſmall portion of that mental ſuperiority, of which he was congratulating himſelf that his diſguſts were an evidence. But his ſenſe of the duty of doing this was, perhaps, leſs cogent from his perceiving that the Evangelical doctrines were inculcated by his relatives, with no leſs deficiency of the means of proving them true than of rendering them intereſting, and he could eaſily diſcern that his inſtructors had received the articles of their faith implicitly from a claſs of teachers, or a religious community, without even a ſubſequent exerciſe of reaſoning to confirm what they had thus adopted. They believed theſe articles through the ha-

bit of hearing them, and maintained them by the habit of believing them. The recoil of his feelings, therefore, did not alarm his conſcience with the convict on of its being abſolutely the truth of God, that under this uninviting form, he was reluctant to embrace. Unaided by ſuch a conviction, and unarmed with a force of argument ſufficient to impreſs it, the ſerioufneſs, perhaps, ſometimes, rugged ſerioufneſs, of his friends, inceſſantly aſſerting his mind to be in a fatal condition till he ſhould think and feel exactly as they did, was little likely to conciliate his repugnance. When, ſometimes their admonitions took the mild or pathetic tone, his reſpect for their piety, and his gratitude for their affectionate ſolicitude, had, perhaps, a momentary effect to make him earneſtly wiſh [that] he could abdicate every intellectual refinement, and adopt the entire aſſemblage of their feelings and ideas. But as the contracted views, the rude figures, and the mixture of ſyſtematic and illiterate language recurred, his mind would again revolt, and compel him to ſay—this cannot, will not, be my mode of religion." (Pp. 129—132).

Our author very properly cenſures the ſtyle in which religious inſtruction is often communicated. It is frequently barbarous, vulgar, and diſguſting. His idea is right when he ſays that it appears to him "that Chriſtian doctrine ſhould be given in that uncoloured neutral vehicle of expreſſion which is adapted indifferently to common ſerious ſubjects; which may, therefore, be called the language of generality; and which ſhould become peculiar on any one ſubject, only juſt ſo far as that ſubject has indiſpenſable peculiar terms." (P. 150). But it is certainly true that the mode of expreſſion made uſe of by thoſe who are deemed Evangelical, is widely different from the general ſtandard of language. It is diſtinguiſhed by a ſtarch ſyſtematic caſt of phraſeology; "inſomuch" ſays Mr. Foſter, "that in reading or hearing five or ſix ſentences of an Evangelical diſcourſe, you aſcertain the ſchool by the mere turn of expreſſion, independently of any attention to the quality of the ideas." (P. 145). On this important topic we copy the following impreſſive reflections.

"The proofs of an intellect ſuperior, in ſome ſmall degree at leaſt, to the common level, accompanied by a moderate ſhare of elegance and of correctneſs, are requiſite to even the loweſt form of what can be deemed good writing by cultivated and critical readers. It muſt have either theſe combined qualities, or an extraordinary meaſure of one of them. Superlatively ſtrong ſenſe will denominate a performance excellent, or at leaſt, able, writing in the abſence of all the graces, and notwithſtanding a conſiderable degree of incorrectneſs. Below this pitch of ſingle, or of combined quality, a book cannot, in a literary view, pleaſe, though its ſubject were the moſt intereſting upon earth; and for acceptance, therefore, the ſubject is unfortunate in coming to thoſe perſons in that book. A diſguſting cup will ſeem to ſpoil the fineſt element which can be conveyed in it, though that were the nectar of immortality.

"Now, in this view, I ſuppoſe it will be acknowledged, that the Evangelical cauſe has not, on the whole, been happy in its prodigious liſt of authors. A number of them have diſplayed a high order of excellence; but one regrets, as to a much greater number, that they did not revere the dignity of their religion too much to beſet and ſuffocate it with ſuperfluous offerings.

To

To you I do not need to expatiate on the character of the collective Chriſtian library. It will have been obvious to you that a great many books form the perfect vulgar of pious authorſhip, an aſſemblage of the moſt ſubordinate materials that can be called thought, in language too grovelling to be called ſtyle. Now only ſuppoſe a man, who has been converſant and enchanted with the works of eloquence, refined taſte, or ſtrong reaſon, to become an enquirer after Evangelical truth, and in the outſet to meet with a number of books of this claſs: in what light would the religion of Chriſt inevitably appear to him, if he did not find ſome happier delineations of it?" (Pp. 173—175).

Large as our quotations have already been, and obliged as we are to draw to a concluſion; we yet cannot quit the ſubject of ill-written and injudicious works, on topics of religion, without laying before our readers one other paragraph from this ingenious Eſſayiſt, with which we need hardly obſerve, that we moſt cordially agree.

"It is quite unneceſſary to ſay, that the liſt of excellent Chriſtian writers would be very conſiderable. But as to the vaſt maſs of books that would, by the conſenting adjudgment of almoſt all men of liberal cultivation, remain after this deduction, one cannot help deploring the effect which they muſt have had on unknown thouſands of readers. It would ſeem beyond all diſpute or queſtion, that books which, though even aſſerting the eſſential truths of Chriſtianity, yet utterly preclude the full impreſſion of its character, which exhibit its claims on admiration and affection, with inſipid feebleneſs of ſentiment, or which cramp its ſimple majeſty into an artificial form, at once diſtorted and mean, muſt be ſeriouſly prejudicial to the influence of this ſacred ſubject, though it be admitted that many of them have ſometimes imparted a meaſure of inſtruction, and a meaſure of conſolation. This they might do, and yet convey very contracted and inadequate ideas of the ſubject at the ſame time. There are a great many of them into which an intelligent Chriſtian cannot look, without rejoicing that *they* were not the books, or not alone the books, from which he received his impreſſions of the glory of his religion. There are many which nothing would induce him, even though he did not materially differ from them in the leading articles of his belief, to put into the hands of an inquiring young perſon; which he would be ſorry and aſhamed to ſee on the table of an infidel; and ſome of which he regrets to think may ſtill contribute to keep down the ſtandard of religious taſte, if I may ſo expreſs it, among the public inſtructors of mankind. On the whole it would appear, that a profound veneration for Chriſtianity would induce the with that, after a judicious ſelection of books had been made, the Chriſtians alſo had their *Caliph Omar, and their General Amrou.*" (Pp. 180—183).

Mr. Foſter is ſeriouſly diſpoſed to maintain that the greateſt part of what is termed Polite Literature, by familiarity with which taſte is refined; and the moral ſentiments are, in a great meaſure, formed; "is fatally hoſtile to the religion of Chriſt." It introduces, he thinks, inſenſibly, a certain ſet of opinions which are not in uniſon with the principles of that religion, and trains the feeling to a habit alien from the Chriſtian Spirit. And here he does not refer to writers obviouſly and profeſſedly irreligious, who have laboured to ſeduce

the judgment into error, and the paſſions into view; but to the general aſſemblage of thoſe elegant authors who are held eſſential to a liberal education, and who are commonly regarded as favourable to both religion and virtue. It is *modern* literature too that he has principally in view; though of the ancients he obſerves that their writings "have continued to operate till now with their own proper influence, that is, a correctly heatheniſh influence, in the very light and preſence of Chriſtianity on the minds of many who have admitted the truth of that religion." (P. 185). He does not ſuppoſe us in any danger of adopting the fables of the Pagan mythology; for moſt readers are ſufficiently tired of Jupiter and Juno, of Apollo and Minerva. But the characters and ſentiments which the ancient hiſtorians, biographers, and poets lead us to admire are certainly not the characters and ſentiments which are recommended by the religion of Chriſt. Of our author's criticiſm on the Iliad we extract a ſhort ſpecimen, containing obſervations as juſt as they are refined. The reader of Homer, he ſays,

"Will find the mightieſt ſtrain of poetry employed to repreſent ferocious courage as the greateſt of virtues, and thoſe who do not poſſeſs it as worthy of their fate—to be trodden in the duſt. He will be taught, at leaſt it will not be the fault of the poet if he is not taught, to forgive an heroic ſpirit for finding the ſweeteſt luxury in inſulting dying pangs, and imagining the tears and deſpair of diſtant parents or wives. He will be inceſſantly called upon to worſhip Revenge, the real Divinity of the Iliad, in compariſon of which the thunder of Olympus is but a deſpicable pretender to power. He will be taught that the moſt glorious and enviable life is that to which the greateſt number of other lives are made a ſacrifice: and that it is noble in a hero to prefer even a ſhort life, attended by this felicity, to a long one which ſhould permit a longer life alſo to others. The dire Achilles, a being whom, if he really exiſted, it had deſerved a conſpiracy of nations to chain or to ſuffocate, is rendered intereſting, even amidſt the horrors of revenge and deſtruction, by the intenſity of his affection for his friend, by the melancholy ſublimity with which he appears in the funeral ſcene of that friend, by one momentary inſtance of ſomething like compaſſion, and by his ſolemn references to his own approaching death. A reader who has even paſſed beyond the juvenile ardor of life, feels himſelf intereſted in a manner that excites, at intervals, his own ſurprize, in the fate of this ſtern deſtroyer; and he wonders, and he wiſhes to doubt, whether the moral that he is learning be, after all, exactly no other than that the grandeſt employment of a great ſpirit is the deſtruction of human creatures. But this, my dear friend, is the real and effective moral of the Iliad, after all that critics have ſo gravely written about leſſons of union, or any other ſubordinate moral inſtructions, which they diſcover, or imagine in the work. Who but critics ever thought or cared about theſe inſtructions? Whatever is the chief and grand impreſſion made by the whole work, on the ardent minds which are moſt ſuſceptible of the influence of poetry, *that* is the real moral; and Alexander, and, by reflection from him, Charles XII. correctly received the genuine inſpiration." (Pp. 190—192).

On modern authors our ingenious Eſſayiſt is particularly ſevere. To the Polite Literature of a country he does not aſſign any claſs of writers directed

directly theological. That ſchool of thinking and of taſte in which cultivated minds are generally bred conſiſts of poets, moral philoſophers, hiſtorians, eſſayiſts, and the writers of fiction. All theſe he aſſerts, with very few exceptions, inculcate maxims and ſentiments which are far from being in uniſon with genuine Chriſtianity. It will probably not a little ſurprize our readers to find Addiſon and Johnſon accuſed of being hoſtile to Evangelical Religion. Our author complains that the many ſerious eſſays in the Spectator have not more of what he calls "a Chriſtian tinge;" and he alleges that the company with whom Addiſon aſſociated would have greeted him with a perfect ſtorm of ridicule, when he entered one of his celebrated coffee-houſes, on the day after he ſhould have publiſhed, in the Spectator, a paper, for inſtance, on the neceſſity of being devoted to the ſervice of Jeſus Chriſt. The mind of Addiſon, our author thinks, was not ſtrong enough to encounter ſuch ridicule. That of Johnſon, however, he acknowledges was; yet he thinks that Johnſon was not ſufficiently familiar with the ſimplicity of Evangelical truth. From the writings of this illuſtrious moraliſt, Mr. Foſter has quoted two ſhort paſſages, which he thinks juſtifies this charge; and as they are ſhort we give them to our readers. "the ſick chamber is a ſcene, where the higheſt and brighteſt of mortal beings finds nothing left him but *the conſciouſneſs of his innocence.*" (Rambler. No. 48). "Sorrow is not that repentance of crimes, for which, however, irrevocable, our Creator has promiſed to accept it as an *atonement.*" (Do. No. 47). We would differ from Mr. Foſter with reſpect; but we certainly ſee in theſe phraſes of Johnſon no dangerous doctrine. Our author ſeems to think that they exclude the proper atonement or ſatisfaction of Chriſt. If ſo he is, ſurely, under a miſtake. The phraſes themſelves imply no ſuch meaning; and we know, beſides, with the utmoſt certainty that no man was ever a firmer believer than Johnſon in that fundamental tenet of the Chriſtian faith.

We ſhall briefly advert to two other charges advanced by our author againſt this claſs of our writers. He ſays that they "commonly repreſent eternal felicity as the pure reward of merit;" and that they recommend "Anti-Chriſtian motives to action." (P. 275). He inſtances in the "love of praiſe," or of human applauſe. But in talking comparatively of human conduct, it is not very eaſy to avoid either the notion or the term of *merit*; and, in our ſtrictures on Mr. Overton's work, we have ſhewn that this expreſſion involves no hereſy, and is no way derogatory to the merits of Chriſt. With regard to the love of praiſe, we wonder what ſhould have led Mr. Foſter to regard it as an Anti-Chriſtian motive; for we think that it is fully ſanctioned and approved in the books of both the Old and New Teſtaments. On the whole, we ſuppoſe that the following ſentence will be reckoned uncommonly and unjuſtly ſevere.

"At the cloſe of this review of our fine writers, it appears to me a moſt melancholy conſideration that ſo many accompliſhed and powerful minds ſhould

ſhould have been in a world, where the nobleſt cauſe, which that world ever ſaw, was inviting their aſſiſtance, and that this cauſe ſhould have vainly ſought even their neutrality. They are gone into eternity with the guilt reſting on them of having employed their genius, as the magicians their enchantments againſt Moſes, to counteract the Saviour of the world." (P. 269).

A Letter from the Archbiſhops and Biſhops of the Province of Dublin to his Holineſs Pius VI. on the Conſtitution announcing the Condemnation of the Errors of the Synod of Piſtoria; with the Anſwer which they received by order of his Holineſs. To which is added a Letter from the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide to the Eccleſiaſtical Truſtees on the Eſtabliſhment and Regulations of the Royal College of St. Patrick at Maynoth; with the Anſwer of the Truſtees to the ſaid Brief, and the elegant original Latin as [it] was printed by the College Printer, by order of the Truſtees. 12mo. Pp. 47. 8d. Coghlan, London. 1797.

THIS very ſhort pamphlet, with a very long title-page, came lately to our hands by chance: and as, among other things, it ſhews, in the teeth of the advocates for Popiſh emancipation, that the Church of Rome has *not* changed her doctrine reſpecting the perſecution of heretics, and her diſpenſing power, we think it neceſſary to take ſome notice of its contents. We paſs over the epiſtle of Archbiſhop Troy and his ſuffragans to the Pope, on their receiving his condemnation of the doctrines of the Synod of Piſtoria, and the anſwer of the preſident of the congregation *de propaganda fide*; though many things in both merit animadverſion: and proceed to that Preſident's Letter to the Truſtees of the College of Maynooth, and to their reply. Both of theſe will prove by the moſt undeniable inferences, that the above unſocial and dangerous tenets are, *at this day*, the doctrines of the Church of Rome, and of her faithful children the hierarchy of Ireland. The Preſident, in his official letter, ſanctioned by the Pope, after deſiring them to pay attention to the *morals* of the ſtudents under their care, comes next to the point of *doctrine*.

"The next object of your paſtoral care will be to provide for the young candidates for holy orders the wholeſome food of ſound doctrine to be by them tranſmitted to the next generation which will be the beſt means you can employ to prevent the introduction or the propagation of pernicious errors among your flocks.

And that this doctrine may be the ſound doctrine of the Church of Rome, he points out in the following paragraph the pure ſource from whence that ſound doctrine is to be drawn.

"As many theological points are ſtill treated problematically in the ſchools, ſo that either ſide of the queſtion may be maintained without the imputation of error or a breach of peace, it will behove you to direct the attention of the ſtudents to ſuch authors as have treated the ſubject. Your choice

choice will naturally be directed to thoſe two great luminaries of the Church, Auſtin and Aquinas. After the moſt diligent inveſtigation, they have delivered opinions which have been revered by the wiſeſt men of all countries and all ages, and have been ſactioned by the approbation of the Apoſtolic See."

He concludes with ſaying that ſtudents, thus inſtructed, "will excite the admiration of their opponents, and will induce them to glorify God in *truth and in ſpirit:*" which, in plain language, is neither more nor leſs, than that it will enable them to pervert every Proteſtant in Ireland to the Popiſh faith!

Thus far the Preſident of the Propaganda. Let us next ſee how Archbiſhop Troy and his ſuffragans echo back the ſentiments of the Preſident.

"In the inſtruction of youth, the hopes of the ſanctuary, it will be of great importance to put before them the wholeſome food of *ſound* doctrine, as your Eminence very juſtly obſerves, and to caution them againſt noxious and ſuſpected paſtors. They muſt be taught to refrain from trivial and contentious diſcuſſion. In thoſe queſtions which are treated problematically, the opinions of Auſtin and Thomas Aquinas, whoſe doctrine has obtained the higheſt commendations of the Apoſtolic See, will be the ſafeſt guides in their inveſtigations."

We juſt ſtop to obſerve that the concluding ſentence of this extract is in the Engliſh tranſlation a very *faint* copy of the Latin: "St. Auſtin, and his moſt faithful interpreter St. Thomas," are both deprived of their *Saintſhip* in the tranſlation: and the indeciſive words "*will be the ſafeſt guides in their inveſtigation*," melt away the ſtrong and decided expreſſion of the original, "*hos, tanquam duces et magiſtros in ejuſmodi quæſtionibus amplectandos et ſequendos curabimus:*" which is literally "we *will* take care that their doctrine *ſhall* be embraced and followed, as they are our guides and doctors in queſtions of the kind."

Let us now ſee what is the doctrine of theſe two luminaries of the Romiſh Church, (ſo warmly recommended *at this day* in the official letter of the Propaganda Preſident, and ſo fervently adopted as their guiding ſtars by the Iriſh biſhops) with reſpect to perſecution and the diſpenſing and depoſing power.

St. Auſtin, in a long letter *ad Boniſacium*, recommends *perſecution*, by arguments indeed the moſt deſpicable, and by a moſt ridiculous and monſtrous perverſion of Scripture. "Schiſmatics cry out (he ſays) did Chriſt ever make uſe of *force*, or *compel* any one? He certainly did—I give them St. Paul as an example—Chriſt, they muſt acknowledge, firſt *compelled*, and then inſtructed him *." We will venture to pronounce that this Saint's *identification* of the *converſion* of St. Paul with the *perſecution* of the Church of Rome, however it may

* Ep. 50. ad Boniſacium.

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be *taught*, cannot be *believed* even by the Profeſſors of the College of Maynooth; and that the pupils muſt have their underſtanding completely diſciplined by the ſcourge of *authority*, before they can ſwallow the abſurdity. This Saint, this *Dux et Magiſter*, quotes Scripture here with as much propriety as the Doctors of the Sorbonne in the reign of Charles IX. who tell us that the *extermination* of heretics is undeniably a Scripture doctrine, "as it is written in the Book of Judges that Sampſon ſet fire to the tails of 300 foxes; by which foxes are plainly typified unto us the ſaid heretics, whom we ought to *correct* and puniſh *capitally*."

St. Thomas is, indeed, the faithful interpreter of his precurſor Auſtin; here Dr. Troy and his Suffragans have told the truth: the Saint himſelf ſhall confirm their verity on this point. He lays it down as an *axiom* that "a heretic, if he obſtinately perſiſt in his hereſy after a firſt and ſecond admonition, is firſt to be anathematiſed, and then put to death." (2da. 2dæ. quæſt. 11ma.) In his happy quotation of Scripture in confirmation of his axiom, he vies with his leader Auſtin. The quotation is from the vulgate tranſlation of the 10th verſe of the 3d chapter of St. Paul's Epiſtle to Titus, "Hereticum hominem, poſt primam et ſecundam correptionem *devita*." The laſt word, devita, he has choſen, in the face of the meaning of the original Greek*, and in oppoſition to the undoubted meaning of the Latin verb, to tranſlate, by implication, *kill, put to death, exterminate*, inſtead of *avoid, reject*.—But what ſignifies the perverſion of *Scripture*, when the perſecuting doctrines of the *Church* are to be eſtabliſhed, as we are told that the latter is "the *lively breaſt of Chriſt*," the former only "*lifeleſs ink* †." Or of what importance is a text of St. Paul, when weighed in the balance with an axiom of St. Thomas!

As to the other doctrine of the Church of Rome, the *diſpenſing* and *depoſing* power, it is taught in the cleareſt and moſt deciſive manner by St. Thomas, the Doctor whom the Preſident of the Propaganda recommends to the Iriſh Popiſh biſhops, and to the profeſſors of the College of St. Patrick at Maynooth, as the immaculate ſource of ſound doctrine; whom the Iriſh Popiſh biſhops declare they will follow as their guide and Doctor, and whoſe doctrines they pronounce they "*will* take care *ſhall* be embraced and followed!" This Doctor of the *preſent* Popiſh Church in Ireland tells us that although the Chriſtian ſoldiers obeyed the commands of Julian the Apoſtate, it was only becauſe the Church *at that day* had not the *power* of bridling the civil magiſtrates (terrenos principes compescendi) but that the real doctrine of the Church, which, of courſe, is to be acted upon whenever ſhe has *power*, is delivered by Gregory VII. in a council at Rome. "We, following the ſtatutes of our predeceſſors, do, by our apoſtolic autho-

* παραιτου.

† Oration of Ludovicus, a canon of the Lateran Church, before the council of Trent. Apud Jewel's Defence.

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rity, abſolve all thoſe from their oath of fidelity, who are bound to **excommunicated* perſons either by fidelity or oath—till the excommunicated perſons have made proper ſatisfaction."

We recommend theſe plain facts to the conſideration of thoſe *very candid* gentlemen, who, both in and out of parliament, make old father Time ſpeak the language of Moliere's Mock Doctor, "Nous avons changé tout cela." It appears that, like the Doctor, they ſpeak without book; and that Time has made no change in the doctrines, though the practice is happily cramped by exiſting circumſtances; while the true children of Rome exclaim inwardly with St. Thomas, "Eccleſia non habet poteſtatem terrenos principes compeſcendi!" We would likewiſe venture to recommend to the abovementioned *very* candid gentlemen, a little attention to the ſubject in debate: it is in its conſequences of the higheſt importance. Above all, we would earneſtly intreat them, for their own ſakes, not to boaſt of their ignorance, while they pronounce moſt decidedly on the matter in diſpute. Whoever does ſo, whoever ſets out with ſaying that his habits, &c. have never led him to conſider a queſtion which depends on facts, on a knowledge of times paſt, as well as of the preſent, and at the ſame time magiſterially decides upon it, inſtead of conviction, will produce ridicule; "*riſu populum quatit.*"

We had no thoughts of looking into St. Thomas for any thing more than what belonged to the two queſtions of perſecution, and of the diſpenſing and depoſing power: but, in turning over his voluminous work, we ſtumbled on a variety of matter, which, as we had not dealt deeply in the ſtudy of the *Schoolmen*, incited firſt of all our aſtoniſhment, and afterwards, our indignation and abhorrence. That the Church of Rome, *at this day*, and at a time when men, who call themſelves Proteſtants, are endeavouring to perſuade us that the old follies, abſurdities, and iniquities of the ſchools are done away, that time and knowledge, in ſpite of the wou'd-be ſucceſſor of St. Peter, in ſpite of St. Auſtin and St. Thomas, and in ſpite of the preſent ſinful truſtees (and future ſaints) of the college of St. Patrick, have obliged it to lower its tone, and to envelope what it is determined not to change, in a tenfold diſguiſe, ſhould have recommended this Schoolman, and Popiſh ſaint as the repoſitory of knowledge and doctrine, is inconceivable. But it is ſtill more inconceivable that the Iriſh Popiſh biſhops (conſidering the circumſtances in which they ſtand, and indeed in any circumſtances) ſhould have publiſhed this mandate, along with their filial and hearty acquieſcence, and thus have expoſed their nakedneſs and their ſhame.

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* He takes care, in the ſame place, to tell us that all heretics are *excommunicated* perſons: *ergo*, to ſpeak in the ſtile of St. Thomas, it is only becauſe the Popiſh Church of Ireland has not *power*, that Geo. III. an *excommunicated* perſon, now ſits upon the Throne. Vid. 2da. 2dæ. quæſt. 12. Art. 2.

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Were we to recite all the follies, impertinences, and groſſneſs of this *Dux et Magiſter* of the College of St. Patrick, a volume not leſs than his own would be neceſſary; we ſhall content ourſelves with laying before the public one or two.

Proteſtants reſt ſatisfied with the little that is ſaid of angels in the Holy Scriptures, knowing that if more had been neceſſary for a Chriſtian, more would have been revealed. Not ſo St. Thomas: he is as well acquainted with the hierarchy of angels as the divines of the College of St. Patrick are with the numerous gradations in the Romiſh hierarchy. He can tell you how they think and how they act with as much minuteneſs and certainty as the members of the college could anatomiſe the thoughts, and paint the daily exertions of mind, of one of their own ſtudents; he informs us that the *lower orders* of angels are the guardians of individuals, that *archangels* preſide over provinces, *principalities* over human nature at large, *powers* over devils, and that *dominions* are entruſted with the care of inferior angels. That each individual has only one guardian angel; but that a prelate, beſides this guardian angel, is illuminated by an archangel, or a principality. That angels ſometimes fight (*pugnant*) in the cauſe of their particular charges —that the ſame guardian angel ſerves both for the mother and child, while it remains in the womb; with an *et cætera* without end of angelic matters equally certain and edifying.*

Paſſing from this tranſcendent ſubject, the Doctor deigns to treat of mere mortal and carnal affairs, which he handles, to all appearance, *con amore*. His inveſtigation of the paſſion of the ſexes, his minute delineation of its *phyſical* effects (in order, no doubt, that the Confeſſor may be maſter of his ſubject, may be able to get to the bottom of theſe myſterious matters, that he may aſcertain the appropriate penance) is likely, inſtead of tending to purity of life, either in the young confeſſors, or their penitents, to produce a plentiful race of St. Thomas—begotten Iriſhmen, who may be afterwards moulded by the elder prieſts, who are paſt the labours of the younger, into an excellent revolutionary army of the Church, by the help of the ſaint's doctrines of perſecution and the diſpenſing and depoſing power. The articles in St. Thomas *de Virginitate*, *Luxuria*, *de Oſculis*, &c. are convincing proofs of what we here advance. Upon theſe we permit the Doctors of Oxford and Cambridge, and thoſe who have attained a doctorial age, to caſt their eyes. But, however *proper* the minute examination of theſe tickliſh queſtions may be thought by the Church of Rome, and the truſtees of the College of St. Patrick, however neceſſary they may deem them to the inſtruction of their ſtudents who aſpire to the honour of the Confeſſor's chair, in order that they may be able to ſearch out and diſcriminate all the variety of ſhades of the ſexual paſſion in their male and female penitents, we pronounce our VETO to

* Thom. Aquin. Summa, 1ma. pars, quæſt. 106—113, where the reader will find many things equally extraordinary and edifying. The various articles on the Virgin Mary, and they are many, are highly worthy of peruſal.

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the peruſal of them by any freſhman, undergraduate, &c. in either Univerſity. As to the members of the Scotch Univerſities, they are ſo devoted to metaphyſics, to what they call the ſtudy of mind, that, like St. Paul in certain circumſtances, they hardly know whether they are in or out of the body, or indeed whether they have a body; they therefore may venture to take a peep at theſe phyſical queſtions; yet, perhaps, it would be prudent even for them to abſtain from the peruſal.

The obvious concluſion to be drawn from this ſmall pamphlet, thus imprudently ſent into the world, is, that no change has taken place in the Church of Rome with regard to the doctrines inimical to Proteſtant governments: and that ſhe is *now*, as formerly, deeply tinged with the folly and groſſneſs of the ages of darkneſs. The court of Rome, and the Iriſh Popiſh hierarchy, here flatly contradict their Popiſh and Proteſtant defenders in this country, declaring their Church to be *unchanged* and *unchangeable*.

Report of the Trial at Bar of the Hon. Mr. Juſtice Johnſon, one of the Juſtices of his Majeſty's Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, for a Libel, in the Court of King's Bench, on Saturday, the 23d Day of November, 1805. Pp. 122. 2s. 6d. Butterworth, London; Burnſide, Dublin. 1806.

THE trial of a *Judge* for a *libel* is ſomething ſo perfectly novel, in our Courts of Juſtice, as to excite the public attention in a very extraordinary degree. The mind of an Engliſhman is ſo apt to aſſociate every thing that is juſt and honourable, and dignified, and praiſeworthy, with ſuch a character, that it revolts with horror from the contemplation of a charge, the object of which is to fix on it every quality of an oppoſite nature. And in exact proportion as this horror is excited, will be the rigid circumſpection, the ſcrupulous nicety, with which it will examine the proofs of an accuſation, ſo foul, and ſo heinous, when preferred againſt a perſonage of this deſcription. It is in this temper, and with theſe feelings, that we ſate down to peruſe this trial, which, on various accounts, we conſider as one of the moſt important that have occurred for many years paſt. Important certainly it is, as it affects the character of a Judge, till now unimpeached, of a Judge, who, before he was appointed to that high ſituation of confidence and reſponſibility, had holden different poſts of importance, and had diſcharged the duties of each, with honour and integrity unqueſtioned and unqueſtionable. But it is of ſtill greater importance, as it concerns the general adminiſtration of criminal juſtice in this country, the rules of evidence, and the verdicts of juries. And all theſe, in our eſtimation, are moſt deeply implicated in the trial before us.

This caſe, however, differs from moſt proſecutions for ſimilar offences, inaſmuch as no queſtion aroſe reſpecting the libel itſelf—

that

that is, whether it was or was not a libel; it being admitted to be a libel as well by the defendant as by the profecutor. The only points for conſideration, then, were, whether this libel was written by Mr. Juſtice Johnſon, and whether it was publiſhed by him, as averred, in the county of Middleſex. Our obſervations on this latter part will be brief; but on the former, from the conſequence attached to it, we ſhall expatiate ſomewhat at large. In order to compreſs what we have to ſay on the ſubject into as ſmall a compaſs as poſſible, as well as to ſet the queſtion (ſtripped of all extraneous matter) in a clear point of view, we ſhall give that part of the evidence which goes to prove or to diſprove the fact of authorſhip, in oppoſite columns. Our readers will then be able to judge of its weight, and, at leaſt, as competent to decide on it, as the jury before whom it was tried.

It would be the height of preſumption in us to aſſert, in oppoſition to the unanimous opinion of the four Judges, that the caſe, cited by the Counſel, of the ſeven Biſhops, was an analogous caſe; or that the fact of the libel being publiſhed in Middleſex, by the *agency*, or *inſtrumentality* of the defendant, was not proved. But it would be deteſtable hypocriſy in us to ſuppreſs our *opinion* on the ſubject; and not to ſay, that after the moſt attentive peruſal of the arguments of Counſel, and of the ſentiments of the Judges, we cannot, for the life of us, diſcover any difference in the *principle* of the two caſes; nor can we perceive that the golden rule of law, *requiring the beſt evidence of which the nature of the caſe will admit*, was obſerved in the very unſatisfactory proof of publication adduced on this extraordinary trial. The Judges ſeem to have thought it important, in conſidering the application of the caſe of the ſeven Biſhops to the preſent caſe, that the remonſtrance preſented by theſe prelates to the King was *no libel*. But that, with humble deference we contend, had nothing to do with the queſtion. Whether, in point of law, it was or was not a libel, did not ſignify a ſtraw, as to the argument built on the proceedings. It was ſufficient that it was then deemed a libel; and the only point for conſideration was, whether the proof of publication in Middleſex, required in that caſe, was not that kind of proof which had not been ſupplied in the preſent caſe, though indiſpenſibly neceſſary to ſupport the charge. The Judges decided that it was not;—we bow to their authority;—though we cannot agree with their concluſion.

Before we proceed to give the evidence, on both ſides, relating to the fact, of Judge Johnſon being the author of the libel, we ſhall ſtate the condition of the different witneſſes, as collected from their own depoſitions; and the neceſſity of this ſtatement our readers will immediately acknowledge, in a caſe in which much, very much indeed, depended on *comparative credibility*.

The witneſſes for the Crown were *four* in number; viz.—1. Mr. Richard Waller, *Solicitor to the Commiſſioners of Cuſtoms* in Ireland;—2. Mr. Charles Ormſby, an Attorney;—3. Mr. Joſhua Nunn, "*Second Remembrancer of the Court of Exchequer, one of the Deputies there, and*

and one of the Secondaries there;—4. Mr. John Edwards, *Solicitor to the Revenue.*

The witneſſes for the Defendant were *five* in number; viz.—1. Sir Henry Jebb, a Phyſician;—2. Dr. Hodgkinſon, Senior Fellow of the Univerſity of Dublin;—3. Mr. Archdale, a Solicitor;—4. Mr. John Giffard, the moſt ſtaunch defender of the King and Conſtitution, in Church and State, and the moſt ſtrenuous oppoſer of traitors and rebels;*—5. Mr. Caſſidy, formerly an Apothecary.

Evidence for the Proſecution.

Mr. Richard Waller:

Q. Do you believe that (the firſt letter) to be the hand-writing of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon?

A. I do, Sir.

Q. Have you any the leaſt doubt that it his hand-writing?

A. I do not feel that I have a doubt in my mind but it is his hand-writing.

Q. As to the body of the letter you ſay you entertain no doubt of it?

A. Indeed, Sir, I have as little doubt as any man can have on any ject.

Q. Have you examined, with equal care that paper? (the ſecond letter)—have you the ſame opinion of that as of the other?

A. I have no doubt; I entertain as little doubt it is the hand of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon, as I can on any ſubject whatever.

In his *cross-examination* Mr. Waller ſaid he had not ſeen the Judge write ſince June, 1801.

Q. I would beg of you to look at theſe papers, they ſeem to me remarkably well-written; did Mr. Juſtice Johnſon always write ſo clearly and ſo neatly as that?

A. No, he did not.

Q. His opinions were not ſo written?

A. Not quite ſo ſmall.

Q. Nor quite ſo fair?

Evidence for the Defence.

Sir Richard Jebb *examined.* He ſtated, that he had been *extremely* intimate with Judge Johnſon for about thirty years; had been conſtantly in the habit of correſponding with him, every week; and had been "*intimately acquainted with his hand-writing for twenty years constantly, down to the present time.*"

Q. Look very carefully at theſe papers, becauſe you cannot have ſeen them before. From your knowledge of his hand-writing, do you believe this (the firſt letter) to be his hand-writing?

A. I do believe this is not the hand-writing of Judge Johnſon.

Q. Look at this (the ſecond letter).

A. This ſtrikes me to have leſs ſimilitude than the other.

Q. Is that hand-writing a leſſer or fairer hand than Judge Johnſon writes?

A. His hand in general was larger and freer, and the turns of the long-tailed letters are different from his.

Q. From your idea of his hand-writing, by ſeeing it for ſo long a period, do you think this is his hand-writing?

A. My belief is, that it is not.

Q. Your belief is not founded on compariſon?

A. No, from my long knowledge of his habit of writing.

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* We do not collect this from the depoſition of this honourable man, but from our perſonal knowledge of his conduct and character. But of this more hereafter.

A. His

Evidence for the Profecution.

A. His general hand was free, but more like the words "Affairs of Ireland."

(N. B. Thefe words were written in quite a different hand.)

Q. You admit this writing is much more fair and fmall than the general hand of the Learned Judge?

A. It is much fairer and fmaller than his common writing.

Mr. Charles Ormfby examined;—he ftated, that he had known the Judge 20 years, and had feen him very often write franks, and had alfo feen opinions of his writing.

Q. Be fo good as to tell us whether you believe that (the firft letter) to be Mr. Juftice Johnfon's hand-writing?

A. The general tenor I do apprehend to be his hand-writing.—The general body I apprehend to be his writing. The general writing (of the fecond letter) I believe to be his hand-writing, from the beft opinion I can form.

Cross-examination.

Q. You had an opportunity of feeing his corrected pleadings?

A. Yes; and I have had franks from him before he was a Judge; and have feen his fignature fince he was a Judge, fuch as a fignature to affidavits; but I do not recollect feeing any of his letters immediately after he was a Judge.

Q. Was the character of his hand-writing to the corrected pleadings as correct as that?

A. They were rather of a looſer hand than this—this feems to be written more clofe; but the caſting of the letters is the fame, particularly the letter I; and the corrected pleadings was rather a wider hand. The letter I, in particular, is like the letter he figns his name—Johnfon. The hand-writing to opinions, or pleadings, was what I call a more fcattered hand.

Q. As large as the hand to pleadings?

Evidence for the Defence.

Q. I think I underſtood you to have ſaid, that your acquaintance with his hand-writing has gone on without interruption?

A. There never has been an hour's interruption.

In his *cross-examination*, Sir R. Jebb ſaid, that the hand-writing of the letters was "very diſſimilar to Judge Johnſon's," but that a man leſs acquainted than himſelf with the Judge's writing, might think there was ſome general reſemblance:—that he had ſeen the Judge write "to crowd as much in as he could," and on a brief, and that "on all occaſions" he had "ſeen him write a larger and freer hand.

Dr. Hodgkinſon *examined*. He ſtated himſelf to be nearly related to the Judge, to have correſponded with him, "without interruption," for "upwards of twenty years," and to have ſeen him frequently write.

Q. From your general knowledge of his character of writing, do you believe that to be his hand-writing? (ſhewing him the firſt letter).

A. I do not believe it to be his hand-writing.

Q. Look at the other (the ſecond letter).

A. *This is ſo totally a different hand*, particularly at the beginning of it, *that I have no heſitation in ſaying it is not his hand-writing*, as I believe.

Cross-examination.

Q. With reſpect to the firſt, you ſeemed to take pains to look over it?

A. I did ſo, becauſe an abſtract piece of writing of this kind being produced to me now, for the firſt time, at a diſtance from my own country, it is neceſſary that I ſhould carefully examine it, and eſpecially as at firſt view it has ſome general appearance.

Q. You was at the ſame diſtance from your native country when you looked at the ſecond paper, and therefore why did you take leſs time in looking at it than at the firſt?

Q. He

Evidence for the Proſecution.

A. No, this ſeems to be a contracted hand.

Q. He wrote a worſe character in pleadings?

A. It was a looſer and a larger hand, and not written with the care which appears in this, of putting ſo much on the paper.

Joſhua Nunn, examined. — He ſtated, that he had known the Judge ſince 1792, that he had ſeen him write frequently, that he knew the character of his hand-writing, and that he had examined the letters, containing the libel, before.

Q. Tell me whether you believe that (the firſt letter) to be in the hand-writing of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon?

A. I do believe this to be of the hand-writing of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon.

Q. Do you believe that (the ſecond letter) to be the hand-writing of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon?

A. I do, Sir.

In his *croſs-examination* Mr. Nunn ſaid he had not ſeen the Judge write ſince June, 1801.

Mr. John Edwards *examined*. He ſtated himſelf to have been clerk to the Collector to the Revenue from 1794 to 1802; that is, from the age of 16 to 24, that he had had frequent opportunities of ſeeing the Judge's writing, and that he *ſuppoſed* he could form a judgment whether a paper was his writing or not.

Q. Do you believe it (the firſt letter) to be his hand-writing?

A. I do, Sir, from the opinion that I can form; to the beſt opinion I can form, I believe it to be Mr. Juſtice Johnſon's hand-writing.

Q. Seeing the general character of the hand-writing, do you ſpeak to that (the ſecond letter) alſo?

A. I conceive it to be the hand-writing of Mr. Juſtice Johnſon, according to the beſt opinion I can form of it.

Evidence for the Defence.

A. This latter is ſo very unlike Judge Johnſon's writing, particularly in the beginning of it, that it took me leſs time to form an opinion of it than of the firſt paper writing.

Q. Then you have no doubt as to this not being his hand-writing?

A. It is not, particularly in the beginning, at all like it. I will not ſay there are not ſome words like, but the general appearance of it is very unlike.

Q. Did you look at the word "could?"

A. I did not particularly obſerve that word in theſe papers.

Q. How do you ſpell it?

A. C-o-u-l-d; I believe it is uſually ſo ſpelt.

Q. How does Judge Johnſon ſpell it? does he ſpell it with the "l," or without it?

A. I have found that he has ſpelt it both ways.

Q. Can you take upon yourſelf to ſay, that you took particular notice of the words *ſhould* and *could*, to ſee how he ſpelt them in the papers now ſhewn to you?

A. Certainly *not particularly*, it was hardly poſſible to do ſo under the circumſtances, and in the manner in which they have now been produced to me; nor do I believe that he has ſpelt them in the papers now ſhewn to me.

Q. It was the general character then of his hand-writing that you looked at?

A. Yes.

Q. You ſaid that you had ſeen his writing frequently; what was the nature of that writing?

A. Letters and notes.

Q. When written?

A. Some a long while ago; ſome within theſe few months.

Q. I believe you have paid particular attention to the words *could* and *would* in Judge Johnſon's writing?

Evidence for the Defence.

A. In the papers now ſhewn to me I did not, it was ſcarcely poſſible for me to do ſo under the circumſtances in which I have now firſt ſeen them; in other writings of his I have certainly done ſo, and have ſeen him ſeveral times and on different occaſions ſpell theſe words in both ways.

Q. I take it you obſerved that circumſtance before this proſecution?

A. Certainly long before.

Q. Who was it that pointed it to you that the words *could* and *would* were ſpelt that way?

A. Without an "I." I had heard it, I believe, rumoured through the Four Courts in Dublin, that that circumſtance had been fattened upon by the proſecutors, and that it had left no doubt of his being the author of theſe papers.

Q. You heard it by common rumour?

A. Yes.

Q. Then as you have heard there was that diſtinguiſhing feature, I ſhould think that on referring to theſe letters you would take particular notice of it?

A. Having heard the obſervation, I in conſequence of it have looked over, and examined many writings of Judge Johnſon's, ſome written many years ago; and I have found that he ſpelt theſe words both ways, therefore, even if it had been practicable, I ſhould not probably have directed my attention to this circumſtance upon the preſent occaſion.

Q. I am ſure you muſt have ſhrewdneſs enough to ſee that it would be very material to obſerve whether *could* and *ſhould* were wrote in the uſual way that they are written or not?

A. I think I have already explained why, even if practicable, it is not probable that I ſhould now direct my attention to that circumſtance;

Evidence for the Defence.

Judge Johnſon, like moſt other perſons, writes them in both ways.

Q. What would you ſay to his writing them differently ſince the proſecution?

A. Of that I know nothing, not having obſerved it.

At the cloſe of his examination the Doctor ſaid, that he had come to England principally on his own buſineſs, and never conceived, till the Monday before the trial, that he was to be called as a witneſs on it.

Mr. Archdale *examined*. He ſtated himſelf to have been intimately acquainted with the Judge for 14 or 15 years, to have correſponded with him, to have ſeen him write *lately*, and for *the courſe of ten years*, to have been an aſſiſtant to Mr. Waller, and to have had more frequent opportunities of ſeeing the Judge write than Mr. Waller had.

Q. In your judgment, is that (the firſt letter) the hand-writing of Judge Johnſon?

A. In my judgment of Judge Johnſon's writing it is not.

Q. Have you any doubt?

A. Upon my word, *I have no doubt in the world.*

Q. What is your opinion of the ſecond letter?

A. My opinion is, that it is not Judge Johnſon's hand-writing, *nor do I think it any way like it; no ſimilitude at all to it.*

Nothing material to the point occurred in the *croſs-examination* of this witneſs; in his *re-examination* he added, that Judge Johnſon's hand was "a fair and larger hand" than the hand-writing in the letters.

Mr. John Giffard examined. He ſtated that he had known Judge Johnſon more than 30 years, though he had been "but little in the habit of ſeeing him write;" that, however, he had ſeen him write "within this week." Upon the two letters being ſhewn him, ſeparately, he ſwore, that

Evidence for the Defence.

that he did not believe them to be the hand-writing of the Judge.

In his *cross-examination* he ſaid, that the firſt letter was more like the Judge's hand than the ſecond. "The one is a crampt hand—the Judge's is a looſe daſhing hand."

Q. That is not ſuch a one as the Judge writes?

A. No, it is not.

Being ſhewn the ſecond letter again, he was aſked, "Does the cut of theſe letters reſemble Judge Johnſon's letters?

A. If you ſuppoſe the tranſverſe lines to be parallel to the plane of the horizon, then the writing ſhewn me is more perpendicular to that plane than Judge Johnſon's.

Q. You could not be impoſed on then ſo much as to believe it his?

A. No.

Q. You ſay that this hand is larger than yours, and that Judge Johnſon's is larger than yours; this writing, then, may be Judge Johnſon's?

Evidence for the Defence.

A. O, Sir, that is a groſs *non ſequitur*.

Mr. David Caſſedy *examined*. He ſtated, that he had known Mr. Juſtice Johnſon for 25 years, had been educated in the ſame city with him, and had been in the habit of correſponding with him "generally to this day." Being ſhewn the *firſt* letter, he ſaid, "There is ſome reſemblance."

Q. From your knowledge of the character of his writing, do you believe it to be his?

A. I rather think it is not, for his is a more diffuſe and larger hand.

Q. Is the character of that hand-writing more ſtiff than you think the Judge would write?

A. I think it is.

Q. Look at the other paper.

A. I do not think the ſecond is ſo like as the firſt.

Q. Putting the ſame queſtion again to you, do you think either of theſe his hand-writing?

A. I think neither.

Such is the evidence on both ſides. Our readers will form their own opinion of it. *Our* opinion moſt decidedly is, that the weight of evidence, whether we conſider the opportunities enjoyed by the reſpective witneſſes, of acquaintance with the hand-writing of the Judge, or the deciſion with which they ſpeak, is in favour of the defendant. But whatever difference of opinion may obtain on that point; we think there exiſts not a man bold enough to deny this fact, that the evidence was ſuch as muſt, of neceſſity, throw ſuch a degree of doubt and uncertainty about the caſe, as, whenever it appears, is invariably, by the mild ſpirit of the Britiſh law, made to favour the party accuſed. That this is the courſe conſtantly purſued in all our Criminal Courts, at the Old Bailey eſpecially, where the Judges never fail to cloſe their charges to the Jury, with an exhortation to give the priſoner the benefit of any doubt that fairly ariſes in their minds, we appeal to the knowledge of every man, in the habit of attending theſe courts. Thoſe minds, in which the contradictory evidence produced on this trial could not, or did not, raiſe ſuch doubts, muſt be very differently conſtructed from any minds of which we have any conception. But we now come to a very delicate part of the queſtion—the Judge's charge. Here we advance with fear and trembling. Reſtrained, on the one hand, by our great reſpect for the character and

high ſtation of his Lordſhip; and ſtimulated, on the other, by a ſenſe of public duty, by an earneſt deſire to promote truth and juſtice, we feel at a loſs how to act. Actuated, however, by the beſt of motives, we will boldly proceed, aſſerting that right of free diſcuſſion, which Britons alone, of all the nations of the earth, enjoy, but not treſpaſſing beyond thoſe bounds which prudence and decorum alike preſcribe.

"His Lordſhip," we are told, "read over the evidence of Mr. Waller, Mr. Ormſby, Mr. Nunn, and Mr. Edwards, without any particular comment, farther than that from the official ſituations they held, they were perſons who appeared to be every way competent to identify the hand-writing of the defendant.

Now, with all due deference, we ſubmit, that as all the obſervations of his Lordſhip, on the evidence for the defendant, had a direct tendency to diſcredit the teſtimony of his witneſſes, it might not have been amiſs—as the merciful ſpirit of the Engliſh law, too, always conſiders a Judge as Counſel for the priſoner—to remark, that three out of the four witneſſes for the proſecution were officers of the Crown, and might therefore poſſibly be ſuppoſed to have ſome little bias on their minds. Not that we mean even to inſinuate, in the moſt diſtant manner, that an officer of the Crown is not as honourable a man, and as unlikely to forſwear himſelf, as any other man upon earth. Far be any ſuch unworthy ſuppoſition from our minds. We only ſuggeſt what, as it appears to us, would have been a ſtrong mark of impartiality in a Judge, without at all going out of his way. Beſides, it could not eſcape obſervation, that the Viceroy of Ireland, in which country theſe witneſſes held public ſituations, was not very ſcrupulous in the diſmiſſion of public officers, who preſumed to differ from him, even in the conſcientious diſcharge of their duty.

The Chief Juſtice laid a great ſtreſs on a cock-and-bull ſtory repeated by Sir Richard Jebb, of a perſon in Dublin who wrote ſo like Judge Johnſon, that the two hands could not be diſtinguiſhed; and that he had written the letters containing the libels; but by *whom* he was told this, or whether he believed it, does not appear from his teſtimony. But an inference is drawn from this, that he did believe it, and that therefore when he ſaid that the writing of the libellous letters was not like the writing of the Judge, he muſt forſwear himſelf. In our mind ſuch an inference is not at all ſanctioned by the evidence (ſuppoſing it to be here correctly reported) and is much too ſtrong to be looſely drawn. It is obſervable, too, that Sir Richard Jebb ſwore that he had ſeen the hand-writing of the Judge forged in franks, long before this libel was written. But the Chief Juſtice purſues this (as it appears to us, *miſtaken*) idea. "The courſe of the examination of the witneſſes tends to the inference, that although two perſons wrote ſo much alike that their writing could not be diſtinguiſhed, yet that what is ſuppoſed to be the hand-writing of one of them, has no reſemblance to the character which it profeſſes to have imitated." Now, if ſuch be the courſe of the examination of the witneſſes, that exa-

examination muſt be moſt incorrectly detailed in the printed trial before us, for moſt certainly, we neither did nor could, draw from it any ſuch inference as that which is here imputed to his Lordſhip. It never appears to have been ſuppoſed, by any one of the witneſſes in queſtion (admitting the accuracy of the printed trial), that the libellous letters were written by the ſame perſon who forged the Judge's hand-writing ſo ſucceſsfully. Dr. Hodgkinſon plainly ſays, that the forged writing was produced to him by the Judge's brother, "to ſhew how eaſy it was to counterfeit the Judge's hand-writing." And ſurely it was natural enough, when it was known that the charge was to be ſupported by the ſimilarity of the hand-writing, for a near relative of the party accuſed to ſhew the dreadful uncertainty of ſuch a criterion of guilt, by producing a perſon who, it was very well known, wrote ſo much like the Judge, that the writing of one might be eaſily miſtaken for that of the other. But the confuſion of Sir Richard Jebb's head gave to this natural proceeding a ſuſpicious aſpect, and the Counſel for the Crown took advantage of it; while the matter coming unexpectedly on the defendant's counſel, who, it appears from the remark of one of them, had no previous knowledge of the tranſaction, the Judge's brother, Mr. Thomas Johnſon, who was preſent, and who could, we doubt not, have cleared up this apparent myſtery in a ſatisfactory way, was not called. Perſiſting, however, in the ſame notion, his Lordſhip farther adds, "the only concluſion I can draw is, that it appears very inconſiſtent, that a perſon ſhould be ſaid to write ſo like Judge Johnſon, that the ſtyle of the one cannot be diſtinguiſhed from the other; and yet that witneſſes ſhould afterwards come into court, and pretend that there is no ſimilitude between *their* writing." The *inconſiſtency* here talked of, can be viſible only to thoſe who can diſcover in this trial what, after the moſt attentive peruſal, and re-peruſal of it, we have been unable to find.

"As to Mr. Archdale," his Lordſhip ſtill addreſſing the Jury, ſaid, "it may be neceſſary for you to attend to the demeanour of this man. He has ſaid, upon his oath, that if, upon his going out of court at this late hour of the evening, any perſon whom he did not know, was to aſk him to walk with him to Whitechapel, he would go with him; and he alſo tells you, he went to a houſe in Dublin, *only because he was not afraid to go any where:* ſuch a mode of giving evidence in a Court of Juſtice, certainly throws great diſcredit on the teſtimony of any witneſs."

Mr. Archdale, on his examination, ſwore that he went to the houſe in queſtion with Mr. Giffard, a barriſter. "Q. How came you to go with him?—A. *Becauſe he aſked me*, and I am not afraid to go any where." Either his Lordſhip's charge or Mr. Archdale's evidence muſt, ſurely, be incorrectly taken. We ſhall only farther obſerve on this part of the charge, that nothing but his Lordſhip's ignorance of the habits and diſpoſition of Iriſhmen, could have led him to diſcredit their teſtimony upon oath becauſe they have more wildneſs and eccentricity about them than Engliſhmen.

We now come to conſider a part of this charge which ſtrikes us as the moſt extraordinary paſſage we ever read in any production purporting to bear that ſtamp of ſolemnity which every portion of a Judge's charge muſt bear. But before we quote it, we muſt extract that part of Mr. Giffard's evidence which gave riſe to it.

"Q. Of what profeſſion are you?—A. At preſent I am of none. I held an office in the Revenue, but was turned out by Lord Hardwicke.—Q. Why?—A. For that, being a Proteſtant, I moved a Petition, which was preſented to the Imperial Parliament, praying them to ſuſtain the King and Conſtitution.—Q. How do you know this was the cauſe of your diſmiſſal?—*A.* Lord Hardwicke told me ſo."

Now we beg the particular attention of our readers to the Chief Juſtice's obſervation on this part of Mr. Giffard's evidence.

"As to what has been told you by the next witneſs, Mr. Giffard, reſpecting Lord Hardwicke's having turned him out of office *because he was a Proteſtant*, it is a libel on the Noble Lord's Character, to ſuppoſe there can be *truth* in ſuch a ſtatement. If it was poſſible *that Lord Hardwicke*, or any other man, *had been baſe enough ſo to have acted*, it is *not at all probable* that he would have been hardy enough to have avowed it, *as the witneſs tells you he has done*.

Now here we would contend againſt all the Judges of the land, were it poſſible they could be oppoſed to us on ſuch a point, that if a witneſs of unimpeached character, ſwears that a fact, within his perſonal knowledge, did happen, no argument founded on the *improbability* of ſuch fact can poſſibly be urged againſt the credibility of his teſtimony. If the fact did not happen, Mr. Giffard was guilty of wilful and deliberate perjury; it was a point on which he could not be miſtaken; it did not admit of *miſconception*; it was not ſuſceptible of two *interpretations*; it muſt, therefore, have happened, preciſely as he ſtated it, or he muſt be wilfully perjured. To oppoſe the plea of *improbability* to the truth of ſuch teſtimony, is to——but we forbear; we would not for the world hurt the *feelings* of the Chief Juſtice; and we have recently been told, for the firſt time in our lives, by high authority, that to hurt the feelings of a public man, by a diſcuſſion of his public conduct, is *libellous*. Here again we bow to the authority, though we enter our ſolemn proteſt againſt the *dictum*. We have, however, a great deal more to ſay on this extraordinary paſſage. In the firſt place, we conclude, that the Chief Juſtice's words muſt be reported incorrectly; for our readers will perceive, in a moment, that Mr. Giffard did not ſay what the Judge is here made to aſſert that he did ſay. Mr. Giffard did not, certainly, ſay that Lord Hardwicke turned him out of office *becauſe he was a Proteſtant*, but becauſe he (being a Proteſtant) moved a certain Petition againſt *Catholic Emancipation*. Now, we can very eaſily conceive, that Lord Ellenborough, who formed a part of that Adminiſtration, by which Lord Hardwicke was appointed Viceroy of Ireland, and which came into power on the very principle of a determined oppoſition againſt the monſtrous

monſtrous claims of the Iriſh Papiſts, muſt naturally feel a conſiderable degree of indignation at any imputation caſt upon the ſaid Viceroy, for diſmiſſing a truſty and approved ſervant of the King, only for oppoſing thoſe very claims. And if this had been intended as a ſarcaſm on the Viceroy (however we might have thought it miſplaced in a judicial charge) it would have paſſed unnoticed by us. But the ſolemnity of the occaſion, and the high character of the Judge, forbid us to entertain any ſuch ſuppoſition. We can, then, only expreſs our aſtoniſhment, that a fact notorious to all Ireland, a fact which had been rendered the ſubject of public diſcuſſion; on which reſolutions had paſſed publicly in the Municipal Aſſembly of Dublin, ſhould have been ſo perfectly unknown to his Lordſhip, as to induce him rather to ſuſpect a moſt reſpectable gentleman of wilful and unprofitable perjury, than to give credit to his aſſertion of the truth of ſuch a fact.

For our part, we have been long acquainted with every circumſtance attending this diſgraceful tranſaction; and ſhould have commented on it, with appropriate ſeverity, but for particular circumſtances, partly of a public, partly of a private, nature. Since, however, a doubt has thus been caſt upon it, it would be the height of injuſtice to a moſt meritorious individual, and, indeed, a dereliction of public duty, were we any longer to perſevere in the cautious plan of ſilence which we have hitherto purſued. Beſides, every conſideration calls upon us for ſuch an explanation as will remove from the noble mind of the Chief Juſtice the erroneous impreſſions which, from the moſt laudable impulſe, as ſuggeſted above, it was led to entertain.

After the Committee of Popiſh Delegates had ſate ſeveral days, in Dublin, not only with the acquieſcence of the government of that country (who certainly had no right to interfere with them), but in frequent communication with it, and with its perfect approbation, a petition was by them prepared, and, as is well known, afterwards preſented to the Imperial Parliament, where, ſtrange to ſay, it was ſupported by Mr. Grattan and Lord Grenville! The loyal Proteſtants of Ireland, who, notwithſtanding the falſhoods of their advocates in both countries, "actually poſſeſs forty-nine fiftieths of the landed, and three-fourths of the moveable property in Ireland; who are more than two-fifths of the whole population, and who have always remained firm to their King, and to the Britiſh Conſtitution," felt alarmed at theſe proceedings, and preſumed to think that they alſo might meet and deliberate, in a conſtitutional way. Accordingly the citizens of Dublin met in their "Quarter Aſſembly," on the 26th of April, 1803, when Mr. Giffard, after an appropriate ſpeech, moved the following reſolutions, which were carried, with only *three diſſentient voices*:

1. "That we have ſeen with aſtoniſhment and ſorrow, a copy of a petition lately preſented to Parliament in the name of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, and containing demands of political power, which, if yielded, muſt be ruinous to our happy Conſtitution in Church and State.

2. "That the time and manner of making theſe demands, while the hor-

rors of the laſt ten years are ſtill freſh in our recollection, are ungracious and improper, and muſt neceſſarily produce *the most dangerous irritation in the public mind.*

3. "That a petition be preſented to each Houſe of Parliament, in oppoſition to the demands of the Roman Catholics of Ireland."

A petition was accordingly framed, and afterwards preſented. And the very day after theſe reſolutions were carried, on Saturday, April 27, was Mr Giffard diſmiſſed from the office of Surveyor on the Cuſtom-houſe Quay of Dublin, which he had holden ever ſince the year 1783. He immediately wrote to Lord Hardwicke, complaining of this treatment, the conſequence of his effort, in the preſent inſtance, to ſupport and maintain the King and Conſtitution. And will any man be bold enough to deny that, in moving the reſolutions in queſtion, he at once exerciſed an acknowledged right, and diſcharged a ſacred duty? He afterwards had a long converſation with the Viceroy, who did not for a moment conceal that his diſmiſſion was the conſequence of his conduct at the Quarter Aſſembly. His Excellency, forſooth! wiſhed to conciliate all parties, and to prevent all diſcuſſions on religious ſubjects!! That the wiſh was a laudable wiſh we are not diſpoſed to deny; but, by the means which his Excellency adopted for its gratification, we ſhould have ſuſpected that he had paſſed his whole life in Ireland; for certainly, to conciliate one party by irritating the other, and to prevent diſcuſſion by confining it to oneſide of the queſtion, is not a very cuſtomary, nor a very rational mode of proceeding. Be that as it may, Lord Hardwicke perſiſted in his reſolution to gratify, as he thought, the Papiſts at the expence of the Proteſtants, and Mr. Giffard remains diſmiſſed at this very moment. To put the matter, however, beyond all doubt, we ſhall extract a part of the proceedings of the Commons of Dublin, on the 2d of May 1805, from the Dublin paper of May 4.

ADJOURNED QUARTER ASSEMBLY.

Thursday, May 2, 1805.

"Mr. Giffard addreſſed the Sheriffs and Commons on a ſubject which he conſidered as of the higheſt importance—their right, in common with every other ſubject, to petition any branch of the legiſlature—a right, which never till the preſent day had been denied, or even doubted. He called to their recollection, that on the laſt day of their meeting in full aſſembly, both houſes had almoſt unanimouſly agreed to petition the two houſes of the Imperial Parliament on the ſubject of the Roman Catholic *demands*, and to pray, that the Conſtitution in Church and State ſhould be preſerved unimpaired: it were unneceſſary, he ſaid, to recapitulate the arguments which were then offered; they had convinced the aſſembly, and the matter had paſſed with full approbation: For the part he had taken in promoting that buſineſs, he had been the next day diſmiſſed from an office in the Cuſtoms, which, with unſpotted character, he had enjoyed for two-and-twenty years; an office, wholly unconnected with politics, converſant only in mathematical calculations, and no more related to religious differences than was the art of watch-making; and, after a courſe of twenty-ſeven years ſervice, he was deprived of every thing of which government could deprive him; for what? For exerciſing

exerciſing the very right which the Roman Catholics exerciſe, and juſtly exerciſe. In any ſituation connected with politics, if the conduct of their ſervant was diſagreeable to government, they were right in diſcontinuing his ſervices; but to deprive him of an office which was the gift of the noble and liberal-minded Duke of Rutland—a man for ever to be lamented by Ireland—a man whoſe gifts were honours—whoſe favours ſhed dignity where they were beſtowed; an office which through every change of government from that to the preſent time, whether his friends were in or out of power, he had ſtill been allowed to hold; even Lord Fitzwilliam, irritated and exaſperated as his mind was by thoſe about him, had never condeſcended to the meanneſs of looking for the Surveyor and Gauger on the Cuſtom-houſe Quay, to offer as a ſacrifice to party, was an act reſerved for the preſent day; and the crime which it was to chaſtiſe—was a loyal effort, in conjunction with the whole City-Aſſembly, to maintain the Conſtitution in Church and State, and to defend the King from the affront of a demand to violate his Coronation Oath. Who has done this (continued Mr. Giffard)? into the erudite and accompliſhed mind of Lord Hardwicke, ſuch a thought would never enter; the goodneſs of his underſtanding would ſhew him that the perſon who addreſſes you was doing but his duty, and the goodneſs of his heart would never allow him to injure any one for a corporate act of mere duty. His ſecretary, Mr. Marſden, and his ſecretary the Biſhop of Kildare, I know did not adviſe it: whence then did it emanate? Did it emanate from the viper of ſeditſon, who having ſtung his own country almoſt to death, is now gone to ſhed his venom in another? Did it emanate from the libeller of the King's perſon, and of the principles of the Proteſtant government, and of the glorious King William; probably, indeed, it was a compact of men on the other ſide, and that this is probable may be gathered from the fact, that it has for many days paſt been declared by ſome of the moſt notorious agitators, that the perſon who ſhould preſume to lift his voice againſt the Roman Catholic petition, ſhould be viſited by the ſevereſt diſpleaſure of the government. To juſtify this act, it is ſaid that a meſſage was ſent to me to forbid me from broaching the ſubject of the petition at all; this may be intended as a juſtification of the diſmiſſal; but I moſt poſitively deny receiving any ſuch meſſage. My honourable friend, Major Sirr, who ſtood by me during the debate, knows I received none; the gentleman who is ſaid to have brought it knows I received none ſuch. How I would have acted had I been forbidden, it is unneceſſary for me to ſay; but this I beg to ſay, that ſuch a ſtyle of commanding would reduce us to mere automata, inſtead of leaving us free agents to act according to the dictates of our conſcience upon the oaths we have taken, and upon a ſubject the moſt momentous to one's happineſs.

"That the King has a right to diſmiſs his ſervants, was never denied, miſerable ſhould we be were it otherwiſe; but that the miniſter of the crown ſhould diſmiſs his Majeſty's ſervants for their zeal and fidelity to him; is unaccountable indeed. I know, Gentlemen, I have troubled you too long upon this ſubject; which, did it concern only ſuch an unimportant perſon as me, would be inexcuſable; but it concerns you all—it concerns all the Proteſtants of the United Kingdom—it concerns the Parliament, who are the guardians of the privileges of the people, becauſe they are their own privileges. I have done my duty—I may have cauſe to ſigh, but I have none to bluſh; for I may truly ſay, that had I but ſerved my God with half the zeal I ſerved the government,

'He

'He would not in mine age,
Have left me naked to mine enemies.'

"Mr. M'Auley then roſe.—He ſaid, that before he came into the aſſembly, he had heard that from common report, which nothing but the ſtatement which he had juſt heard, could have allowed him to believe—that a gentleman, who had for twenty-two years faithfully ſerved his Majeſty, had been deprived of his office for daring to raiſe his voice in ſupport of the King and Conſtitution.

"He was called to order by Mr. Kelly, of the Treaſury, who inſiſted that the aſſembly had met for a ſpecific purpoſe concerning the city accounts, and could entertain no other buſineſs.

[A long diſcuſſion enſued upon the queſtion of order, in which Mr. Stephens, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Hutton, and Mr. Farrel, ſupported Mr. Kelly; and were oppoſed by Mr. M'Auley and Mr. Powell. The point was at length determined by a queſtion being put from the Chair, upon permitting Mr. M'Auley to ſpeak, which was carried in the affirmative.]

"Mr. M'Auley then proceeded.—He thought the preſent a moment in which the aſſembly was either to vindicate itſelf, and to aſſert its right of diſcuſſing public queſtions—or to ſubmit to have their mouths ſealed up by the direction of the Caſtle, and, perhaps, linger out a miſerable and contemptible exiſtence, until it ſhould be the pleaſure of ſome future adminiſtration to ſend an officer to turn them out of their room, as Cromwell did the Rump Parliament, with ſcoffs and expreſſions of contempt. He felt the difficulties which might impede the reſolutions, he was about to offer; every man of thoſe he addreſſed might be liable either in his trade or his perſon to feel the vengeance of an angry government or a vindictive party, who ſeemed to have found favour with that government: but he diſdained ſuch feelings as thoſe of fear or prudence on ſuch an occaſion; he would make, perhaps, a laſt effort for the freedom of debate; perhaps he might ſucceed in preſerving it.

"He then moved,

"That it is the undoubted right of every ſubject of this realm to petition any branch of the legiſlature."

"This reſolution he would follow by two others:

"That to injure any ſubject for the exerciſe of his right is oppreſſive.

"That we have heard with ſtrong feelings of regret, that a member of this aſſembly has been deprived of an office which he had held for twenty-two years under the crown, for having exerciſed this right in his corporate capacity."

The two firſt of theſe reſolutions were carried unanimouſly; and the third by a majority of 58 to 19.

If we had not long known the perfect ignorance of the people of Great Britain reſpecting the real ſtate of Ireland, and the pains taken to miſlead them, we ſhould be very much aſtoniſhed that the Chief Juſtice of the King's Bench ſhould not have been acquainted with a fact of ſuch public notoriety. We are convinced, however, that when his Lordſhip ſhall have been informed of this tranſaction, he will experience deep regret at having, by his diſbelief of it, caſt diſcredit on the teſtimony of as honourable a man as his Majeſty can boaſt of among his ſubjects. Nor will his regret be diminiſhed when he

he learns, that the life of this faithful ſervant of the crown had been devoted to the ſervice of his country: That for ten years he commanded a company of militia, during a moſt perilous criſis, when he ſignalized his zeal and his courage on various occaſions; that he is now captain commandant of three companies of infantry which he raiſed during the late ſanguinary rebellion; and that, in the courſe of the year 1798, he loſt a gallant ſon, an officer in the army, who was murdered by the rebels in cold blood, for refuſing to abjure his ſovereign, and to become their leader; two nephews, one of whom was killed in apprehending Lord Edward Fitzgerald; and the other was murdered by the rebels; a brother-in-law, who died in a rebel priſon, and five other relations who fell in the different actions and maſſacres. We are convinced, too, that when his Lordſhip learns this, he will feel with us the extreme cruelty—to uſe the mildeſt term we can apply to ſuch conduct—of depriving ſuch a man of all the fruits of his able and honeſt ſervices, to the free and full enjoyment of which he was entitled on the ſtrongeſt grounds of juſtice, and of turning him looſe on the world, at an advanced age, to ſeek for a new profeſſion. We are moſt happy, however, to ſtate that this ſtrange conduct of the late Viceroy did not meet the approbation of his Majeſty's miniſters; who, indeed, could not but ſee the ill-effects of this miſtaken zeal; which, inſtead of promoting a ſpirit of conciliation, had a direct tendency to kindle the flames of diſcord. With equal pleaſure too, we ſtate, that one of the very party which it was meant to gratify, we mean one of the Catholic Delegates, moſt honourably expreſſed his diſapprobation of the meaſure to the Viceroy himſelf, and reprobated the idea of injuring any man for fairly maintaining his principles.

As the Chief Juſtice muſt now be convinced of the truth of Mr. Giffard's ſtatement, we ſhall leave his Lordſhip to characterize, as he pleaſes, the conduct to which it refers. We have not dared, ourſelves, to apply to it the very ſtrong term of reprobation which appears in that paſſage of his Lordſhip's charge, which we have quoted above.

To return to the trial of Judge Johnſon; it is very probable that the remarks of the Chief Juſtice on the evidence of Meſſrs Archdale and Giffard, might have an effect on the minds of the jury; but ſtill we inſiſt, that the contradiction between the evidence on the point which conſtituted the very eſſence of the guilt, viz. the hand-writing, was ſuch as to render the caſe extremely doubtful; and we repeat, where that is the caſe, in a criminal cauſe, it is the invariable practice of a jury to pronounce a verdict of acquittal. But, ſtrange to ſay, this jury does not ſeem to have thought the caſe doubtful at all; for they returned a verdict of *Guilty*, in a *quarter of an hour!!!*

We have dwelt ſo much at large on this trial, not ſolely on account of its conſequence to a high judicial character; but from its effect, as a *precedent*; in caſes of great doubt, to be determined on the

the moſt doubtful of all kinds of teſtimony—*evidence to hand-writing*. It appears to us a departure, as we have ſaid, from the general practice, to find a verdict of *guilty* in a cauſe which it is impoſſible for any man to read without concluding that it is a caſe of extreme doubt.—Our obſervations, hitherto, have been confined to the evidence delivered on the trial, and our concluſions have been drawn from that evidence. But we are very much miſtaken, indeed, if it will not hereafter appear, that Mr. Juſtice Johnſon not only did not write himſelf, but did not procure any other perſon, directly or indirectly, to write for him, thoſe libels of which he has thus been found guilty. We happen to know that they contain reflections on a nobleman whom the Judge has never ſpoken of but in terms of approbation and reſpect. As to ourſelves, we cannot be ſuppoſed, in our obſervations on this extraordinary caſe, to be ſwayed by any other motive than that of public duty. The libels in queſtion are directed againſt perſons, ſome of whom have been frequently defended, and not one of whom has, till now, been attacked, by us. We ſubmit our arguments and reflections to the judgment of our readers, and will chearfully abide their award.

The Works of the late Edward Dayes, Draughtſman to his Royal Highneſs the Duke of York, inſcribed, by permiſſion, to the Ducheſs: containing an Excurſion through the principal Parts of Derbyſhire and Yorkſhire, with illuſtrative Notes, by E. W. Brayley; Eſſays on Painting; Inſtructions for Drawing and Colouring Landſcapes; and Profeſſional Sketches of Modern Artiſts. 12 Plates, Pp. 375, 4to. 1l. 10s. Publiſhed by Mrs. Dayes, Devonſhire-ſtreet, Queen-ſquare. Vernor and Hood, &c. 1805.

PRÆSTAT *non vivere, quam vivere miſere*, was the concluding opinion of the moſt ingenious, but ill-fated author of this volume. The fate and fortune of painters and poets often preſent the moſt melancholy views of human life: their morbid ſenſibility, their natural eccentricities, and the *genus irritabile vatum*, contribute to embitter an exiſtence that contains the elements of the moſt exalted pleaſures. The common parent of their calamities indeed has frequently been exceſſive vanity, that peſtilence of human intellect. Time, however, and the more general diffuſion of knowledge, have greatly diminiſhed the influence of this malady; few of the votaries of the Muſes will now ſuffer famine, in order to make verſes, inſtead of purſuing ſome more profitable employment. But the progreſs of taſte, unhappily, has not hitherto been ſo efficient; and it is juſtly obſerved, that, "it is a great misfortune for the arts, when the world entertains an opinion, that a man cannot be a genius without being mad; or, in other words, being a brute or a ſcoundrel." Artiſts ſtill languiſh between the deluſive hopes of poſthumous fame, and the miſery conſequent on momentary exceſſes. Their peculiar circumſtances perhaps may be their

their apology, as every admirer of a beautiful poem is eager to know ſomething of the life of the author, while the amateurs of painting reſt contented with the knowledge of the painter's name.

The firſt part of this volume conſiſts of "An Excurſion through the principal parts of Derbyſhire and Yorkſhire;" the great object of which was to viſit the North, and the Weſt Ridings of the latter, and contemplate the beauties of Dove-Dale in the former. In the literal and graphical delineations of Mr. Dayes, there is an eaſy correctneſs, a grandeur and fidelity of expreſſion rarely to be found in ſuch topographical outlines; they form a ſtriking contraſt to the bombaſtic rant and puerile flippancy, laviſhed on the ſame diſtricts by a recent touriſt. It is even ſtill more rare to find an artiſt, whoſe original and penetrating genius has explored the depths of hiſtory, and the primordial cauſes of events, joined with all the qualities neceſſary to a great maſter of the pencil; and whoſe literary, archailogical, hiſtoric, and philoſophical obſervations are accompanied by moral reflections; replete indeed with gloomy forebodings, yet enlivened with an air of novelty and ſublime piety, that even infidels muſt admire. Wandering over a moſt romantic country, and contemplating ſcenes that may be denominated beautifully ſublime, his ſuſceptible mind ſeems to have expanded with the majeſty of nature, to the moſt animated adoration of the Supreme Will. A few ſhort extracts, taken promiſcuouſly, will enable our readers to judge of the truth of theſe obſervations.

"To recapitulate the merits of DOVE-DALE, in a picturesque point of view, were to say in a few words, that it poſſeſſes an union of grandeur and beauty, not to be equalled by any thing I ever beheld. It is of that high caſt of character which Pallas holds among the females in poetry. Borrowdale, in Cumberland, is ſublime from its magnitude; yet, being deſtitute of wood, it wants the power to please: all there is barren and deſolate; here beauty reigns triumphant. Delightful Dove-Dale! In thee nature exhibits one of the finest of her productions! Beautiful ſpot! Well may Cotton have ſpoken ſo rapturouſly of thy ſtream—

'None ſo bright,
So pleaſant to the taſte, none to the ſight;
None yields the gentle angler ſuch delight.'

Happy is the man, who, diveſted of care, finds himſelf enabled to retire to ſuch ſcenes as theſe, and who at the ſame time poſſeſſes ſenſibility to enjoy their excellence. To be feelingly alive to ſuch wonderful works, is true piety; ſuch as not to be found in the buſtle and artifice of ſociety. Great and beneficent Creator of the Univerſe! deign to accept of this tribute of a feeling heart, while my ſoul overflows with gratitude: THOU who in thy goodneſs haſt beſtowed on me a ſenſibility to diſtinguiſh the perfection of thy works! Without this bleſſing, all nature would become a blank; 'nor hill, nor dale, nor ſhady grove, nor the enlivening ſun, nor limpid ſtream,' could charm the ſenſe to rapture."

The account of Coniſborough Caſtle, the Britiſh *Caer Conan*, has become highly intereſting to the lover of antiquity, ſince the learned diſſertations of Mr. King have given credibility to the opinion of its having

having been "built in an age when Phenician and Phrygian ideas of architecture ſtill prevailed in this country;" and, from the circumſtance of its being built on a rocky eminence, the favourite ſituation of both Phenicians and Greeks, it is not improbable that it preſents ſome imitations of the *Phrygiæ arces*. The ruins of the once magnificent Caſtle of Pontefract are ſketched with equal freedom and fidelity, and we have a conciſe hiſtory of this blood-ſtained fortreſs, in which a King, two royal Princes, and two Earls were put to death. To the pictorial and hiſtorical account of Wakefield is attached a very amuſing biographical memoir of "that eccentric character, the wealthy and witty Dr. *John Radcliffe*, an eminent phyſician, and the founder of Radcliffe Library at Oxford." In Dr. Radcliffe that ſpirit of boundleſs generoſity and independence which has raiſed this country ſo far above any other, and which is connate with Britons, is happily pourtrayed. To the picturesque beauties of *Malham-Cove*, ſucceed thoſe of

"GORDALE-SCAR.—There a ſtupendous mass of rocks forms a ravine, through the bosom of which flows a conſiderable ſtream. The rocks dart their bold and rugged fronts to the heavens, and impending fearfully over the head of the ſpectator, ſeem to threaten his immediate deſtruction. Rock is piled on rock in the moſt terrific majeſty; and an impetuous cataract ruſhes down their dark centre, tearing up with its irreſiſtible force, the very foundations of the earth. Good heavens, what a ſcene! How awful! How ſublime! Imagine blocks of lime-ſtone riſing to the immenſe height of two hundred yards, and in ſome places projecting upwards of twenty over their baſes; add to this the roaring of the cataract, and the ſullen murmurs of the wind that howls around; and ſomething like an idea of the ſavage aſpect of this place may be conceived. None of the paſſes in North Wales equals this."

That Mr. Dayes poſſeſſed a mind much ſuperior to that of being a mere delineator of ſenſible objects, will be the obſervation of all thoſe who read his ſketch of the character of the parliamentary general, John Lambert. The following reflections on the prediſpoſing cauſes of the Civil Commotions that have occaſionally agitated this country, are a happy illuſtration of what has been not improperly denominated the *Philoſophy of Hiſtory*.

"The truſt reposed in Monarchs is of ſo extenſive and important a nature, that the ſlighteſt error is attended with the moſt fatal conſequences. Like cities under the influence of an earthquake, thouſands are buried in their fall. The unhappy Charles, though poſſeſſed of many private virtues, by endeavouring to change a free government into an abſolute monarchy, began a Revolution, under which the nations of Europe at preſent groan. By his miſconduct, multitudes were induced to leave this country for America; not with a diſlike to the man only, but with a ſettled hatred to the office of King. The great province of New England was peopled at that period; and every one knows, that it was at Boſton where hoſtilities firſt commenced; and that the deſcendants of thoſe who had emigrated, were the moſt ſtrenuous in their oppoſition. The conſequence may be eaſily traced;

traced; the flame spread to France, where it overturned that monarchy; and when the effects shall cease the Almighty only knows! Every thing has its cause; even that great event was preceded by another important one, which prepared the way. Henry the Seventh, too proud to claim the throne by descent, and too timid to demand it by right of conquest, well knew that it was the power of the great Barons which had made him King. Their power was such, that any one of them could alarm, and the combination of two or three, overthrow him. Hence it became necessary to use policy, rather than force to break their power. To obtain his end, he framed the statutes of population; the statute against retainers; and that for alienation. The first, by its effect, increased agriculture, by ordering that all farm-houses, to which one hundred acres of ground and upwards were attached, should be kept up for ever: this rendered the yeomanry in a certain degree free of the Lords, who thereby lost their foot soldiers. The act against retainers prevented the Lords having in their service the younger sons of good families, who were men of spirit, and well skilled in arms, and who served them as cavalry: this being forbidden under heavy penalties, deprived them of another prop to faction. Hence they became inactive, prodigal, and luxurious; and their immense estates, though more than enough for country hospitality, became too small for the refined pleasures of the town, and the expences of a court. But the statute of alienation, enabling them to sell, or mortgage, without heavy fines, effectually destroyed their power, and accelerated the fall of the old Barons by tenure. By these means Henry the Seventh increased his own power with that of the Commons, the Nobility being the only sufferers. The dissolution of the monasteries under his son, threw a vast property into the public market; and the strides which commerce was then making, raised up purchasers in the wealthy merchant and trader."

In the ſequel the author diſcovers a tendency to favour the ſentiments of the ancient Whigs, in conſequence of which his portrait of Lambert is drawn with a rather friendly pencil, but ſtill with much decorous moderation and love of impartiality. His knowledge of hiſtory, notwithſtanding his conſtitutional bias, has prevented him from being deluded in the extreme by the ſilly declamations of modern politicians. Indeed he evinces a taſte and ſtrength of mind and judgment that we ſhould in vain look for in the effuſions of ſuch ſpeculators.

Returning to the more immediate objects of his ſtudy, he preſents us with a very neceſſary, but often neglected part of the deſcription of mountains; namely, their elevation above the level of the ſea: had it been accompanied with ſome information on the direction of their moſt elevated ſummits, and greateſt declivities, it would have been ſtill more intereſting to the naturaliſt. It appears that the mountains of Yorkſhire are the higheſt in South Britain; Wernſide is 5340, Ingleborough 5280, and Pennygent 5220 feet, while Snowdon is only 3568, and Benlomond 3240 feet high. Near Aſkrigg are Weathercoat Cave, Mill-gill Force, Whitfield's Force, and Hardrow Force, which preſent ſuch a variety of waterfalls, cataracts, and caſcades, that we are not ſurpriſed to find they arouſed the enthuſiaſm of this picturesque touriſt,

touriſt. The ruins of Bolton Caſtle calls forth ſome of the author's melancholy preſentiments in very animated and ſympathetic reflections on the tranſient ſtate of human grandeur, with ſtrong perſuaſions to be contented, and "paſs away our fleeting moments in a divine tranquillity." Bolton was the birth-place of Henry Jenkins, who lived from the year 1500 to 1670. The few ſcattered remains of Joreval or Jervis Abbey, arouſe the artiſt's honeſt indignation againſt the taſteleſs and covetous deſpoilers of antient works of art, who make fences or roads with what was, perhaps, "the only memorial of departed excellence!" Reverence for antiquity, if not a virtue, is at leaſt its hand-maid; and we have ſeen to what exceſſes of brutality thoſe wretches have gone, who deſpiſed and inſulted the memory of their forefathers: In the ſame moral ſtrain are the reflections on Fountain's Abbey. Our author's obſervations on the antient and modern ſtate of York, the *Eboracum* of the Romans, are in his own peculiar manner; a manner that arranges facts to beget reflection, and that communicates much information in few words. His account of that city is infinitely ſuperior to a deſcription ſince attempted by one of its natives in his Highland tour. On Burton's labouring to prove the fratricide and inceſt of Caracalla at York, a remark occurs that cannot be too aſſiduouſly inculcated.

"What matters it where a wretch might have perpetrated crimes which diſgrace the nature of man! It would be much better to conſign them, with their actor, to oblivion: ſuch inquiries do not contribute in the leaſt to the advantage of ſociety. What is it to us, whether Sappho was a proſtitute, or how often Anacreon might go drunk to bed? It is a great pity that hiſtory ſpeaks ſo often to our paſſions, and ſo ſeldom to our reaſon. The falſe morals in poetry have done infinite harm: Homer begat Achilles, whoſe diabolical actions became the guide to Alexander and others, who plague ſociety with their vices."

On the moral character of the people we have the following concluding obſervations.

"The inhabitants of this moſt delightful county appear, in general, to be in a high ſtate of cultivation; they are polite, hoſpitable, and attentive to ſtrangers; being totally deſtitute of that narrowneſs of ſoul that too frequently gives the moſt exquiſite pain of mind to the obſerver. The manners of the females are extremely amiable; they are mild as the zephyrs of their own native vales, and faſcinate, by their beauty, like the ſpring."

In endeavouring to give our readers ſome idea of the manner and ſpirit of this original excurſion, we paſſed over the "Illuſtrative notes," by the editor, Mr. Brayley, who, as might be expected from his acknowledged talents and exquiſite taſte, has enriched the works of his deceaſed friend with multifarious obſervations, genealogical, literary, mythological, and philoſophical. Our limits proſcribe the poſſibility of extracting more than one of theſe very amuſive and intereſting illuſtrations.

"The delightful grounds of HAM, in Staffordſhire, the ſeat of H. Bate-

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man, Eſq. are generally viſited by ſtrangers, for the purpoſe of enjoying a ramble in their romantic walks. Their great celebrity, however, has ariſen from the ſingular circumſtance, of the rivers *Hamps* and *Manifold* here emerging into day within fifteen yards of each other, after flowing in diſtinct ſubterraneous channels; the former from the vicinity of Wetton Mill, a diſtance of nearly five miles Northward; and the latter from Leek Water-Houſes, about ſix miles to the South-Weſt. That the ſtreams which riſe here are actually the ſame that are engulphed in the fiſſures of the rocks at the above places, has been proved by experiment; and that their waters do not intermingle during their under-ground courſe, is evident, from the difference of temperature, which, on trial with the thermometer, in October, 1802, I found to be two degrees; the water of the Hamps being at 46, and thoſe of the Manifold at 48 degrees. The temperature of the air was 51 degrees. In a little receſs or chaſm in the limeſtone rocks which overhang the hole whence the former ſtream iſſues, and incorporated with the limeſtone, are ſome ſingular petrifactions like *chert*, exhibiting the correct forms of eels, flat-fiſh, &c. In a grotto, in theſe rocks, Congreve is recorded to have written his comedy of the Old Bachelor."

The account of ebbing and flowing wells is ſtill more curious; but the illuſtration of the word *Yule* or *Y-Hule*, in the Celtic, or ancient Britiſh Mythology, will, from another circumſtance, intereſt even thoſe who may not be ſo favourably diſpoſed to ſubjects of North-Weſtern antiquities. A bronze bas-relief, found at Colcheſter, has recently been exhibited in the Society of Antiquaries: it conſiſts of a boy or genius ſeated on a dolphin, the head of which ſeems depreſſed into a ſhape ſimilar to that of a bird. The learned antiquary who exhibited it, acknowledged himſelf unable to give any ſatisfactory account of this intereſting piece of antiquity, but ſuppoſed it to be one of the various repreſentations of the god of love, or of the *Dii penates*. Mr. Brayley has here mentioned a figure nearly ſimilar, as an emblem of "the deſcent of Bacchus *ad inferos*," which, it is alleged, the Greeks borrowed from the people of the North-Weſt regions. How far this may be accurate we ſhall not at preſent inquire; but we hope that the diſcovery of the bas-relief and the above ingenious ſuggeſtion may tend to illuſtrate thoſe parts of the Celtic Mythology and antiquities, which are ſtill involved in almoſt impenetrable obſcurity.

Hitherto we have ſeen Mr. Dayes in the character only of a picturesque touriſt, we have now to view him in his profeſſional one of painter and philoſopher; and if the productions of his pencil have procured him a laſting reputation in the one, we doubt not but theſe "Eſſays on Painting" will inſure him equal fame in the other. The Eſſays are nine in number, moſt of which have previouſly appeared in Tilloch's Philoſophical Magazine, whence they have been tranſlated into French. They treat of Principles of compoſition as connected with landſcape painting; on Taſte; the Elements of Beauty; on Grace; on Invention; on Compoſition, or Diſpoſition; Power and Uſefulneſs of Drawing; on Manner and Penciling; and on Style. It were in vain to attempt an analyſis of the vaſt variety of ſubjects diſcuſſed in theſe Eſſays, almoſt every ſentence of which contains an

aphoriſm, uſeful, not only to the profeſſional painter, but to the general purpoſes of life. No perſon can attentively peruſe them without experiencing impreſſions favourable to good taſte, to the love of decorum, and of ſocial order. They, indeed, eſtabliſh on the moſt inconteſtable evidence this truth, that virtue or moral rectitude is radically eſſential to all human excellence. It is neceſſary, as the author juſtly obſerved, in every department of life to avoid.

"Falling into a careleſs habit, and going from bad to worſe; what is worth doing, is worth doing well. Let us alſo guard againſt the common error, that genius cannot exiſt unconnected with diſſipation: the fact is, the moſt renowned artiſts have been the moſt temperate. Intemperance and ſtudy cannot exiſt in the ſame mind, or at leaſt in ſuch a degree as to produce any ſenſible advantage. He who begins his career of life in the gratification of his corporeal ſenſations, will, in time, find the memory of all other delights deadened, and ultimately muſt ſink into torpor, from which it will be impoſſible to route himſelf."

Painters will find in theſe Eſſays an inexhauſtible ſubject for thinking, and conſequently a more uſeful auxiliary to the powers of imagination, than idle dreams, or the uſe of unnatural food. In the Eſſay on Beauty, the author differs from Mr. Burke, (who excludes proportion from the conſtituents of the beautiful), and contends for the proportion in the Grecian models of beauty. But in this, perhaps, he is more correct as a painter than a philoſopher, as there is ſomething either in our perceptive faculties, or in beauty, that cannot well be reduced to inches. The Dutch anatomiſt Camper, indeed, went ſtill farther in denying the exiſtence of proportion, and the merit of the Grecian models; but his taſte was vitiated by the French ſchool. Mr. Dayes's Eſſay on Grace is, perhaps, the moſt ſimple and intelligible illuſtration of that quality hitherto attempted. We think, however, that the female figure from Carlo Maratti is ſomewhat too recumbent, and recedes a little from the true line of grace, to approach affectation of melancholy: all the others are exquiſite models of the the graceful. The "Inſtructions for Drawing and colouring Landſcapes," though purely didactic, are enlivened by appoſite quotations from the poets, that give them a ſentimental air ſcarcely to be expected in ſuch a ſubject. To theſe ſucceed "Profeſſional Sketches of Modern Artiſts," which conſiſt of anecdotes and ſtrictures on the works of *fifty-one* artiſts, and will be found a moſt uſeful *Vade-Mecum* to all connoiſſeurs, amateurs, and dealers in the works of the Engliſh ſchool. "Theſe Sketches," as well as the whole work, are the beſt refutation to the abſurd French charge of want of taſte and of ignorance of the fine arts in this country. We ſhall ſelect that of a painter, whoſe factitious fame now impoſes on public credulity.

"George Morland—*Landscapes*. In ſpeaking of this artiſt, I ſhall not judge of his works as the world in general do, by the degree of reputation he has attained, but by the intrinſic merit they poſſeſs. That much of that reputation depends on his ſingularities, is beyond all queſtion; as he

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is as much talked of on that account as any other. It is a great misfortune for the arts, when the world entertains an opinion, that a man cannot be a genius without being mad; or, in other words, be a brute or ſcoundrel. This makes many a weak head run into exceſs to acquire a reputation. The many ſtories of exceſs related of this artiſt would fill a volume of ſome magnitude; yet I moſt fervently hope that no one will be at the pains to tranſmit them to poſterity, as the ſureſt way of diſappointing all who may ſet out in life with ſuch views. Whatever his profeſſional talents may be, he is a diſgrace to the name of man, and a blot on the credit of the art. Even when a boy he was obſtinate and wayward.—Of the high quality of mind, his pictures do not poſſeſs the ſmalleſt ſhare; nor are his objects even ſelected, but ſuch as came firſt to hand, with an eternal repetition of the ſame in every picture, which renders them all of one family. How he can be miſtakenly called, as he is by ſome, the Engliſh Teniers, is aſtoniſhing; except it be from his taking his ſcenes from low life. As well might every portrait painter be called a Reynolds. His colouring is dirty, his touch, dry and ragged; and if it is fair to judge by his open ſcenes, he has a very ſuperficial notion of the *chiaro-oscuro;* and alſo of aerial perſpective, as may be ſeen in his ſkies and diſtances, which are hard and dry. His beſt pictures are the interiors of ſtables; theſe are often ſpirited; but he has no idea of exhibiting his animals in a ſtate of action; nor are they anatomically correct. His pigs, calves, and ſheep, are unqueſtionably his beſt works; and as they are often in interiors, afford ſhadow of courſe. But, though moſt of his pictures are ſhamefully ſlight, he muſt, nevertheleſs, be pronounced a man of ſuperior abilities. Morland died in October, 1804, aged forty."

We ſubmit the following "Profeſſional Sketch" to our readers, without either directly or indirectly pledging our own opinion on the ſubject.

"Henry Fuseli—*Hiſtory.* All the benefit reſulting from the fine taſte of Cipriani, has been in a great degree rendered nugatory, by the wild effuſions of the perturbed imagination of this native of Zurich; and one of the moſt ſevere reflections on the underſtandings of would-be connoiſſeurs, is the taking this man's "chimeras dire" for efforts of the ſublime: they have always appeared to me more like the dreams of a lunatic, than the productions of a ſound mind.

Such frantic flights are like a madman's dream,
And Nature ſuffers in the wild extreme.

A great deal might be overlooked, but for his exceſſive vanity, which will not allow merit in others. He aſſerts that no man in England underſtands drawing but himſelf; and that Michael Angelo was a greater man than God Almighty; alluding to the ſtyle of figures of that artiſt, which he is weak enough to think ſurpaſſes nature. Enthuſiaſm in the arts is often miſtaken for genius, which, if not directed by ſound judgment, will anſwer little purpoſe, and often end in error; this is preciſely the caſe of Fuſeli, whoſe heart is not tempered with the coolneſs of judgment neceſſary to an artiſt. His figures are meagre and poor; and the articulations of the joints ſo hardly marked, as to appear without fleſh on them. The pictures he has painted for the Shakeſpeare Gallery, are ſo full of contemptible whimſies, as to render them unintelligible; and to underſtand them would require a madman's gloſſary; that is, thoſe from the Midſummer Night's Dream. He

who propoſes to himſelf an extenſive and permanent reputation, muſt be careful that his works are founded on the true principles of nature. Of the ſober dignity of hiſtorical painting, he has not the ſmalleſt conception; and to beauty he appears equally a ſtranger: in this reſpect his picture of the Night-mare is one of the beſt. His women in his Shakeſperian works, are the devil. His colouring is chalky and hard, with a great weight in the ſhadows, and little judgment in their diſpoſition. It has been whimſically aſſerted, that when he firſt ſtarted as an artiſt in this country, the R. A's. held a council to conſult whether he was a genius or not. Among other reaſons aſſigned for electing him Profeſſor of Painting, Bacon ſaid he voted for him, that he might once hear him lecture; but he died before that took place. That Fuſeli has injured the taſte of our young artiſts, may be ſeen in their works, as they miſtake his extravagance for grandeur. He produced a figure of Macbeth in front, with his arms up; the back of the ſame figure was Lawrence's Proſpero; and the idea of the back figure appeared in Reynolds's Macbeth. General Vernon ſaid, that when he was ſome years ago returning from Italy through Switzerland, he was ſtruck with certain odd ſcramblings of figures on the walls of the inns, and traced them all the way to England; and that when he ſome time afterwards arrived in London, he knew the man by the ſame extravagancies in his pictures. On the whole, he appears to be juſtly deſerving of the character given of him, "that he is the fitteſt artiſt on earth to be appointed Hobgoblin Painter to the devil."

This volume is dedicated, by permiſſion, to her Royal Highneſs the Ducheſs of York; and, as a work replete with original genius, poliſhed taſte, and juſt moral ſentiment, it is highly worthy of that royal patronage which has been ſo handſomely beſtowed. Few modern works, indeed, diſplay ſuch examples of original, profound, and correct thinking; ſtill fewer contain ſuch a diverſity of ſubjects treated with ſo much perſpicuity, brevity, and even elegance; and what is here ſaid on hiſtory and on painting and painters might, were the expreſſion admiſſible, be denominated "*matter of thought*," for the benefit of poſterity. In a national view, we regard it with peculiar pleaſure, as our continental neighbours received a very imperfect tranſlation of the firſt rude outline of the Eſſays, now greatly improved, with a mingled ſenſation of aſtoniſhment and admiration, ingenuouſly confeſſing the great inferiority of all their own writings on painting. In the ſame view, it preſents yet another and more amiable feature, a noble example of genuine Engliſh philanthropy, in the learned Editor, who has thus devoted his highly cultivated and original talents and taſte to the relief of the ſurviving family of the author, and to the preſervation of writings deſtined to effect a permanent public good. We ſhall cloſe this imperfect ſketch in his own words:

"As the excluſive advantage of Mrs. Dayes has been my great object in bringing forth this publication, I truſt that my efforts will be ſeconded by a liberal patronage. My own attention has been beſtowed gratuitouſly: the ſeveral artiſts employed have done credit to their abilities; and highly to their honour, their charges have been moſtly regulated by the pure principles of benevolence. The intrinſic merit of the work, however, is in itſelf ſufficient to ſecure it an extenſive circulation; and I heſitate not to affirm, that its pre-eminent value will be allowed wherever the arts are cultivated."

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A Comparative View of the new Plan of Education promulgated by Mr. Joſeph Lancaſter, in his Tracts concerning the Inſtruction of the Children of the labouring Part of the Community: and of the Syſtem of Chriſtian Education, founded by our pious Foreſathers, for the Initiation of the young Members of the Eſtabliſhed Church in the Principles of the Reformed Religion. By Mrs. Trimmer. 8vo. Pp. 152. Rivingtons, 1803.

MUCH as the public are indebted to this excellent Lady, for her diverſified labours, in the great cauſe of pure Religion and of Scripture morality, ſo ably ſupported in the various productions of her pen; and valuable as her paſt publications have, unqueſtionably, been; there is not any work of hers which has yet iſſued from the preſs, at once ſo ſeaſonable, ſo important, and ſo neceſſary, as the tract now before us. Mr. Lancaſter's Plan of Education, though utterly deſtitute of that which is indiſpenſibly neceſſary in every plan of education, had received the ſupport, not only of ſuperficial obſervers, who examine nothing but the ſurface of every object preſented to their notice; but of men who had grown grey, as it were, in the ſervice of youth;—not only of artful and deſigning perſons, who perceived, approved, and encouraged, its object and its tendency; but of thoſe who had ſenſe to diſcern (if they had taken the trouble to exert it), and a diſpoſition to check and to diſcourage both; not only of ſectaries of every claſs and denomination, who are ready to join in any project, either deſigned, or tending, to ſap and to undermine the eſtabliſhed religion of the land; but of thoſe whoſe firſt wiſh, and whoſe bounden duty it is, to protect and to ſupport that eſtabliſhment;—even the *Head of the Church* himſelf. If then this plan, ſo encouraged, and ſo ſupported, be, as we ſhall endeavour to ſhew that it certainly is, radically vicious in its principle, and pregnant with the moſt miſchievous and the moſt dangerous effects to the community, what praiſe, what rewards are due to her, who has thrown aſide the veil which had hitherto concealed its deformities from the public eye, laid open its hideous and diſguſting features to general view, expoſed its defects, and exhibited it in thoſe true colours in which the moſt common underſtanding may trace and appreciate its merits and its demerits.

We lay it down as a fundamental principle, that religion is the only true baſis of every ſyſtem of national education; and if any ſyſtem be propoſed which is deſtitute of ſuch baſis, whatever merits it may have, in point of management and detail, it muſt be eſſentially bad, and can, on no account, be received as deſerving of encouragement and protection. We ſhould have thought it perfectly needleſs in a Chriſtian country, ſo ſpecifically to advert to, and to inſiſt upon, a principle ſo obvious, and ſo ſelf-evident, if a plan in which it is not only not acknowledged, but whence it is expreſsly excluded, had not

been promulgated, with moſt extraordinary diligence, art, and aſſiduity; and received the countenance of the King, the greater part of the Royal Family, and ſome of our prelates. The plan to which we here allude, is the plan of Mr. Joſeph Lancaſter, who has carried it into effect in a ſchool in St. George's-fields, containing between ſeven and eight hundred ſcholars; and who is endeavouring, by means of the ſubſcriptions he has obtained, to extend it over the whole United Kingdom, on a ſyſtem perfectly analogous to that of the Jeſuits on the Continent, and very ſimilar to the revolutionary ſyſtem of education recently adopted in France. Let the ſubſcribers to this plan read Mrs. Trimmer's book, which we ſhall now proceed to conſider, and then continue their ſubſcriptions if they pleaſe.

In recommendation of this plan, it ſeems, that Mr. Lancaſter has publiſhed ſome Tracts, which we have not yet had an opportunity of examining; and among others, one entitled "*Improvements in Education, as it reſpects the lower Orders of Society*, which has run through three editions. Mrs. Trimmer's obſervations on this Tract, and her extracts from it, are amply ſufficient to ſhew its ſpirit and object. Calling on the wealthy, with his uſual confidence, Mr. Lancaſter tells them, with the true modeſty of a quaker, it muſt be confeſſed, that *his* plan is a *national concern*, and that "it would long ago have been ſo, had not a mere *Phariſaical ſect-making ſpirit* intervened, and that in *every party*, to prevent it. His ſyſtem, therefore, is recommended as one "which would not gratify this diſpoſition." Certainly it would not gratify the diſpoſition of any man, of whatever denomination of Chriſtians, who thinks, with us, that Religion is the baſis and firſt principle of every ſyſtem of education; for it is worthy of obſervation here, that Mr. Lancaſter conſiders the attention which the members of the eſtabliſhed Church pay to this eſſential point in their ſchools of inſtruction for youth, and the *national ſyſtem* adopted at the Reformation, and ever ſince enforced by the law of the realm, as a proof of that *Phariſaical ſect-making ſpirit*.—But let him ſpeak for himſelf.

"*Above all things*, education ought not to be made ſubſervient to the propagation of the peculiar tenets of any ſect beyond its own number: (Quere, Mr. Schoolmaſter, the number of the *education?*) it then becomes *undue influence*, like the ſtrong taking advantage of the weak; and yet a reverence for the ſacred name of God and the Scriptures of truth, a deteſtation of vice, a love of veracity, a due attention to duties to parents, relations, and ſociety; carefulneſs to avoid bad company, civility without flattery, and a peaceable demeanour, may be inculcated in any ſeminary for youth without violating the ſanctuary of private religious opinions."

Such a plan may, for ought we know, make boys very good Quakers, or Socinians, but it is very clear it will not ſuffice to make Chriſtians of them. In ſhort, prayers of all kinds are excluded from Mr. Lancaſter's ſchools, and the repetition of the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments (which every Chriſtian godfa-

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ther pledges himſelf at the font to take care that the child ſhall learn), is deemed a mark of a *Phariſaical ſect making ſpirit.* And who is this ſturdy reformer who thus inſolently ſteps forth to revile, not only our national ſyſtem of education, but our eſtabliſhed Religion? Why, forſooth, a man bred to the trade of making baſkets, a Quaker by profeſſion, and having an Anabaptiſt for his father, and a Methodiſt for his mother—a birth and education, certainly not very likely to make him entertain any undue bias in behalf of any particular creed, whether of human or of divine authority.

Mrs. Trimmer's very juſt remarks on the paſſage laſt quoted, we ſhall extract for the gratification of our reader.

"The hiſtory of mankind in all civilized nations may be referred to, in order to prove the neceſſity of having a religion of ſome kind connected with the ſtate, and it has ever been thought eſſential that children ſhould be educated in the doctrines and tenets of the *national religion*, ſo as to preſerve a general uniformity throughout the nation; though licence might be granted to individuals and communities, for deviations from the eſtabliſhment for *conſcience ſake.* No legiſlature, I believe, has been more liberal in this reſpect than our own; every *Proteſtant* in the united kingdom is at full liberty, according to the *Act of Toleration*, to connect himſelf with any ſociety of nominal Chriſtians amongſt the numerous ſects, into which the Chriſtian world is unhappily divided; each ſect may aſſemble without moleſtation to worſhip God in its own way; and parents of every religious perſuaſion may bring up their children according to their own peculiar opinions.—But if any one of theſe ſects endeavours to gain an aſcendancy over the *Eſtabliſhment* to ſuperſede it, and occupy its place, this may indeed be called *undue influence*; the term, however, cannot juſtly be applied to the Church, on account of any endeavours that may be made by her members either to keep children who have been baptized according to her ordinances within the fold, or to bring back thoſe, whether children or adults, who have ſtrayed from it, provided no infringement be made on the liberty of conſcience granted to other communities of Chriſtians.—But in a *generalizing plan*, limited to the particulars enumerated in the latter part of the paſſage above quoted, viz. '*a reverence for the ſacred name of* GOD,' &c. as a member of a church, which holds *Faith in the Doctrines of Chriſtianity* to be eſſential towards completing the Chriſtian character, I cannot ſubſcribe.—In ſhort the religious opinions of every true member of the eſtabliſhed church would be '*violated*,' to uſe Mr. L's expreſſion), were it required of them to ſuffer their children to be educated by a plan from which many eſſential things are excluded.

"I know it may be ſaid that Mr. L's plan leaves Chriſtians of all denominations at liberty to give their own children what religious inſtruction they pleaſe, and to ſend them to *Sunday Schools*: but it ſhould be remembered, that religious education is an EVERY DAY BUSINESS; and it is well known that parents in general of the lower orders are not capable of inſtructing their children; and that they are beſides very neglectful of their own religious duties; and, ſuppoſing that children are ſent to *Sunday Schools*, they cannot poſſibly gain ſuch a comprehenſive knowledge in them, as *Day Schools* ought, and *would* afford, if they were conducted upon the *national plan.*

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Mr. Lancaſter afterwards tells us, truly enough, that the world is inundated with wickedneſs; but we do not ſee that the remedy which he propoſes is likely to ſtem the torrent. "I long," he ſays, "to ſee men, who profeſs Chriſtianity, contend not for *creeds of faith*, *words*, and *names*, but in the practice of every heavenly virtue."—How our virtue is to be increaſed by the renunciation of our faith we cannot very well underſtand; we ſhould rather have thought that we were more likely to become virtuous, and to acquire the ability of reſiſting the temptations of the devil, by adhering more firmly, and by following more cloſely, thoſe Creeds which this benevolent Quaker is ſo anxious to explode. At all events, we truſt that Chriſtian parents will prefer the apoſtolic injunction to *hold faſt the profeſſion of their faith*, to Mr. L.'s exhortation to abandon it; particularly when they conſider, what *his* ſcholars are *not* taught, *who* is the *author and the finiſher* of it.—On this ſubject, Mrs. T. truly obſerves:

"That 'a flood of wickedneſs has broken in upon the world,' muſt be acknowledged, but it may be traced to a different ſource from that of contentions among Chriſtians for *Creeds*, *Words*, and *Names*—to a *conſpiracy* of an INFIDEL SECT againſt CHRISTIANITY *itſelf under every form*. This is not a time, then, for the CHURCH *of this nation* to give up her *Creeds* and her *Name*: her members are *pledged in duty to ſupport* them; to educate their children with a predelection for them; to "*hold faſt the profeſſion of their faith without wavering*;" and "teſtify it" by "*doing works worthy of the vocation with which they are called.*" And, depraved as the world is, ſuch works *are* done, and upon the beſt principles, amongſt thoſe who adhere to the religion of their forefathers, and train their children in the good *old paths*.

There can be no doubt of the juſtice of Mrs. T.'s remark, that Lancaſter's plan is more in uniſon with the tenets of Quakeriſm (as far as theſe are known) than with the doctrines of the eſtabliſhed Church; and ſhe places the queſtion between him and the members of that Church in a clear and proper point of view; her comments on it are judicious and unanſwerable. The queſtion, ſhe ſays, is,

"Whether the *members of the Church of England*, can, conſiſtently with *their* principles, depart from the eſtabliſhed ſyſtem of education, which requires the carrying on *from day to day* a continued ſeries of religious inſtruction founded on the *Church Catechiſm*, of which the Creed is a principal part, and adopt in its room a ſyſtem from which this *Catechiſm* and the *Liturgy* of the National Church are excluded?"—In the ſect to which Mr. Lancaſter belongs, there is, as I underſtand, the ſtricteſt *uniformity*, *order*, and *diſcipline*, among themſelves in reſpect to children and youth; and in this particular the *Society of Friends* muſt certainly be allowed to ſet a laudable example. But if, as a member of this ſociety, Mr. Lancaſter would be ready to reject an invitation from the members of the church to ſend the children of Quaker parents to a ſchool to learn the *Church Catechiſm*, and to be initiated in the *Common Prayer*, ſurely he muſt allow it to be equally reaſonable, on the other hand, in parents of the eſtabliſhed religion to reject an invitation, however engaging in other reſpects, to caſt thoſe things (to their apprehenſion eſſential) aſide."

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Mrs. Trimmer gives a ſketch of Lancaſter's mode of inſtruction and of the hiſtory of his ſchool, the plan of which (we mean the mechanical parts of it) appears to have been taken from the account of a ſcholaſtic inſtitution eſtabliſhed at Madras, by a very learned and ſenſible Scotchman, Dr. Bell. Certainly many of the mechanical parts of this plan are good, and might, with advantage, be introduced into our free and parochial ſchools. But this is a ſubordinate conſideration. It is to the *principles* of his plan that we are anxious to limit our own attention, and to direct that of our readers. His leading principle is, that *the maſter ſhould gain a complete aſcendancy over the hearts and minds of his ſcholars.*

"The influence a maſter has over his ſcholars,' (ſays he) 'is very great; the veneration with which they regard him is *almoſt equal to idolatry*, and that ſimply by his conduct in his ſtation; ſo much ſo, that they are all his willing ſervants, and doubly proud to be his ambaſſadors on trivial occaſions; his ſmiles are precious, and even bitter things are ſweet when beſtowed by his hand.'

"This he inſtances in the following quotation from *Sallzmann's Gymnaſtics for Youth.* 'By way of ſport, or to try the dexterity of the pupils, the maſter leads them to a clump of trees, and while he is counting fifteen every one muſt climb up ſome tree ſo high as to be out of the reach of his cane; all exert themſelves with much laughter to eſcape the ſtick, as if ſome wild beaſt were at his heels; if any one be defective in agility he will be reached, and receive the penance of a few playful ſtrokes.'—'Theſe playful ſtrokes,' ſays Mr. Lancaſter, 'from a companion or an equal would moſt likely produce a tough battle, and black eyes, but from a maſter, a beating we read is taken very pleaſantly. The effects of the approbation, or the contrary, of the ſenior boys to leſſer ones, ſeems to carry a degree of weight almoſt ſimilar to that of their maſter. Whenever a neat, ingenious trick of a miſchievous nature has been played, we may be ſure ſome arch wag, who officiates as captain of the gang, perhaps a *Franklin*, was the original and life of the conſpiracy.'—'*Active youths*,' continues Mr. Lancaſter, '*when treated as cyphers, will generally ſhew their conſequence by exerciſing themſelves in miſchief.*'—'I am convinced by experience that it is practicable for teachers to acquire a proper *dominion* over the minds of the youth under their care, by directing thoſe active ſpirits to good purpoſes. This livelineſs ſhould never be repreſſed, but directed to uſeful ends; and I have ever found the ſureſt way to cure a *miſchievous* boy was to make a *monitor* of him."

The conſequence of this *veneration* for the maſter in boys trained as Mr. L. trains his ſcholars, and infected with that *eſprit de corps*, that ardent zeal for *the honour of the ſchool*, which it is an eſſential part of his plan to excite, may be eaſily conjectured. It is preciſely the plan of the Jeſuits. As for the *Gymnaſtics* of Mr. Sallzmann, of which Mr. L. is ſo enamoured, they are calculated for nothing that we can ſee but to make the fool of a maſter, a laughing-ſtock to his boys. They remind us of a curious plan of education, promulgated ſome years ago, by the diſſenting miniſter who wrote the memorable inflammatory hand-bill at Birmingham, at the time of the riots, and who kept an academy in the vicinity of that town; in which, among other

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recommendations equally alluring, he aſſured the public that he *mingled in the amuſements of his fellow men*; Anglice, that he played at hoop and ball with his ſcholars. It is, however, a novelty, we believe, imputable to the fertile invention of Mr. Lancaſter, to *reward* a boy for *miſchief*; other leſs enlightened preceptors, a Foſter, a Goodall, a Vincent, or a Heath, would probably deem *miſchief* a fit ſubject for *puniſhment*, and, inſtead of making the *captain of the gang a monitor*, would order him to be flogged.

One chief buſineſs of the monitors is to promote that *public ſpirit*, as Mr. Lancaſter calls it, which is to connect all the boys in the ſchool together, as cloſely as links of the ſame chain: and they are to teach the boys that the ſchool will be *diſhonoured* if any individual in it is detected in "*telling a lie, ſwearing, behaving ill to his parents, playing truant, having a dirty face*, or *a ſinging tone in reading*." Our readers will, probably, be aſtoniſhed at ſeeing offences, ſo different in their nature, their magnitude, and their effect, thus ſtrangely aſſociated; and he will immediately perceive that playing truant, having a dirty face, or a ſinging tone in reading, is put, by this ſtrange reformer, on the ſame footing, with the breach of two divine commandments, the *third* and the *fifth* of the Decalogue. Nor does he ſeem to render theſe offences odious to the boys, by repreſenting them as offenſive to God, but by making them believe that they are diſhonourable to the ſchool!!! Thus, as Mrs. Trimmer forcibly obſerves, rendering "the *fear of man* a ſtronger motive than the *fear of God*." There is ſtill, however, another motive, even more objectionable, which Mr. Lancaſter endeavours to excite in his ſcholars, for he ſeems to prefer every ſtimulus, however feeble or impotent, to the obligation which *religion* impoſes. This motive is nothing leſs, than the *dread of public ridicule*; we ſhall briefly obſerve on this motive, that nothing, in our opinion, is leſs calculated to make boys good men, than to encourage them to ridicule their ſchool fellows. There is ſo great a propenſity in the human mind to ridicule, a propenſity at direct variance with the doctrine of Chriſtian charity, that it is the duty of every preceptor to ſuppreſs, and not to encourage it. Boys encouraged to indulge this bad propenſity, muſt become deſpicable in the eyes of all ſober Chriſtians, and, in all probability, will prove very indifferent members of ſociety. We doubt very much alſo whether the notable plan of making the boys informers againſt each other is calculated to anſwer any good moral purpoſe. Certainly it is highly proper to make boys entertain a proper abhorrence of the ſin of ſwearing, or taking the Lord's name in vain, and to puniſh them for it when they commit it; and never, we will venture to aſſert, does this offence eſcape puniſhment at any of our public ſchools; but the boaſting of Mr. L. that when an informer of this deſcription had a complaint to prefer, he would not pollute his lips by the repetition of the words; but *wrote them upon the ſlate*; and that another *ſpelt the words very deliberately inſtead of pronouncing them at full length*; is proof, with us, that he has a mind both weak and vain. We would fain aſk him, whether theſe

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ſcrupulous boys (whom we firmly believe to be well-taught hypocrites) had not the ſame idea in their minds which the words, had they uttered them, would have conveyed; and whether any more guilt could poſſibly attach to them for uttering theſe words, in the uſual way, than for writing, or for ſpelling them? In ſhort it is a diſtinction without a difference. The concluding paſſage of Mr. L.'s improvements, with Mrs. Trimmer's comments on them, we ſhall extract.

"The benefits reſulting from a ſyſtem of education which will create motives in the minds of youth, and induce them to exert their powers," ſays Mr. L. "is far ſuperior to any benefit the exertions of the maſter can produce to them: this will be illuſtrated in a ſtriking manner by the following curious fact.—Some years ago a lad, when about thirteen years of age, took it in his head to write paragraphs for the newſpapers: he did ſo; but all the paragraphs were returned to him unprinted. Previouſly to this he had attempted to write a collection of anecdotes: in this he did not perſevere. He attempted to write a ſermon, and left it nearly finiſhed, and better than could be expected, conſidering his education and youth. His next attempt was an anſwer to 'Paine's Rights of Man,' which was followed by a *new* ſyſtem of phyſic, a democratical pamphlet, and a defence of revealed religion. In all theſe attempts he waſted many quires of paper, roſe in the morning early, neglected his meals, and was often wholly ſwallowed up in the ſubject with which his mind was engaged. Theſe were his various and fluctuating purſuits. But what was the reſult of all theſe laughable attempts? He inſenſibly acquired the art of thinking intenſely and clearly on any ſubject on which his mind was engaged; and in the end attained a conciſe familiar ſtyle of writing, which, it is probable, he never would have acquired by any other means.'

"I cannot but agree with Mr. Lancaſter, in the poſition with which he introduces the foregoing anecdote.—*Motives* are every thing, it is they alone which give merit to the beſt actions; and to furniſh the youthful mind with proper ones for the common occaſions of life, is a principal part of a good education.—Thoſe which actuated 'the boy of thirteen to write anecdotes for newſpapers, &c. &c.' were probably *profit* and the love of *fame*; but his principles, both in reſpect to religion and morals, muſt have been very looſe at that time, or he would not have fluctuated ſo from one extreme to another.—Had he been well educated he would moſt probably have *begun*, where he is ſhewn to *have ended*, with 'a defence of revealed religion,' or ſomething analogous to it; and it is to be hoped he reſted on that ſafe ſhore after having been toſſed about in a ſea of uncertainties!—A few directions from his maſter before he left ſchool, or his parents afterwards, would probably have put him into a right channel, and enabled him to turn his natural abilities to good account.—*Poor* boys ſent into the world, without fixed principles, may, in conſequence of having been taught to write and read, become very dangerous members of ſociety.—Had this boy, for inſtance, retained his *democratical principles*, he would have been a *ready inſtrument of ſedition and rebellion.*"

Certainly, and he might have been hanged for his endeavour to attain a conciſe and familiar ſtyle of writing!

(To be continued.)

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MISCELLANIES.

Remarks on the Report of M. Chaptal (late Miniſter of the interior) to the Conſuls on former Government of France, with an Examination of the Claim of M. Guyton de Morveau to the Diſcovery of the Power of the Mineral Acid Gaſes on Contagion. In a Letter addreſſed to Wm. Wilberforce, Eſq. M. P. &c. By Jas. Carmichael Smyth, M. D. &c. Pp. 50. 8vo. 1s. 6d.. Callow, 1805.

Of the important utility of acid fumigations it is not now the queſtion: the merit of their diſcovery has become a matter of national importance in the eſtimation of the chemical politicians of France. Fortunately for Dr. C. Smyth he lives in a civilized country; but were he under the influence of theſe chemico-politico authors, he might expect to be brought to the ſcaffold, and Chaptal and Guyton perform the like office to him that Guyton and Fourcroy did to the unfortunate Lavoiſier, in order to poſſeſs themſelves of his papers. That they ſhould however attempt to aſſume the merit of the diſcovery is very conſiſtent with their character and conduct, and it is for Dr. Smyth to expoſe the flimſy frabrications by which they endeavour to make out this impoſition. A ſhort letter is perhaps rather limited a compaſs to reduce all the contemporary facts neceſſary to develope the long and hitherto unſuſpected plagiariſm of the French chemiſts. Such an inveſtigation is rather a work of labour than of talent, and might conſequently be more eaſily executed. Dr. Smyth has made an eſſay in which are ſome uſeful hints, but his chemical reading and knowledge are either not ſufficiently extenſive or his time is too much occupied in his profeſſional labours. It is to be hoped that he or ſome other well qualified perſon will return to the charge of M. Chaptal, and preſent to the public in a connected view, the hiſtory and progreſs of the ſyſtematic plan adopted by all Frenchmen to appropriate every diſcovery and all literary merit to the writers of their own country or language. Such a combination among literary labourers is perhaps ſomewhat unpreſidented; but its exiſtence is now known and felt by all the truly learned in the Chriſtian world. It has attained its climax, and its irrecoverable fall cannot be diſtant. Some Italian and Spaniſh authors have given true but rather diminutive ſketches of this literary monſter of national ambition. Kirwan too has pourtrayed one of its ruthleſs hands; and our own reſearches authorize us to affirm, that there is not a fact mentioned in all the voluminous works of the modern chemiſts of France, the archetype or mother idea of which we could not trace to ſome Engliſh, Italian or German author. Their knowledge of the German was acquired principally from Engliſh or Italian tranſlations. From the Spaniſh through the medium of the Italian, they alſo ſtole the greater part of their knowledge of Anatomy and almoſt all their phyſiology. From the ſame ſource they derived alſo their belles-lettres criticiſm if it may be ſo denominated. All the pure bullion of the different nations of Europe has been moulded in the minds of Frenchmen, and after being alloyed in their mint, has been diſſeminated over the civilized world, which groans under the preſſure of its baſeneſs, while the genuine native ore has ſunk almoſt to oblivion. Truth too profound for their ſuperficial and imbecile minds were enveloped in a tawdry veil to effect their firſt grand purpoſe, *l'Europe Françaiſe!*

Bu;

But to return to our author, who, although he has not done enough has yet done ſome things well, and has we think ſatisfactorily eſtabliſhed the point that the French had no knowledge of all the mineral acids being antiliaimies before the publications of Dr. C. Smyth; ſtill leſs of nitrous acid gas. We can alſo add, from perſonal knowledge, that neither Guyton nor Chaptal would ever have dared to arrogate to themſelves the merit of Dr. S's diſcovery, had not the hint (in this caſe as in every other) been given by certain Engliſh polemics. We alſo know ſome of their colleagues who could not avoid pointing to the Engliſh author, whence Guyton firſt learned the uſe of fumigations by muriatic acid. Whoever has ſeen a copy of the French tranſlation of the Philoſophical Tranſactionsof the Royal Society of London, with the marks on the margin by French chemiſts, has ſeen the key to all the pretended diſcoveries of Frenchmen.—The generous and truly liberal ſentiments in this letter are highly honorable to the author, and becoming an Engliſhman, who is ſuperior to low cunning and national or perſonal abuſe. His profeſſional merits have been honeſtly declared by his opponent, Dr. Johnſtone; and whatever may be his ſcientific merits as a chemical diſcoverer, we ſhould always wiſh to ſee ſuch laudable efforts liberally recompenſed by parliamentary munificence. We muſt however condemn him for aſcribing to Guyton the merit of diſcovering the uſe of muriatic acid gas, when it was notoriouſly practiſed in this country by different perſons long prior to the Dijon experiments. Dr. Smyth may alſo be ignorant of the real character of L. B. Guyton, and ingenuouſly allow him merit; but the blood-ſtained aſſaſſin of his friend and maſter, Lavoiſier, muſt ever be an object of horror and deteſtation to every virtuous mind. Of the truth of his moſt heinous guilt, as well in that as many other matters, we have been confidently aſſured by one of his preſent colleagues, and a profeſſor. Our author is alſo very unfortunate in not knowing that, notwithſtanding his ample means, and inceſſant labour, it is remarked of Guyton, that he has never poſſeſſed "*one original idea!*" Let his friend and admirer in this country, who has now literally written himſelf into pitiable oblivion, diſprove the fact, if he can: it will be a happy ſubject for him to make another volume, by the help of ſome of his obſcure political ſarcaſms, the offſpring of inviduous malignity.

Memoirs of the Profeſſional Life of the Right Honourable Horatio Lord Viſcount Nelſon, Vice Admiral of the White, Knight of the Order of the Bath, Duke of Bronti in Sicily, Grand Croſs of the Orders of Ferdinand and of Merit, and Knight of the Imperial Order of the Creſcent. Comprehending authentic and circumſtantial Details of his glorious Achievements under the Britiſh Flag, and a Sketch of his Parliamentary Conduct and Private Character. With Biographical Particulars of Contemporary Naval Officers. By Joſhua White, Eſq. Second Edition, conſiderably improved. 12mo. Pp. 348. Boards. 6s. 6d. Cundee. 1805.

WITHIN the recollection of the preſent age, no event has excited ſuch univerſal intereſt, ſuch general and deep regret, as the death of Lord Nelſon, the firſt of Britiſh heroes. Thouſands of pens have been employed in eulogiſing his memory, and myriads, yet unborn, will dwell with rapture on the page which records his exploits; will ſhed the mingled tear of tranſport and unavailing ſorrow, in peruſing the account of that laſt battle, in which Nelſon, fought, conquered, and bled.

The life of Lord Nelſon is a theme replete with intereſt. No one, who feels as he ought to feel, for the glory and the welfare of his country, can read it without deeply participating in the heroic and pious exertions of his Lordſhip, while leading the glory of England to the achievement of ſucceſſive victories.

To thoſe who wiſh for ample and well arranged details, of the life and actions of him who has done ſo much in ſupporting and exalting the naval flag of Britain, the volume before us will prove highly acceptable. The author ſeems to have been indefatigable in his reſearches, and has ſucceeded in collecting every accefſible document relative to the ſubject on which he was engaged.

The portable form of the volume, the neatneſs of its typography, and the engraved plans of the chief battles in which the deceaſed Admiral had been engaged, will be additional recommendations to the admirers of naval merit.

DIVINITY.

A Sermon preached on Occaſion of the late Naval Victory, in the Pariſh Church of Wellington, Salop, Nov. 10, 1805 By the Rev. John Eyton. 8vo Pp. 30. 1s. Fine Paper, 1s. 6d. Wellington, printed; Crofby and Co. London; Wood, Eddowes, and Morris, Shrewſbury; Scariott, Shiffnal. 1806.

FROM a very appropriate text, "Rejoice with trembling," which was peculiarly applicable to the thankſgiving ordered for the *Peace of Amiens*, and which, we wiſh, was more frequently ſelected on ſimilar occaſions, Mr. Eyton has deduced a variety of uſeful and impreſſive concluſions. His remarks on the piety of Lord NELSON, and his admirable ſucceſſor, Lord COLLINGWOOD, in aſcribing the victory to the Lord of Hoſts, and in their various comments, and in their whole conduct, on that glorious event, are extremely pertinent, and highly worthy of attention. Indeed the whole ſermon (with one *ſolitary* exception) is written in a truly Chriſtian ſpirit, with great good ſenſe, and ſound judgment.

The exception to which we allude is the indiſcriminate cenſure of the ſlave trade, which the preacher conſiders as ſufficient "to render the very name of Chriſtian an abomination among the heathen." Againſt ſo ſtrong an inference we muſt, in Chriſtian charity, enter our ſolemn proteſt. And we conjure Mr Eyton not haſtily to adopt a popular prejudice; but ſeriouſly to inveſtigate this much diſputed ſubject, before he repeats ſo deciſive a ſentence of condemnation. Among other documents, we ſtrenuouſly recommend to his peruſal, Profeſſor Dalzel's curious and intereſting Hiſtory of the Kingdom of Dahomy.

The true Baſis of National Confidence, in Seaſons of Diſtreſs. A Sermon, delivered in the Pariſh Church of St. James, Briſtol, on Thurſday, the 5th Day of December, 1805. By the Rev. Thomas T. Biddulph, A. M. Miniſter of the ſaid Church. 8vo. Pp 22. 1s. Lanſdown, Briſtol, 1805.

THE ſame Chriſtian ſpirit, the ſame prudent diſcrimination, as pervade the preceding ſermon, are equally remarkable in this. And happy are we

to

to see our clergy take up national victories in so proper, because so Christian, a point of view; not disgracing themselves and their profession, by undistinguishing adulation: and not bestowing praise but for qualities and for conduct which a Christian minister can praise most conscientiously. The concluding pages of this sermon, however, are objectionable, on the ground (before urged by us in our comments on the proceedings on the Thanksgiving Day) that they convert a *thanksgiving* into a *charity* sermon; and the preacher moreover not only sanctions, but applauds, that part of the conduct of the Committee of the Patriotic Fund, which appeared to us most reprehensible; we mean their application to the clergy to make collections at their respective churches, instead of applying to the bishops, in the first instance. Against so gross and glaring an irregularity we shall ever enter our solemn protest. Indeed, we much doubt the *legality* of collecting money in such a way.

Gratitude for the Mercies of Providence. A Sermon preached at Reigate December 5, 1805, *being the Day appointed for a general thanksgiving to Almighty God for the signal and important Victory obtained by his Majesty's Ships of War, under the Command of the late Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson, over the Combined Fleets of France and Spain, on the 21st of October*, 1805. By Jeoffrey Snelson, M. A. Vicar. 8vo. Pr. 19. Reigate, printed by Joseph Allingham.

THE Rev. Preacher (from P. cvii. 1, 2.) takes occasion very earnestly to inculcate on his hearers the doctrines of a general and particular Providence. These doctrines, he observes, are so repeatedly urged in scripture, that were he to cite all the passages which teach them in the book of Psalms only, the time would fail him. He then shews what reason Britons, in particular, have for acknowledging the kind interpositions of Providence in their behalf as a nation: pays a high, but just and correctly chastened, tribute of applause to the late unparalleled exertions of our navy; and speaks of the noble and lamented Nelson in terms which, though far removed from the fulsome strain of adulation, are yet expressive of lively gratitude and regret. He recommends the object of the Patriotic Fund, but does not dwell very long on the subject. In short, the discourse is more of a religious than of a political complexion. It is pious, plain, and orthodox: well suited to the occasion on which it was delivered; and we have no hesitation in recommending it to the attention of our readers.

We have observed in this sermon two or three transgressions of the rules of grammar, which the author will excuse us for pointing out to him. The note in p. 7, as it now stands, can hardly be reconciled to any principles of construction. Perhaps a parenthesis, including the words from *gentleman* to *made* would improve the sentence, which, however, even then, would still be awkward. In p. 11, we read thus: – "We having acquired, and still being able to maintain, the high rank we hold amongst them [the nations" of Europe] *is* not to be accounted for from what is called natural causes. Here *is* should evidently be *are*. In the note in the same page, the relative *which*, in the second clause of the second sentence, should certainly be expunged.

MEDICINE

MEDICINE AND CHEMISTRY.

An Inquiry into the Nature and Action of Cancer, with a View to the Eſtabliſhment of a regular Mode of Curing that Diſeaſe by Natural Separation. By Samuel Young, Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London. I. Vol. 8vo. Pp. 130. Phillips. 1805.

THE Author in this treatiſe propoſes ſimply to follow nature in exhibiting the origin, progreſs, and nature of cancer, and thus to form a baſis for *future* diſtinct and explicit criteria of this diſeaſe. With this view he ſets out with conſidering the nature of ſpecific virus, which he maintains, muſt invariably produce a *determined* ſpecific action; he illuſtrates this axiom by adducing ſmall-pox and vaccina, as examples. In adverting to the nature of the "cancerous character," he proves it to have been frequently miſtaken, and quotes ſome well adapted caſes of ſyphilis, which, had erroneouſly been treated as cancers.

He next denies that cancerous matter is ſpecific, and very judiciouſly replies to the caſes of Tulpius and Mr. Smith, both of which he (very juſtly in our opinion) attributes to mental impoſition. Another caſe of a child, mentioned by Mr. Gooch, where ulcers were produced by the matter, from which it was ſuppoſed, the conſtitution received a cancerous taint, is given at length, with the reply of Mr. Pearſon, and bears every appearance of its being ſcrophulous. We perfectly agree with Mr. Young, that in numerous inſtances ſcirrhus is frequently miſtaken for cancer, and that owing to this error great miſchief frequently ariſes. The ſame reaſoning applies alſo to ſtrumous glands.

In this inveſtigation of the "tranſitive critical, and hereditary nature in cancer," on which the vague notions (we cannot call them, principles) of Dr. Nilbet are ably refuted, he juſtly laments the little attention which had been paid to this important point, and of the want of diſcrimination, with reſpect to appearances ariſing from cauſes and actions totally different from the other. As he denies the *ſpecific* quality of cancerous virus, he, of courſe, cannot admit its tranſitive and hereditary nature.

He next proceeds to examine the theory of cancer, which he grounds on the poſition that "a morbid alteration ſhould never be viewed independently of the natural organization and functions of the part, or as beyond the limits of the laws of life." He adds, "I thought it the more neceſſary to make theſe few general remarks; becauſe they at once exclude the erroneous mode of reaſoning adopted in the alkaline hypotheſis, which attributes the foundation and progreſs of the cancerous diſeaſe to the preſence of a "powerful volatile alkali" in the ſyſtem; to the preſence of a thing that cannot come into being, but by a putrefactive fermentation; which of courſe, cannot take place as long as the living principle remains." He concludes with the obſervation, that "all the opinions of a vitiated ſtate of the humour being neceſſary for the generation of a cancerous poiſon, muſt fall to the ground, ſince theſe opinions have been taken up on the qualities of the diſcharge alone, without any other concurring theory and facts.

Mr. Young afterwards conſiders the parts moſt liable to cancer, which poſſeſs a complication of ſtructure and function, ſuch as, the female breaſt, the ovaria, the teſtes, the glandulæ proſtater, the labia pubenda, and their neighbouring parts, the glans penis, the tongue, lips, angles of the eyes, &c.

&c.; though he confeſſes that other parts leſs complicated, ſuch as the alæ of the noſe, the pendulous portions, &c. are not exempt from its attacks; on its exiſtence in the latter part, he makes ſome judicious remarks.

With regard to a prediſpoſition for the complaint, he concedes to Dr. Baillie, that a certain degree of prediſpoſition may be conſidered as exiſting, but certain reſtriction, ſuch as the caſe of dram drinkers, a woman's breaſt at a certain advanced period of life, &c. &c.; yet he denies that this may be conſidered as a proof of the queſtion, as attaching that peculiarity to the cancerous actions itſelf which Dr. B. would ſeem to infer.

Chapter VII. treats of the progreſs and circumſtances of actual cancer, which are ably explained; we ſhall here only ſtate an obſervation of our author, namely that the offenſive ſmell of cancerous ſores appears to him to have been much exaggerated; a circumſtance he attributes in a great meaſure to the ſpare ſecretion in ulcers of this claſs. Capter VIII. relates to the recurrence of cancer, to which we ſhall only add an ingenious obſervation made and inſiſted upon by the celebrated Peter Camper, that, whenever a ſettled pain is felt in the cheſt, as if the ſternum were pierced, all hope of ever accompliſhing a cure, whether by extirpation or other means, muſt then be given up.

In Chapter IX. our author is rather diffuſe in noticing the diſpute between Meſſrs. Guy and Gataker, reſpecting the Plunket receipt; but approves much of the application of the cauſtic, adapted to the individual circumſtance, with a view of promoting natural ſeparation. In Chapter X. he lays down the baſis for a radical cure, which muſt not only ſtrike at the *action* in cancer, but alſo at a complete *ſeparation* of the morbid ſtructure. After noticing the difficulties, on which a cure depends, he treats of the means of regulating excitement in complicated caſes (the principal of which are arſenic, and its various preparations, which he much approves of), which he remarks, "ſhould be modified to the power of a diſeaſed ſurface, where it is evident the living principle is but ſparingly diſtributed, and the partial deſtruction of which muſt give energy to the whole maſs." To the principle of excitement he aſcribes the ſucceſs of the red onion; but what he chiefly relies upon for this purpoſe, is the ſabina. This ſtimulating treatment he deems far preferable to the antiphlogiſtic plans which, he obſerves, can only ſuppreſs *increased* action depending upon direct excitement.

Chapter XIII. embraces the conſtitutional and auxiliary remedies; and here our author ſtrongly recommends the alterative plan, with a view of rouſing the abſorbents, as the principal means of reſolving the diſeaſe; theſe alteratives are not to be employed ſingly, but in common with alterative means. With reſpect to the internal adminiſtration of arſenic in this malady by Le Febevre, we may alſo add the names of the celebrated Selle, Stark, and others on the Continent, to thoſe who have made favourable mention of it.

In an Appendix, Mr. Y. enters upon a diſquiſition relative to the opinion of the cancerous tumour poſſeſſing a power of generating a ſpecific poiſon or contamination, which, it is evident from the preceding ſtatement of his ſentiments, he denies, and we think with good reaſons.

His ſtyle is, upon the whole correct and eaſy; the arrangement is well adapted; and the outlines of his method of cure (for he means this work to be conſidered merely as a baſis for a future and more enlarged ſtructure) are clearly explained. The hints which he has thrown out, as well as his becoming reſpect to the received opinions of others, we conceive to be well worthy of praiſe.

A Medical Guide for the Invalid, to the principal Watering Places of Great Britain; containing a View of the medicinal Effects of Water. 1. As applied to the Body in a simple State. 2. As exhibited in its impregnated or mineral Form. 3. As employed in this Form for the Cure of particular Diseases, with their Mode of Treatment; and 4. As assisted in its Effects by the Situation and Climate of the Watering Places resorted to. By William Nisbet, M. D. Fellow of the Royal College of Edinburgh, &c. &c. 12mo. Pp. 295. Price 5s. 6d. Highley. 1804.

THE title page sufficiently explains the nature of this volume, which cannot fail to be of much more importance to the *invalid* than the local information which is given in such volumes as "*guides to the watering places.*" A stage-coach will convey a man to any place to which his inclination may lead him, and if he be a stranger, a friend may point its curiosities; but directions as to the mode of restoring health by ablution, or drinking the mineral fluids are of far greater importance. This volume will therefore be found eminently useful, as it contains not only the substance of every modern publication on mineral waters, and a particular description of the properties of those at all the fashionable watering places, but likewise very copious remarks on the diseases for which they are beneficial. It is therefore a valuable companion for all perambulating valetudinarians.

A Proposal for destroying the Fire and Chonk-damps of Coal-mines; and their Production explained on Principles of modern Chemistry: addressed to the Owners and Agents of Coal-works, &c. By Thomas Trotter, M. D. late Physician to his Majesty's Fleet, &c. Pp. 47. 8vo. 2s. 1805. Newcastle, printed. Longman, London.

THIS is an important and interesting little tract. "The subject, I think," says Dr. Trotter, in his address to those interested in coal-mines in Northumberland and Durham, "admits of demonstration, at least as far as human knowledge can depend on the faith of experiment. No merit is claimed, where there is no invention; and no fame is expected for being industrious. I only hold out a short explanation of well-known facts, in the hope of seeing them conducive to save human beings, whose labours are useful to the community." That this proposal, if effectual, may be eminently useful to humanity, cannot be doubted, when it is remembered that very lately in the mine called Hebburn-main, 32 men were killed by explosions of the *fire-damp*, or hydrogenous gas of chemists. The author observes, that to destroy this *fire-damp* "we have only to employ some of the strong acids in a state of vapour, such as the acetic, nitrous, or oxymuriatic. These acid vapours seizing the hydrogen, recompose water, which is converted into steam by the caloric, disengaged during the combustion." The oxymuriatic acid gas he considers the best for destroying hydrogenous gas or fire-damp, and gives the following proportions for one fumigation:—"Common bay salt, 3 oz. 2 dr. 10 gr.; black manganese, 5 dr. 17 gr.; water, 1 oz. 2 dr. 33 gr.; strong sulphuric acid (oil of vitriol), 1 oz. 7 dr. 5 gr. The salt and manganese are pounded together, put into a stone ware dish (about two inches deep) the water poured upon them, and afterwards the sulphuric acid slowly through a glass funnel. This quantity is sufficient for a space of 16 feet by 12; but the frequent employment

employment muſt depend on the manner how the fire-damp is evolved." Dr. T. propoſes to remove the *choak-damp* (carbonic acid gas) by throwing water into the apartments where it is found to exiſt, as that fluid, eſpecially at the temperature of 40°, ſpeedily abſorbs this gas: to facilitate the proceſs of abſorption a little lime might be diluted in the water. It is alſo alledged, that, "whenever either *fire-damp* or *choak-damp* is detected in coal-pits, there will be reaſon to fear a collection of the other near the ſpot, if not powerfully ventilated; for it is without doubt, that they are invariably generated by the ſame proceſs (the decompoſition of water and vegetable matter, or ſtagnant putrid water in contact with coal or carbonaceous ſubſtances) and at the ſame time." The *fire-damp* (hydrogen gas) is from 13 to 16 times lighter than common air, and therefore floats at the upper part of the mine: the *choak-damp* (carbonic acid gas) is more than twice the weight of atmoſpheric air, and conſequently lodges always in the bottom, ſo that the fumigation which deſtroys the former cannot act on the latter, which muſt therefore be diſplaced or abſorbed by lime-water, or copious ſtreams of freſh water. In every part where ſtagnant water may remain, the author recommends the immediate introduction of freſh air and freſh water, in order to avoid the generation of fire or choak damps. Dr. T. wiſhes it to be remembered, that although he now propoſes fumigations in mines, where ventilation is difficult and often impoſſible, he ſtill perſiſts in oppoſing them in hoſpitals and in ſhips, as deſtroyers of contagion. He now, however, expreſſes his ſentiments with much more temperance and decorum* than formerly, and diſplays a very humane ſpirit, in animated and perſpicuous language. There are, nevertheleſs, ſome ſentiments that we are ſurpriſed a "Britiſh phyſician" was not aſhamed to write. Does Dr. T. wiſh to fraternize with the infamous Guyton and Fourcroy, in whom he diſcovers, ſtrange to tell, *humanity*? He ſpeaks of the "active *revolutionary* genius and *enlightened* ſpirit of Guyton, whom he miſcalls Morveau, although this wretch ſwore eternal hatred to the ex-noble title *de Morveau* on the altar of the Jacobins of Paris. Such an "acknowledgment" may be a proof of the liberality of "a Britiſh phyſician," but it is none of his judgment and virtue. To aſcribe inventive merit to a man whoſe mind was never once illumined by a ray of "heaven-born genius," who has never evinced, with all his induſtry, any other talents than thoſe of a deſtroyer, muſt be an infatuation approaching inſanity. Yet how much greater ſtill the deluſion of that Engliſhman, whoſe knowledge and genius enable him to apply the modern principles of ſcience to one of the moſt important purpoſes of ſociety, the preſervation of the lives of a moſt eſſential claſs of induſtrious men, and who ſtrangely aſcribes all the merit of it to one of the moſt *ſterile* minds, to the moſt *atrocious* and moſt *vile of French ſlaves!!!* What Engliſh chemiſt can

* We ſhould here perhaps except a note (p. 36.) which reflects on the inefficiency of fumigations, did we not know that it is ſanctioned, in ſome meaſure, by the late unfortunate fever at Gibraltar. It ſhould indeed be obſerved, that they were not uſed in the hoſpital of that garriſon, but we alſo know, that both Dr. Smyth's and Guyton's plans were but very partially effectual at Malaga, where fumigations were adminiſtered with as little judgment indeed as ſucceſs.—*Rev.*

coolly hear and voluntarily approve of the expreſſions of Guyton and others, which are re-echoed all over France, that Black was a ſuperficial old man *(vieillard borné)*; Prieſtley a fool *(un ſot)*; and Kirwan a ſilly dotard *(ſot rodateur)*; while the viſionary Frenchified labours of Chenevix,* have procured him the emphatical name of *chimiſte!* If Dr. T. can join in ſuch wanton abuſe, ſuch baſely invidious contempt, and above all, ſuch foul *ingratitude* to thoſe Engliſh philoſophers who have taught Frenchmen all they yet know of true chemical ſcience, we ſincerely pity him. He ought to know that it is not patriotiſm† to deſignate the Corſican ruffian by the epithet "Tyrant of France," while he beſtows the moſt unmerited praiſe on much older, equally atrocious, though leſs powerful enemies of his country; and we can no more pardon the philoſopher, who deſpiſes the fell head of a ſtate, whilſt he reverences the cruel heart which ſupports it, than we can the merchant, who with the one hand contributes to the Patriotic Fund, and with the other knowingly ſigns a policy of inſurance, guaranteeing the enemy's property, falſely and treacherouſly denominated neutral! To Dr. T. we were diſpoſed to allow the ſame merit for his application of modern chemical principles as has been allowed to Berthollet for his adoption of the well-known powers of oxymuriatic acid to deſtroy vegetable colours in the proceſs of bleaching: but as he has *generouſly* reſigned all his pretenſions to the "active revolutionary genius of Guyton," we, as impartial adminiſtrators of literary juſtice, muſt beg leave to transfer this honour again to its legitimate owners, the "Britiſh phyſicians," Johnſtone and Smyth. We have yet another example of Dr. T.'s generoſity to Frenchmen ſtill more reprehenſible; namely, his beſtowing on Lavoiſier, (p. 16.) the merit of being the firſt who decompoſed water. It is groſsly falſe; Lavoiſier learned that experiment, as well as the germ of his whole ſyſtem, from the Hon. Mr. Cavendiſh, notwithſtanding all his lofty and arrogant aſſumptions of being a diſcoverer. Our author ought not to have thus wantonly detracted from the ſuperior merit of this far-famed Britiſh philoſopher, merely from the vain pretenſions of Frenchmen. The unjuſt claims, however, of Lavoiſier, will, we doubt not, be very ſoon univerſally acknowledged, whenever the public becomes fully acquainted with his poſthumous works recently publiſhed by the Counteſs (formerly Madame Lavoiſier) and Count of Rumford; the latter, who is a Britiſh ſubject, beſt knows how far his conduct is reconcileable with the honour and principle eſſential to that diſtinguiſhed character. But it is now time to withdraw the flimſy veil which French boaſting has long ſuſpended before the too credulous eyes of Engliſhmen, and diſplay to the hitherto deluded

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* Doubtleſs the public is greatly indebted to this ingenious gentleman for his very learned diſſertation on the French and Engliſh adjective terminations *ique* and *ic*, and his readineſs to grind down Engliſh into French; but Dr. Wollaſton has amply repaid him in his experiments on Palladium!—*Rev.*

† We hope that certain other philoſophers will profit by this hint, and ceaſe to abuſe the envied honour of a fellowſhip of the Royal Society of London, by introducing the name of very "*unworthy foreigners*," merely from the ignoble vanity of giving an occaſion to publiſh their own names in ſome ſycophant French journal. We ſigh on reflecting that there has been already an example of this meanneſs. *Rev.*

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world this irrefragable truth, that Frenchmen are really as devoid of original genius, as all Christendom now knows them to be of genuine virtue. For the preſent we ſhall only expreſs our aſtoniſhment, that notwithſtanding ſo many of our countrymen who viſited France during the truce, not one has yet diſcovered the exiſtence, or publiſhed any account of the infamous "conſpiracy among French writers, to aſſume the merit to themſelves and country of every diſcovery in the arts and ſciences" that has been or ſhould be promulgated throughout the civilized world. The exiſtence of this conſpiracy, and baſe efforts of the conſpirators at Paris, have been ſome time well known in Italy, in ſome parts of Germany, and even in Spain; and we would recommend it to Drs. Trotter and Smyth, to think again before they write, and thus wantonly (but we hope unknowingly) detract from the ſuperior merits and original genius of their countrymen, the "iſlanders," as we are now contemptuouſly denominated. Let our arrogant plagiariſt enemies, however, remember, while they affect to deſpiſe us, and depreciate our genius and wiſdom, that almoſt all the philoſophers of antiquity, almoſt all the *true diſcoverers*, have been *iſlanders!*

POETRY.

Nelson's Tomb: a Poem. By William Thomas Fitzgerald, Eſq. Author of Nelſon's Triumph, or the Battle of the Nile, &c, *To which is added, An Address to England on her Nelson's Death.* By the ſame Author. 4to. Pp. 18. 2s. 6d. Aſperne. 1805.

IT is impoſſible for any man who loves his country to read the loyal effuſions of Mr. Fitzgerald's muſe without feeling ſome ſparks of that generous ſpirit by which ſhe is ever animated, and which, at once, imparts grace to her numbers and dignity to her ſtyle. Of all the tributes which have been paid to this firſt of naval heroes, none is more worthy of the ſubject than this poetic wreath woven by the hand of genius, directed by the heart of patriotiſm. The poet, having decorated the hero's tomb with appropriate ornaments, his eye glances forward to future days, when it ſhall be the reſort of other heroes, and the theme of the traveller's praiſe and admiration.

"Oft from ſome diſtant hill, at dawn of day,
The lonely trav'ller journeying on his way,
Shall cry—when LONDON'S FANE firſt ſtrikes his eyes,
BENEATH THAT DOME THE MIGHTY NELSON LIES!
Such were the honours, ſuch the ſplendid mead,
His Country offer'd, and his King decreed!
Thus muſing on—the ſubject at his heart—
The ſigh will murmur, and the tear will ſtart;
And, pond'ring on the naval warrior's fate,
A life ſo glorious! and a death ſo great!
His patriot mind, with new-born ardour fir'd,
Will then exclaim, like one by heaven inſpired!
When that GREAT FABRIC moulders into duſt,
The ſcythe of time ſhall ſpare the Hero's buſt;
And future millions ſhall record his fame,
From age, to age, while ENGLAND has a name!"

The *Address* to England appeared in the poetical department of our Review for November, 1805; our readers, therefore, muſt know that it is marked by the ſame ſpirit and genius as "Nelſon's tomb."

The Pleaſures of Love: being Amatory Poems, original and tranſlated, from the Arabic and European Languages. With Engravings. By G. W. Fitzwilliam, Eſq. 12mo. Pp. 200. 6s. Cundee. 1806.

THE admirers of this ſpecies of poetry will here find a choice collection; as well from the dead as from the living languages; indeed Mr. Fitzwilliam ſeems to have ranſacked every *Amatory* poet of antient and of modern times, and to have extracted their ſweets with bee-like induſtry. His *Original* Poems are few in number, but they diſplay both taſte and genius. We ſhall extract one of them, as a ſpecimen, on a ſubject which we thought had been completely exhauſted, but which he has certainly treated with conſiderable ingenuity and talent, and in a manner that gives it the air of novelty.

"To a Kiss.

"Humid ſeal of ſoft affections,
Tendereſt pledge of future bliſs,
Deareſt tie of young connexions,
Love's firſt ſnow-drop, virgin kiſs!
Speaking ſilence! dumb confeſſion!
Paſſion's birth and infant play!
Dove-like fondneſs, chaſte conceſſion,
Glowing dawn of brighter day!
Sorrowing joy! adieu's laſt action,
When lingering lips no more muſt join!
What words can ever ſpeak affection
So thrilling, ſo ſincere as thine!
Thee the fond youth, untaught and ſimple,
Nor on the naked breaſt can find,
Nor yet within the cheek's ſmall dimple—
Sole offſpring thou of lips conjoin'd!
Then haſte thee to thy dewy manſion;
With Hebe ſpend thy laughing day,
Dwell in her rubied lip's expanſion,
Baſk in her eye's propitious ray.

Poetical Amuſement on the Journey of Life; conſiſting of various Pieces in Verſe: Serious, Theatric, Epigrammatic, and Miſcellaneous. By Mr. Meyler. 8vo. Pp. 212. 6s. Bath, printed; Robinſon, London. 1806.

THE author appears to have emptied the whole contents of his poetical common place book into this volume, which contains as motley a collection of rhymes, as we remember ever to have met with. Variety as well of ſubjects as of metre abounds, and there is ſomething to pleaſe every palate that is not very faſtidious in the choice or flavour of its food. In truth we cannot compliment Mr. Meyler on his poetical talents; though, from ſome few lines ſcattered o'er his work, like a ſtray flower on a barren heath, we have been induced to believe him not deſtitute of genius. In his tributary poem to

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the authors of the Spiritual Quixote, and of the New Bath Guide, which we conſider as one of the beſt of his productions, amidſt a number of indifferent lines, we find the following.

"Above all pomp of grief, or blazing pyres,
Give me the ſigh that gratitude inſpires.
The boſom-tomb which honeſt ruſtics raiſe,
Shames the proud urn and monumental phraſe; (praiſe)
Tranſcends the marble's boaſt, and chiſſel's art,
Sinking th' inſcription deeply in the heart."

Theſe are certainly good lines; and beſpeak ability in the writer of them. But, in this poem (which, by the bye, like many others in the collection, is highly creditable to his *heart*) he jumps from one kind of meaſure to another, in the moſt extraordinary manner, and by that means gives a ludicrous air to a ſerious ſubject. He is, moreover, the moſt careleſs and ſlovenly of bards.

In p. 91 of this volume is an epigrammatic poem, entitled, "The Fair Equivoque," which appeared in our Review for January, 1805. It was given to us as the production of a clergyman in the vicinity of London. If it be really the offspring of Mr. Meyler's muſe, we can only ſay that it bears not the ſmalleſt likeneſs to the reſt of the family. It is beyond compariſon the beſt piece in the volume.

MISCELLANEOUS.

On the reputed Tomb of Alexander, now in the British Museum.

TO THE EDITOR.

Sir,

NOTWITHSTANDING that almoſt all the *Reviews* have now given their judgment concerning Dr. Clarke's *Diſſertation on the reputed Tomb of Alexander*, yet they have formed it upon inſufficient evidence, and the queſtion ſeems to be ſtill in as much doubt as ever, through the many erroneous ſtatements and miſrepreſentations of all parties; for, as Dr. C. has unfaithfully ſtrained many antient teſtimonies to prove that noble monument at the Muſeum to be the real ſarcophagus of Alexander, ſo, on the other hand, thoſe who have differed from him, have equally employed ſuch unſolid arguments, as have rather involved the ſubject in more uncertainty, than rendered it clearer than before. I preſume, therefore, that it will be acceptable to your readers, and to ſuch as may viſit that curious relic of antiquity, for which the government have now aſſigned a ſum of money to preſerve it from injury, if I endeavour to ſtate in a manner free from all prejudice, either way, the real nature of what evidence exiſts concerning this fruit of our victories in Egypt.

That the Turks and Egyptians have ever reverenced this tomb, as the real one in which Alexander was interred, can admit of no doubt, the only queſtion is, whether there be any ſuch evidence extant, as may help to confirm the tradition thus received concerning it. This evidence is of two kinds, either that ancient one derivable from Greek and Roman authors, or,

from more modern oriental writers. Dr. C. has had recourſe to both, and ſo far as the teſtimony of oriental authors is concerned, they invariably confirm the oral tradition in Egypt in favour of the fact. "Nevertheleſs, as the Mahometan prieſts made advantage of this belief, it may have been an impoſition by them, they may have removed the tomb of ſome ancient Egyptian king into the incloſure, which was formerly the royal cœmetery of the Ptolomies, and converted it into a ſacred ciſtern for their ablutions, under the pretence, that it was the tomb of the founder of Alexandria; who had undoubtedly been buried ſomewhere within that incloſure, as well as the families of the Ptolomies themſelves, but of whom there is not now the leaſt veſtige remaining; they having been all totally deſtroyed by the religious zeal of the Chriſtians, on account of the idolatrous reverence paid to their bodies and ſepulchres. It is probable, however, that if liberty could be obtained to dig the ground of that incloſure, ſome inſcriptions, and other ancient relics might be ſtill diſcovered buried in the earth, and poſſibly the foundation of ſome of the tombs: but that at preſent this ſtone coffin of Alexander ſhould alone be preſerved, certainly raiſes a ſuſpicion concerning it, more eſpecially, ſince we are informed by *Niebuhr*, that the Turks have ſeveral ſuch ſtone coffins before their moſques, which they employ as ſacred ciſterns for the water of their ablutions. His words are, "The largeſt inſcription, which I ſaw in Egypt, was that upon a great coffer of black granite near the moſque *Teilun*. Pocock has already repreſented the figure of it in his 11th plate. Perry has alſo given the figure of a ſimilar coffer in his 33d plate; it is about ſeven feet long, and wider [plus large] at top than at the bottom; whence it is natural to conclude, that it has ſerved as the coffin of ſome Egyptian of rank; it is covered with hieroglyphics both within and without: it is at preſent uſed for a water-cheſt. Maillet pretends that this ſtone-cheſt has been taken out of ſome pyramid, but the ſtone-cheſt now in the pyramid is not round at the head, nor covered with any hieroglyphics. I conclude, therefore, that perſons of rank in Egypt were buried in ſuch ſumptuous cheſts. It is pretended, that the courts before moſques at Cairo contain many ſuch other cheſts covered with hieroglyphics, and which ſerve as water-cheſts. About twenty years ago, there was a cheſt which one *Oſman* had cauſed to be *dug out of the earth*, and ſent up the Nile, to be placed for the ſame purpoſe near a moſque, but it was broken in getting it out of the veſſel, and afterwards the fragments were placed round a tree to cover its roots. I copied the hieroglyphics, as preſented in my plates, 31, and others." *Tom. i. p.* 164 and 166. Now the exterior form of this coffer, here referred to, ſeems to have been a perfect parallellogram, ſo far as we can judge by the fragments in *Niebuhr*, as alſo ſeems to be that other mentioned by him before, in which reſpect they differ from the tomb of Alexander, which is rounding at the head. The hieroglyphics also of thoſe two in Niebuhr are ſome placed in horizontal lines, and ſome is perpendicular ones; the faces, moreover, of the figures repreſented, turn ſome one way, and ſome another, but in general from left to right. In theſe reſpects again they differ from the tomb at the Muſeum, in which the figures turn from right to left in general; the few which do otherwiſe ſeem to have only a variation of the ſameneſs of poſture in view, but there are three horizontal ranges of natural figures between horizontal ranges of Egyptian hieroglyphics, which does not occur in any other monument. In this reſpect then the coffers diffet greatly, for on Alexander's tomb the figures are not groteſque compounded Egyptian monſters, but natural figures of men, oxen, camels, or horſes, and many figures are in boats; it ſeems, in fact, to be

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a proceſſion, for they are not repreſented as ſtanding, as moſt of the figures are in the hieroglyphics, and in ſtrange ſtiff awkward poſtures, but both men and animals have their legs evidently in motion, as if walking in a proceſſion. What groteſque figures are inſcribed, are, moreover, in ranges by themſelves; ſo that the repreſentations are not all of a piece, but appear to be partly Egyptian and partly European: they may then repreſent the proceſſion, partly by land, and partly by water, from Memphis to Alexandria, when the body was removed. Nay, ſtill farther, at the head of the cheſt is repreſented, within a boat, a man fixed upright in the middle of three ſides of a ſquare formed around his head, which would naturally enough repreſent the body of Alexander carried in the boat, and fixed upright, juſt as Diodorus has deſcribed his body to have been fixed when carried from Babylon to Egypt; and the ſquare lines around him may repreſent the golden ſquare throne, which Diodorus mentions to have been extended behind him; for his deſcription ſeems to imply, that it was fixed behind him as a kind of *back-board*, juſt as that figure in the boat repreſents. His words are, υπο δε την υπαροφιαν παρ' ὁλον το εργον θρονος χρυσους τω σχηματι τετραγωνος. *Sub imam partem faſtigii erat thronus per totum opus aureus figurâ quadratus.* Here the throne is deſcribed as being extended *under* the *loweſt* part of the covered roof fixed over the body in the carriage; for υπαροφιαν means υπο οροφιαν *under the roof*, the Greek word being actually formed from the Scythian roof; it muſt then have been extended all *behind* the body. Still farther, Diodorus adds, *that upon the throne were traced out the heads of tragelaphi.* Now what was the animal to which the ancients gave the name *Tragelaphus?* The moderns ſeem at a loſs to determine: they pretend that it was the *chamois*, or ſome ſuch common European animal partaking of the deer and goat. But it does not ſeem probable, that ſuch common animals ſhould be figured out on ſuch an occaſion and ſituation. Diodorus mentions *tragelaphi* as being found where *Bubuli* were found, in Arabia, Æthiopia, and Lybia (lib. ii.): theſe latter were evidently Buffaloes, for Martial calls them *atroces*, and alſo ſays, that they were exhibited in the Circus at Rome along with *Biſons*, in order to fight. We know that Buffaloes are the produce of the above-mentioned wild deſerts, although they are now rendered tame in Egypt. The tragelaphus then muſt have been ſome curious kind of wild deer, of which Spaarman has ſhewn, that there are great varieties in Africa. Now, on the loweſt of the three ranges of natural figures, and not far from the middle, are repreſented two animals of the deer kind; by the height of their heads they look like camelopards, but ſuch could ſcarcely be the figures on the throne, for Diodorus mentions camelopardi as being diſtinct from tragelaphi, unleſs the hiſtorian whom Diodorus copied meant, in his deſcription by *tragelaphi*, ſome animals in general only of a *double nature*, as Diodorus deſcribes them and ſeveral others to be *duplicis formæ*, partly goats and partly deers. But however this may have been, the ſight of two ſuch noble animals of the deer kind introduced into the proceſſion, has ſomething very extraordinary in it, and not to be found among any hieroglyphics on monuments purely Egyptian. They may have been intended to exhibit the original animals, which were figured out on the golden throne behind Alexander, in order to adorn the calvalcade. The above circumſtances then ſufficiently prove, that the tomb in queſtion was not that of an ancient Egyptian king; but either the tomb of Alexander, or ſome of his ſucceſſors, the Ptolomies of European birth and manners. Diodorus mentions alſo ſeveral other animals as being traced out on other parts of the royal equipage, which were probably other uncommon oriental animals, which would have been

been very acceptable ſights in Macedonia, where the body was at firſt intended to be ſent. If ſuch perſons as have an opportunity to examine the natural figures on the tomb, with glaſſes, would communicate their obſervations to the public, ſome other particulars may poſſibly be diſcovered, which will confirm the monument to be not a mere Egyptian one by ſimilar *internal* evidence. In my next I will examine the *external* evidence of the Greeks and Romans concerning the body of Alexander, which Dr. C. has impaired by miſrepreſenting it with more zeal than accuracy; but which, if it does not confirm, yet, at leaſt, does not contradict the oriental tradition concerning this coffin. S. S.

Mr. Carr's Letter, on two Passages in his Northern Tour. TO THE EDITOR.

Sir,

UPON my return, a few days ſince, from Ireland, I had the gratification of peruſing your very liberal and handſome criticiſm on my Northern Summer, or, Travels round the Baltic; for which I am very much obliged.

In the concluſion of the Review, you obſerve that I have aſſerted that the number of proſtitutes in London is greater than that of Paris, if you will do me the honour of again referring to the book, you will find that it is *Peterſburgh*, and not Paris, and you will much oblige me by doing me the juſtice of correcting this miſtake as ſoon as you conveniently can.

You may rely upon the authenticity of the Anecdote reſpecting a prieſt of the Greek Church receiving a confeſſional bribe; I had it from unqueſtionable good authority. I hope the fair Romaniſt will not, on account of the re-aſſertion, impeach my gallantry, as ſhe has done my veracity: and that at her next confeſſion ſhe will acknowledge herſelf to have been in error. I remain, Sir, your moſt obedient ſervant,

Garden-court, Temple, Jan. 15, 1806. JNO. CARR.

POETRY.

The Rembrancers, or Stella, A Monody.

CHILD of the Brain, thou, whoſe reflecting power
Recalls each paſſage of the former hour,
Wakes in the mind bright ſcenes of raptures paſt,
Too ſtrong to be forgot, too frail to laſt,
Inhuman Memory! why ſo oft, in vain,
Have I implored thy aid with anxious pain,
Whilſt thou, averſe, refuſed thy ſuppliants prayer,
Yet now, unaſked purſueſt me every where?
Oft' at my Board, when ſpread with wholeſome fare,
A ſigh reminds me Stella is not there;
Loſt in that thought, while I my fate lament,
The cooling viands loſe their grateful ſcent:
I wake, as from a trance, and all ſurprize,
Behold the taſtleſs food before my eyes.
If I to Friendſhip's cheering circles fly,
I find thee there in ev'ry ſparkling eye;
So look'd my Charmer when her Colin ſmil'd,
And thus the flitting moment ſhe beguil'd.

If

If o'er the verdant Lawns I chance to ſtray,
In various ſhapes thou haunteſt all my way,
With tear-fraught eye and pitiable tone,
Thou ſay'ſt—why, Colin, art thou here alone?
Far other tranſports did thy boſom fill,
When Stella climb'd with thee her favorite hill;
When ev'ry bird that chirp'd among the boughs,
And ev'ry bloſſom witneſs'd to thy vows:
Nor birds, nor bloſſoms only lent an ear,
But Heaven and Stella heard thy vow ſincere.
Ye Birds, ye Bloſſoms quit the leafy ſpray,
For Heaven is wroth and Stella torn away:
No more thoſe charms like blooming Nature ſmile,
Inſpire my ſong and crown my pleaſing toil.
The glaſsy ſtream that ſilent glides along,
Like Time, unheeded by the giddy throng;
That, when its banks, in happier days, I roved,
Gave me the picture of the Fair I loved,
No more reflects each ſoul attracting grace,
But my own woe worn melancholy face.
Ye ſpringing flow'rets which adorn the green,
Perfume the air and brighten all the ſcene,
Kind Monitors, who once in paſſions aid,
Taught this fond leſſon to my lingring maid;
How ſhort is life! how frail the bloom of youth!
Too true ye ſpake for *now* I feel the truth.
If to thoſe ſacred Courts I bend my way,
Where Youth and Age their grateful tribute pay,
As through the Church-yard walk I pace along
And mix my footſteps with the ſober throng,
Each now raiſ'd mound of earth, each letter'd ſtone
Swells my ſad boſom with a plaintive groan;
But whem in ſight the holy letter ſtands,
Where faithfully we plighted hearts and hands,—
What Lover's tongue could thoſe fond tranſports ſpeak?
What Lover's heart but for their loſs muſt break?
O pardon, gracious Power, whoſe piercing eye
Can ev'ry thought in ev'ry mind deſcry,
When in Thy houſe I join the ſacred ſtrain;
If pious joy my impious grief profane
If the full heart, that would be all thy own,
Debaſe thy ſervice with its ſenſual moan!
Can I forget, ſweet Saint! what honeſt pride
I felt, when thou wert kneeling by my ſide;
Throbbing with heart felt joy, when thou wert near
My thanks were ardent, and my vows ſincere.
If from the ground my eye has chanced to ſtray
On ev'ry ſide I meet ſome pitying ray;
Whilſt each condoling glance renews my ſmart,
And plants another dagger in my heart.
Ceaſe, ceaſe, affective memory, thus to tear
A wounded breaſt with pangs too ſharp to bear!
I know thou wilt not—yet, for once be kind,
Bring all my Stella's virtues to my mind;

Her piety ſincere, her love unfeign'd,
Her ſocial kindneſs, chaſtity unſtained,
That meek deportment, which no thought betray'd
Unworthy of a pure and baſhful maid,
Thoſe thouſand decencies that ſwell delight—
All theſe were hers——all ſunk in endleſs night!
To life's laſt moment can it be forgot
A lovely Wife and Infant *were* my lot,
Oft have I *then* with raptur'd fondneſs gazed,
Now the ſweet Child, and then its Mother prais'd:
Long has the little Cherub been no more—
Now I its Angel-Mothers loſs deplore.
The vetnal Powers, in pity to my pain,
Before my eyes diſplay their genial Train;
But burſting verdure and unfolding flowers
No more can ſoothe my grief diſtracted hours;
The fluſh of Beauty and the Warblers lay
No more can make my bleeding boſom gay,
Oh! were her folding arm encloſed in mine,
Then might their charms with priſtine beauty ſhine!
Why do I rove in ſearch of loſt delight,
Whilſt each new object brings new woes in ſight?
Let me return and ſeek my lonely ſhed,
And hide in ſweet forgetfulneſs my head—
Ah! 'tis in vain—for there my thoughts review
The happieſt hours affection ever knew.
Where are thoſe eyes which more than words could prove
The ſofteſt feelings of the pureſt love?
Where is that tongue that could at once impart
Kindneſs and Prudence to my aching heart?
Where are thoſe lips that Hyblas' ſweets diſtil,
And all my ſoul with balmy raptures fill?
Where is that radiant form that ſhone around,
And made my humble dwelling fairy ground?
Thoſe moments where ſo tranquil and ſo bright,
When Love could revel in ſupreme delight,
And from intruſion free and guileful art,
Ope' all the tender ſluices of the heart?
All, all are paſt and like the ruſhing wind,
Leave only Ruin, Wrecks, and Deaths behind!
Come gentle ſleep, for thou canſt ſoothe my care,
And ſtill the raging paſſions of Deſpair:
Wrap my wild ſenſes in thy ſilken veſt,
And with thy poppies calm my tortur'd breaſt.
He comes, he comes, and with him brings along
The ſhin'ing ſubject of this mournful ſong.
I feel her potent charms through all my frame
The vivid ſpirits kindle into flame;
Mad tumults ſeize on ev'ry vital part?
I fly and graſp her to my trembling heart—
Where haſt thou been, dear ſource of all my pain?
O'! never, never let us part again!
Extatic joys the Morphean chains uncloſe,
And wake my ſoul to agravated woes.

SIMPLEX.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

IT was our full intention to take a view of the political ſtate of Europe, and to preſix it to the Appendix to the laſt volume of our work, as a kind of Hiſtorical Preface; but various circumſtances, not neceſſary to enumerate, have combined to induce us to poſtpone the execution of our deſign, for, at leaſt, another month. Indeed, all, at preſent, is ſpeculation and conjecture: the few hiſtorical facts that are known afford ground for little elſe. The times, in truth, appear to be ſtrangely out of joint; and ſurely the lapſe of a month is little enough to reſtore them to ſomething like a ſtate of regularity—to ſuch a ſtate as may enable the hiſtorian of paſſing events to form ſome *probable* eſtimate of the preſent ſituation of the political world, and of the conſequences which may be likely to reſult from it.—Amidſt the aweful, and *ominous* occurrences of the day, that which preſſes foremoſt on the mind of every true-born Briton, is the *death* of WILLIAM PITT. Such is the impreſſion which this dreadful event has had on our minds, that (we are not aſhamed to acknowledge the fact, much as, we know, it will expoſe us to the unfeeling ridicule of thoſe in whom *party ſpirit*, and low *ſelfiſhness*, riſe predominant over every generous impulſe of patriotiſm), we feel ourſelves, not only incapacitated from entering upon thoſe ſerious and ſolemn diſcuſſions which exiſting circumſtances ſo imperatively call for from every public writer; but even from paying a tribute of juſtice to the object of our lamentations. Thoſe diſcuſſions, then, and that tribute muſt be reſerved for a future day, when the mind, relieved from the weight which now preſſes upon it with irreſiſtible force, ſhall have recovered its native elaſticity. This is not the language of affectation—the tearful eye, the burſting heart, too ſtrongly atteſt its ſincerity and truth.

"Quis deſiderio ſit pudor aut modus,
Tam cari capitis?"

If we be not egregiouſly miſtaken, the day is not far diſtant, when the want of the knowledge, the talents, the integrity, the vaſt and capacious mind, the generous, the diſintereſted heart, of this moſt able and moſt upright Stateſman, will be ſeverely felt and univerſally acknowledged. With him, his *country* was ever the *firſt* object, *ſelf* the *laſt*. Fallible, as *man* muſt, of neceſſity, be, he might be ſometimes miſtaken in the *means* of promoting the intereſts of his country; but every meaſure of his political life had, unqueſtionably, thoſe intereſts for its end. However party might miſrepreſent, however malice might pervert, however perſonal enmity might diſguiſe, his conduct and his motives; we defy the ingenuity of either to ſupply, from the annals of Europe, any ſtateſman, ſince the days of Sully, ſo perfectly ſuperior to every ſelfiſh feeling, or who ſo chearfully and ſo uniformly ſacrificed private intereſt to public good: His political wiſdom was pre-eminently great; though, in eſtimating it by its effects, regard ſhould ever be paid to the critical circumſtances of the times in which he lived, and to the neceſſity which exiſted for the occaſional ſurrender of his own opinions, to the prejudices of the public, to the ſentiments of his aſſociates in power, or to other paramount influence which he either could not, or ought not to, controul. His oratorical powers were, as has been truly obſerved, *ſui generis*; like the profeſſional genius of Nelſon, they ever roſe, in ſplen-

dour

dour and effect, to a level with the occaſion that called for their diſplay. He combined the elegance of Tully, with the energy of Demoſthenes. Had his ſpeeches been literally reported, the moſt chaſte, correct, and claſſical writer of the age could, with difficulty, have found a ſingle paſſage, the alterations of which would have given additional grace to the ſtyle, greater effect to the thought, or ſuperior dignity to the ſubject. His eloquence was ſpontaneous; always great, it ſhone with peculiar, with unequalled ſplendour, in a reply, which precluded the poſſibility of previous ſtudy; while it faſcinated the imagination by the brilliancy of language, it convinced the judgment by the force of argument; like an impetuous torrent, it bore down all reſiſtance; it extorted the admiration even of thoſe who moſt ſeverely felt its ſtrength, and who moſt earneſtly deprecated its effect. In a word, if ever there exiſted a man of SPOTLESS INTEGRITY, that man was WILLIAM PITT. In private life he was rigidly juſt, and ſtrictly moral. And as his virtues were greater, ſo were his failings leſs, than fall to the lot of moſt men. The good and the honourable, amongſt his contemporaries will admire, poſterity will appreciate, hiſtory will record, his merits. As he lived reſpected, ſo has he died lamented, by all who knew his private worth, and who felt the value of his public ſervices. Had the Roman Bard been intimate with this illuſtrious man, he could not have drawn a more faithful picture of his public character than is exhibited in the following lines:

"Juſtum, et tenacem propoſiti virum,
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus inſtantis tyranni
Mente quatit ſolidâ."

Nor yet a truer repreſentation of his private character than is contained in this one verſe:

"Integer vitæ, ſceleriſque purus."

By whom the vacant place which the death of Mr. Pitt has made in the Cabinet will be ſupplied, is yet a matter of uncertainty. Nor is it eaſy to eſtimate what courſe or turn our leading ſtateſmen will take in the preſent moſt extraordinary ſtate of political parties. It would be idle to indulge in ſpeculations on this ſubject; or even to offer an opinion until the choice of the Sovereign, in whoſe hands the laws have wiſely veſted the ſelection of his own miniſters, ſhall be known. Whatever that choice may be, it is the duty of the ſubject to reſpect it;—The royal prerogative is an eſſential part of the Britiſh Conſtitution, and its exercise is not to be queſtioned on light or trivial grounds. Whoever his Majeſty may be pleaſed to call to the direction of his councils, we ſhall judge them by their *meaſures* alone; if thoſe are calculated to maintain the honour of the Crown unſullied, the intereſts of the country unimpaired, they ſhall have our honeſt ſupport; but if theſe primary objects ſhould be diſregarded, *quod Deus avertat!* our remonſtrances ſhall be firm, though reſpectful, and, true to the principles which we have invariably ſupported, ſhould it ever be poſſible that our ſenſe of allegiance could be oppoſed to them, we will throw aſide the pen, and illuſtrate, by our conduct, the unjuſtly-reproved, becauſe groſsly-miſunderſtood, doctrine of *paſſive obedience to legitimate authority.*

Dreadful, indeed, and not leſs ſudden and unexpected than dreadful, is the change which has taken place in the aſpect of public affairs on the Continent of Europe, ſince the laſt month. Aſſuming the favourable accounts,

counts, received from Berlin, and from various parts of Germany, of the operations of the allied armies, subsequent to their partial defeat, in the plains of Moravia, on the 2d of December, to be *substantially true*, we drew from thence a flattering picture of the situation of the powers combined to repel the aggressive conduct of the Corsican Usurper. We take no shame to ourselves for having given credit to accounts the truth of which there seemed to be no reason to doubt; and certainly the deductions which we drew from such premises were perfectly just, and, indeed, such as subsequent intelligence of the respective force and situations of the different armies has fully justified. It was no more possible for us to foresee what we must consider as the *pusillanimous* conduct of the Emperor of Austria, than the previous imbecillity and treachery of his favourite General Mack. As far as we are yet able to form a judgment, from the information transmitted from the Continent, there existed not the smallest necessity for the most unaccountable and most unexpected conclusion of a truce, by which Francis the Second signed the death-warrant of his house's glory, and laid his throne, his territory, his political existence, at the feet of Napoleone Buonaparté. That he should have consented to such a truce at all, is matter of extreme surprize; but that he should have signed it without the participation or knowledge of that faithful and magnanimous ally, who had fought his battles for him, who had exerted all the resources of his kingdom, and who had even exposed his own life, in his service, is a fact which future ages will scarcely credit, and which it would be vain in us to attempt to characterize. We may hereafter take a survey of the state of Europe, as established by the peace of Presburgh, when the ultimate arrangements, consequent on that event, shall have been carried into effect. For the present, suffice it to say that Buonaparté has atchieved, what the House of Bourbon had, for more than a century, endeavoured to promote;—not only the humiliation, but the downfall, of the House of Austria. It is not merely the loss of territory which has produced this effect; but that spirit which could alone support its honour and independence, that spirit which erst animated the truly royal Theresa, when she fled from her capital, then in the hands of the French, to her faithful magnates and gallant people of Huguary—that spirit is gone, and the vital principle of the Imperial dignity is extinct. The Hungarians, on the occasion alluded to, most pertinently addressed their justly beloved Empress in these words: *Regi* nostro Mariæ Theresæ;—were Francis the Second to seek for refuge among them, now, might they not, with equal propriety, address him, *Reginæ* nostræ Franciscæ Secundæ?

On Prussia we have never reposed the smallest reliance; we have repeatedly warned her that if she should persist in her crooked and selfish policy, the only reward she would reap for her unworthy conduct, would be the satisfaction of being the *last* devoured. She may possibly escape for the present; but her fate, if we mistake not, is not far distant. We observed, in our last, that "if the allied powers suffer the present opportunity to escape them for the accomplishment of this desireable purpose, (the establishment of the security of Europe) long, very long, it may be, ere it will return; and possibly it may *never* return." Prussia and Austria *have* suffered it to escape, and they must abide by the consequences of their own neglect. Fatal, alas! will these consequences prove! The whole Continent of Europe, (Russia only excepted) lies prostrate at the feet of Buonaparté; and dreadful indeed must be the state of those countries which are indebted for

their

their ſafety ſolely to the tender mercies of ſuch a conqueror. This Corſican upſtart has done ſtill more; he has completed the degradation of the regal dignity; if any thing indeed were wanting to its completion after the aſſumption of that dignity by himſelf—by making it the reward of the moſt deteſtable treachery that ever diſgraced the conduct of man! But we turn with diſguſt from the contemplation of ſuch objects!

There can be no doubt, that having attained his object on the Continent, (for ere this, probably, the kingdom of Naples is annihilated, and the territory annexed to the *iron* crown of Italy) this reſtleſs and ambitious Uſurper will direct his undivided vengeance againſt this country. We have certainly the ability to baffle his utmoſt efforts, and even to render his maritime power as contemptible as his military power is formidable. But for either of theſe purpoſes, *union* (*unanimity* it would be abſurd to expect in the preſent ſtate of ſociety) will be neceſſary. Let men of all parties unite their talents for the defence of their country, and for the defeat of its enemies, and, (under Providence) our triumph will be certain and complete. But if our councils are to be diſtracted, our energy palſied, our efforts rendered impotent, by diviſions among ourſelves, we ſhall not only experience the ſame diſgrace which the Continent has ſuſtained, but we muſt prepare ourſelves for calamities, infinitely more ruinous and deſtructive, than any which have been inflicted on the other enemies of France; calamities proportioned to the magnitude of our own efforts, and to the malignity of her hatred. *They* have been only perſecuted, but, if we fail in the conteſt, annihilation, as a ſtate, will be our certain lot.

Jan. 27, 1806.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

IN reply to Mr. Marſh's vindication of himſelf, the writer of the critique to which he alludes is bound to declare, that he has not the ſlighteſt perſonal knowledge of the Rector of Long Critchill with More Critchill annexed—that the criticiſm was ſuggeſted by the peruſal of his pamphlet, which is as redundant in words as it is defective in argument. The writer of that article recommends it to Mr. Marſh, not merely to let Mr. Sturt "be welcome to a reaſonable ſhare of the profits," but to give him a LIBERAL ſhare, calculating from the time he expected to have been in poſſeſſion of the living. If Mr. Marſh has no other preferment in the dioceſe of Briſtol than the Rectory he now holds, he muſt be aware that upon his reſignation, which, it is to be hoped, will not, under any frivolous pretences, or trifling objections, be delayed, he cannot give induction to his ſucceſſor, as every clergyman who inducts another into a benefice, muſt himſelf be, if not an incumbent, at the leaſt a licenſed curate.

We hope to have now ſatisfied Mr. Marſh: here we cloſe our correſpondence.

M. A.'s offer is thankfully accepted.

Z, is requeſted to be explicit; as we are totally at a loſs to underſtand the particular object of his expoſtulation.

[The Appendix to Vol. XXII. of this Work was publiſhed on the 1ſt of February. It contains as uſual, a Review of Foreign Literature, an Index to the Volume, and various communications from our Correſpondents.]